Global Climate Policy Beyond Nation-State Actors by Hagen, Achim
Global Climate Policy Beyond
Nation-State Actors
An Economic Analysis of Environmental Cooperation
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
eingereicht an der Lebenswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
von
M.A. Achim Hagen
Präsidentin der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin:
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Dr. Sabine Kunst
Dekan der Lebenswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin:
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Grimm
Gutachter:
1. Prof. Dr. Klaus Eisenack
2. Dr. Hans-Peter Weikard
3. Prof. Dr. Matthias Kalkuhl
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 22.10.2018
ii ii
iii
Zusammenfassung
Internationale Kooperation zur Vermeidung von gefährlichem anthropogenen 
Klimawandel erweist sich als sehr komplex. Viele Schwierigkeiten, ein verbindliches 
internationales Abkommen mit ausreichenden Reduktionszielen zu erreichen, sind au-
genscheinlich und werden in bestehender ökonomischer Literatur ausführlich diskutiert. Es 
entstehen allerdings stetig neue Ansätze und Ideen um Klimakooperation zu fördern. Diese 
Arbeit untersucht neue Wege der internationalen Klimakooperation und erweitert den Horizont 
der spieltheoretischen Forschung zu internationalen Umweltabkommen um Ansätze aus 
der Global Governance, politischen Ökonomie und Außenhandelspolitik. Zudem wird 
die Übertragbarkeit spieltheoretischer Erkenntnisse aus der Forschung zum Klimaschutz für 
die transnationale Klimaanpassung diskutiert.
Die Arbeit fundiert in großen Teilen auf analytisch-spieltheoretischer Modellierung. In 
der zu Grunde liegenden Spielstruktur entscheiden Länder anfangs, ob sie einer internationalen 
Koalition beitreten oder nicht. Anschließend wählen die Koalitionsmitglieder ihr Emission-
sniveau in einem Spiel zwischen der Koalition und den Nichmitgliedern.
In diesem Analyserahmen wird die Option mehrerer gleichzeitig parallel existierender 
Klimaklubs auf ihr Potenzial zur Verbesserung der Zusammenarbeit und Emissionsminderung 
untersucht. Darüber hinaus wird der Einfluss v on p olitischen I nteressengruppen (Lobbys), 
die die Interessen von Industrie und Umweltverbänden vertreten, auf die Stabilität interna-
tionaler Umweltabkommen analysiert. Dies geschieht durch eine politökonomische Ergän-
zung des Grundmodells. Die Eignung von Handelssanktionen als Mittel zur Förderung der 
internationalen Kooperation für den Klimaschutz wird ebenfalls in einem analytischen Mod-
ell untersucht und die Auswirkungen dieser Maßnahmen anschließend in einem angewandten 
allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell quantifiziert.
Die Erkenntnisse der Arbeit zeigen, dass eine Vielzahl von Akteuren und Koali-
tionsstrukturen eine wichtige Rolle in der Klimakooperation spielen und die Wirksamkeit 
von Klimapolitik verbessern können. Es zeigt sich, dass das Potenzial multipler Koalitionen 
entscheidend von den Charakteristika der Nutzen- und Schadensfunktionen der Länder für 
Treibhausgasemissionen abhängt. Wenngleich die Existenz mehrerer paralleler Koalitionen die 
Kooperation nicht immer verbessert, ist sie dem Klimaschutz nicht abträglich. Klimaklubs 
sollten daher als ein möglicherweise vielversprechender Weg für internationale Klimapolitik 
betrachtet werden.
Weiterhin zeigt die Arbeit, dass sich Lobbyeinflüsse sowohl auf Emissionsreduktionen 
als auch auf die Koalitionsstabilität von Klimaabkommen auswirken. Lobbyaktivitäten, sowohl 
von Industrie als auch Umweltverbänden, können unter bestimmten Bedingungen die interna-
tionalen Ambitionen zum Beitritt zu einem Klimaabkommen fördern. Der Einfluss von Lob-
iv
byismus sollte somit weder bei der theoretischen Analyse, noch bei der Politikgestaltung zu
Klimakooperation vernachlässigt werden.
Während frühere Forschungsarbeiten zum Einfluss von Handelssanktionen auf Kli-
makoalitionen die Möglichkeit von Vergeltungsmaßnahmen betroffener Länder außerhalb der
Klimakoalition vernachlässigen, wird diese in der vorliegenden Arbeit berücksichtigt. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass diese Option in strategischen überlegungen von entscheidender Bedeu-
tung sein kann. Wenn Nichtmitglieder Vergeltungsmaßnahmen beschließen können, ergibt
sich ein Schwelleneffekt: Ab einer bestimmten Koalitionsgröße ergibt sich eine stabilisierende
Wirkung von Handelssanktionen, die größere Koalitionen ermöglicht. In Koalitionen unterhalb
dieser Koalitionsgröße überwiegt hingegen der destabilisierende Effekt von Vergeltungsmaß-
nahmen. Handelssanktionen als wirksame Maßnahme zur Stabilisierung der Klimakoalitionen
sind daher wenig attraktiv, wenn Vergeltungsmaßnahmen berücksichtigt werden. Nur wenn
sich bereits große Koalitionen gebildet haben, die mehr als die Hälfte des weltweiten Bruttoin-
landsproduktes ausmachen, können sie zur Bildung einer globalen Klimakoalition beitragen.
Dies ist eine wichtige Erkenntnis für die internationale Klimapolitik, die sich derzeit im Kon-
text eines zunehmenden Risikos von Handelskonflikten abspielt. Wenn eine Klimakoalition von
zu geringer Größe versucht, Außenseiterstaaten zum Beitritt zu zwingen und diese mit Vergel-
tungsmaßnahmen reagieren, kann dies bereits bestehende Koalitionen destabilisieren.
Eine Einordnung wichtiger Ergebnisse aus der spieltheoretischen Forschung zu inter-
nationalen Klimaschutzabkommen in den Kontext der transnationalen Klimaanpassung zeigt
schließlich, dass diese dazu beitragen können, Lösungen für Probleme über den Klimaschutz
hinaus zu finden.
In einem sich verändernden globalen Klimaregime ist die Suche nach neuen Wegen der
Kooperation für eine effektive Klimapolitik von entscheidender Bedeutung. Die Erkenntnisse
dieser Arbeit zeigen, dass es sinnvoll ist, den Spielraum der bestehenden spieltheoretischen
Forschung zu erweitern. Dies kann dazu beitragen, tragfähige Optionen für verbesserte Koop-
eration zu finden. Für die Klimapolitik sind neue strategische überlegungen jenseits national-
staatlicher Akteure von zunehmender Wichtigkeit und die konomische Forschung sollte darauf
vorbereitet sein, strategische Empfehlungen zu entsprechenden Politiken zu erarbeiten.
vSummary
International cooperation to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change has proven 
to be very hard to achieve. The difficulties t o r each a  b inding i nternational a greement with 
sufficient r eduction t argets a re evident a nd e xtensively d iscussed i n t he e conomic literature. 
Nevertheless, new ideas towards cooperation are evolving. This thesis offers an exploration 
of new avenues to international climate cooperation, widening the scope of game theoretic 
research on international environmental agreements towards global governance literature, polit-
ical economy and trade. It also extends the potential applicability of the findings from the game 
theoretic literature on international environmental agreements for climate change mitigation as 
it discusses potential insights for cases of transnational climate adaptation.
The analysis is based on analytical theoretical modelling, using a game theoretical model 
in which countries first choose between joining and not joining an international coalition. Then 
the coalition members choose their level of emissions cooperatively in a game between the 
coalition and the outsiders.
It includes the possibility of multiple parallel climate clubs, focusing on their potential 
to enhance cooperation and emissions abatement. Further, the influence of political pressure 
groups (lobbies) that represent the interests of the industry and environmentalists on the stability 
of international environmental agreements is examined. This is done by augmenting the basic 
model of international environmental agreements with a politico-economic model of political 
contributions. The potential of trade sanctions to induce international cooperation for climate 
protection is assessed in an analytical model and the effects of these trade measures are then 
quantified in a static multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model of global 
trade and energy.
The insights of this thesis indicate that a variety of actors and coalitional structures can 
play an important role for climate cooperation and improve the effectiveness of climate policies. 
It is shown that the potential of multiple coalitions crucially depends on the characteristics of 
the countries' benefit- and damage functions of greenhouse gas emissions. Although admit-ting 
multiple coalitions does not always improve cooperation, they are not detrimental. Climate 
clubs should, therefore, be considered as a potentially promising avenue for international cli-
mate policies.
Lobby contributions turn out to have an important effect on both emissions reductions 
and coalition stability, with the latter being often not straightforward, depending on the com-
position of asymmetric countries in an international environmental agreement. Lobby activit-
ies from both industry and environmentalists can facilitate international cooperation to abate 
emissions. This implies that lobbyism should not be neglected in considerations about climate 
cooperation, neither in policy-making nor in the theoretical analysis.
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In contrast to previous work on the influence of trade sanctions on climate coalitions,
this thesis considers the possibility of retaliation by targeted countries outside the coalition. The
results indicate that this option is crucial in strategic considerations. If outsiders can retaliate, a
threshold effect of trade sanctions emerges: Above a certain coalition size, a stabilizing effect
from trade sanctions enables larger coalitions whereas in coalitions below that coalition size the
effect of retaliatory trade measures predominates and destabilizes the coalition. Trade sanctions
as an effective stick to stabilize climate coalitions are therefore less attractive if the possibility
of retaliation is taken into account. Only if substantial coalitions of countries that cover more
than half of the global GDP have already formed they may help to establish the grand coalition.
This is an important finding for international policy-making that currently has to deal with
an increasing risk of trade wars with the involvement of the US as an outsider of the climate
coalition. If a climate coalition of insufficient size tries to force outsider countries to join and
these react with retaliatory measures, this can destabilize existing coalitions or even destroy
cooperation.
Finally, with a contextualisation and discussion of the results this thesis shows that in-
sights from the game theoretic literature on international environmental agreements for climate
change mitigation can help to find solutions to problems beyond the realm of climate mitigation,
such as the example of transnational adaptation.
In a changing global climate regime, the search for new avenues of cooperation is crucial
for effective climate policies. The results imply that it is worthwhile to broaden the scope of the
game theoretic analysis as this may indeed help to find viable options to increase cooperation.
Climate policies increasingly consider new strategies beyond nation-state actors and economics
should be prepared to provide strategical advice.
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1 | Introduction
Tackling climate change poses one of the most difficult challenges for society worldwide. An-
thropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased with economic and population
growth such that the current atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and ni-
trous oxide are at a level that is unprecedented in the last 800,000 years (Pachauri et al., 2014).
To keep "[. . . ] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2◦C above pre-
industrial levels [. . . ]" (UNFCCC, 2015) will require significant efforts (Pachauri et al., 2014).
Although for many years political efforts have been made to reach a global treaty that leads
to effective commitments by nation states, global GHG emission reductions are still far from
sufficient to achieve this goal (Climate Analytics et al., 2018; Janssens-Maenhout et al., 2017).
From an economic perspective, this can be explained by the fact that climate change mitiga-
tion efforts are contributions to a public good which implies that strong free-rider incentives
exist. For over two decades, a game theoretic strand of economic literature evolved, that ana-
lyzes the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) as a means to facilitate
contribution to a global public good. This literature mostly focuses on welfare maximizing
nation states, depicting individual countries as monolithic players in a game theoretic setting
that analyzes the formation of a single IEA for the abatement of GHG emissions (Finus, 2001;
Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri, 2016). In parallel, the governance literature has reported on
more diverse approaches towards transnational environmental governance and cooperation (e.g.
Biermann et al., 2009; Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013) but has not analyzed the strategic
inter-dependencies that occur in such arrangements from a game theoretic economic angle.
This thesis explores new approaches towards climate cooperation from an economic
perspective. This chapter will set the stage by providing information on anthropogenic climate
change and its economic effects, introducing the public good characteristics of climate change
mitigation and the resulting need for cooperation. It gives a short overview of climate agree-
ments and the economic literature on IEAs and presents the specific research objectives and
methodology of the following chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 2, the scope and limits of the
economic literature on IEAs are discussed further and an overview of transnational approaches
in the global governance literature is presented. In addition, Chapter 2 introduces two proposals
for economic models to analyze climate clubs and city alliances and puts them into context.
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Chapter 3 then takes up on the idea of multiple parallel climate clubs and analyzes their po-
tential for cooperation and emissions abatement in a game theoretic model. In the following
Chapter 4 the influence of political pressure groups (lobbies) that represent the interests of the
industry and environmentalists on the stability of IEAs is examined. Chapter 5 widens the scope
of the analysis and includes the trade regime by assessing the potential of trade sanctions to in-
duce international cooperation for climate protection. The insights of the previous chapters that
are focused on the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions are evaluated with regard to their
potential for transnational adaptation actions in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the
results and implications of all chapters and concludes with a discussion of limitations of the
presented research and an outlook on promising ways of further research.
1.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change and its Economic Effects
Since the industrial revolution the global economy has grown and increased its GHG
emissions rapidly to a current level unprecedented in history. As a consequence, the concentra-
tion of the GHGs carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide in the atmosphere have reached a
level that is the highest in at least the last 800,000 years (Pachauri et al., 2014). By altering the
earth’s energy budget through increasing energy uptake of the climate system, cumulative GHG
emissions contribute to rises in the average atmospheric temperature. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment finds that since the 1950s the atmosphere as well
as the oceans have successively become warmer, global amounts of snow and ice in glaciers
and ice sheets have decreased and the sea level has risen. But also temperature and precipit-
ation extreme events have increased. These trends will continue in the future with increasing
GHG emissions resulting in rising surface temperature, more frequent and longer lasting heat
waves as well as more intense and frequent precipitation events in many regions of the world
(Pachauri et al., 2014). These changes in the global climate will have severe impacts on people
worldwide as they threaten basic elements of life. The widespread effects include increasing
flood risks, reduced dry-season water supply, declining crop yields, ocean acidification that will
affect marine ecosystems and fish stocks, rising sea levels, malnutrition and heat stress and in-
creased vulnerability of ecosystems (Stern, 2007). These consequences of climate change are
very diverse and unevenly distributed, with low income countries that contribute least to global
GHG emissions being most vulnerable (Tol, 2009). To limit these risks from climate change,
substantial reductions in GHG emissions to limit climate change are required as well as ad-
aptation measures (Pachauri et al., 2014). Assessing the costs and benefits of climate change
mitigation Stern (2007) finds that although the stabilization of the climate causes significant
costs, delaying it would be considerably more costly and dangerous.
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1.2 Why We Need Climate Cooperation
Although scientific evidence indicates clearly that there is a need for the abatement of
GHG emissions (see previous Section) we see that global efforts to limit climate change are
fare from being sufficient. The fact, that it is impossible to exclude anyone from the benefits
of climate change mitigation and that the "consumption" of reduced climate damages does not
preclude others from enjoying these benefits makes the abatement of GHGs a global public
good. Economic theory clearly predicts that in such a case of a desirable public good, private
provision leads to an insufficient level of supply (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In terms of climate
change this means that if countries act unilaterally, global emissions reductions will be far
below the social optimum. Following Samuelson (1954), this optimal supply of a public good
is characterized by the condition that the sum of the marginal benefits from the public good
equals the marginal cost of its provision. As a consequence, the supply of public goods in a
given economy is usually seen as a task of the government (Perman et al., 2003). However,
regarding climate change, there is in fact no global government that could enforce sufficient
contributions of GHG abatement from the countries. Without cooperation and coordination
between countries’ governments, it will be impossible to mitigate severe anthropogenic climate
change.
1.3 Climate Agreements and the Economic Literature on
IEAs
Since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Confer-
ence) in 1972 a large number of IEAs has been signed. The Toronto Conference in 1988, where
the first CO2 emission targets were set marked one of the first important milestones shortly
before the IPCC was established in the same year (Perman et al., 2003). In 1992 the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signature and
entered into force in 1994. Its ultimate goal is the "[. . . ] stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system"(UNFCCC, 1992). In the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change that was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2005
concrete GHG emission targets and a timetable for their attainment were set (UNFCCC, 1998).
However, some of the biggest GHG emitters like China and India were not required to commit
to the abatement targets which was a crucial weakness of the protocol and other countries, like
the US, did not ratify (Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri, 2016). Most recently, the Paris Agree-
ment 2015 sets the goal of keeping the global temperature rise below 2◦C or even 1,5◦C but
does not force countries to specific targets and dates (UNFCCC, 2015). So far, the country
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Figure 1.1: Emissions and expected warming based on pledges and current policies, source: Climate
Analytics et al. (2018).
pledges of GHG emissions abatement fall short of achieving this goal (Climate Analytics et al.,
2018) and the agreement does not include a binding enforcement mechanism (Marrouch and
Ray Chaudhuri, 2016; UNFCCC, 2015).
Figure 1.1 shows that current policies exceed the pledged emission abatement targets
and would lead to a projected temperature increase of 3,1-3,7◦C (as of November 2017) and the
US Trump administration decided to withdraw from the agreement. So far, the outcomes of the
international climate negotiations are in line with the rather pessimistic economic predictions
about insufficient contributions to a global public good and do not really manage to tackle the
problem.
The urgency of the problem and the difficulty to find solutions has sparked an immense
research interest in the formation of IEAs in economics and governance research as well as in
other disciplines. Beginning in the early 1990s with seminal papers by Hoel (1992a); Carraro
and Siniscalco (1993); Barrett (1994) the game theoretic economic strand of literature focuses
on the formation and stability of self-enforcing IEAs. As an important result already early con-
tributions found that self-enforcing IEAs for the contribution to a public good will be either
broad but shallow or deep but small or, in other words, they do not bring substantial improve-
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ments over the non-cooperative outcome (Barrett, 1994; Finus and McGinty, 2015). In light
of these findings the observable lack of effective international cooperation for climate change
mitigation on the international arena is not surprising. Since then, the literature has taken into
account several approaches that might be promising to overcome these problems. Amongst
others, side-payments, issue-linkage, alternative coalition structures and different membership
rules have been put into focus (Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri, 2016). The role of the trade
regime and the political economy have recently gained increasing attention as important levers
for international cooperation (Wangler et al., 2013; Lessmann et al., 2009; Nordhaus, 2015).
But the game theoretical literature is not the only field of research that deals with the challenge
of climate cooperation. In analyzing climate change as a collective action problem (Cole, 2008)
the Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom supports the idea of complementing global efforts with small-
to medium scale climate governance. The fact that costs and (co-)benefits of climate action
occur at multiple scales motivates her call for a polycentric system of climate governance that
includes a multiplicity of public and private actors (Ostrom, 2009, 2012). Such a system com-
prises efforts like city alliances (Cities Climate Leadership Group, 2018), multiple sub-global
climate coalitions called climate clubs (Widerberg and Stenson, 2013; Falkner, 2015). However,
these important advances to tackle climate change are only sparsely analyzed in game theoretic
literature so far. This thesis addresses this research gap.
1.4 Research Objectives and Methodology
The main research objective of this thesis is to offer an exploration of new avenues to in-
ternational climate cooperation, widening the scope of game theoretic research on IEAs towards
global governance literature, political economy and trade. Further, it also extends the potential
applicability of the findings from the game theoretic IEA literature as it discusses potential
insights for cases of transnational climate adaptation. The following main five Chapters 2-
6 approach this aim from different angles before Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings
and presents conclusions. The following subsections provide a short overview of the main
Chapters 2-6 including research objectives and applied methods of the chapters.
1.4.1 Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Act-
ors
This chapter serves as a more extensive introduction to the research area of the thesis.
It focuses on climate cooperation between different heterogeneous actors, in the course of the
chapter called transnational environmental agreements, as complements to the UNFCCC pro-
cess. The scope and limits of the current economic literature on IEAs are discussed more
extensively than in the previous general introduction to the thesis. An overview of relevant
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publications in the global governance literature and empirical observations transnational envir-
onmental agreements helps to transfer new insights and ideas to the game theoretic analysis.
These include the consideration of (i) actors that are not nation state governments, and (ii) mul-
tiple environmental agreements. Two proposals for game theoretic models that analyze climate
clubs and city alliances are made. These illustrative simple models extend standard game the-
oretic models of IEAs (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994). The results show that
transnational environmental agreements can be individually rational and can improve effective-
ness of climate policies. This chapter is joint work with Leonhard Kähler and Klaus Eisenack
and published as Hagen et al. (2017).
1.4.2 Climate Clubs vs. Single Coalitions: The Ambition of IEAs
Following and expanding the proposed model structure of the previous Chapter 2, the
idea of climate clubs as multiple parallel environmental agreements is investigated in more
depth in this chapter. It examines whether global cooperation on emissions abatement can be
improved if asymmetric countries are allowed to sign one out of several parallel environmental
agreements. Additionally the assumption that countries are symmetric, which is often made
in the IEA literature, is relaxed. The analysis is based on a two-stage game theoretical model
that allows for multiple coalitions with multiple types of countries. The chapter considers two
different possible cases for both the benefits and the damages from emissions: constant and
decreasing marginal benefits from emissions and constant and increasing marginal damages
from emissions. For all four possible combinations of these benefit and damage functions the
potential of multiple agreements to increase global emissions abatement above the outcome
with one IEA is assessed and conditions for stable coalitions and the resulting global emissions
are determined. The results indicate that the potential of multiple coalitions crucially depend
on the characteristics of benefit- and damage functions. In the case of decreasing marginal
benefits and constant marginal damages, admitting multiple coalitions increases the number
of cooperating countries and reduces emissions compared to the standard case with a single
coalition. In contrast, with increasing marginal damages and constant marginal benefits, global
emissions are independent of the number of coalitions admitted. If both damages and benefits
are non-linear, admitting multiple coalitions can decrease global emissions. The chapter thus
contributes to the emerging discussion on the scope and limits of climate clubs. This chapter is
joint work with Klaus Eisenack and based on Hagen and Eisenack (2015).
1.4.3 The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of IEAs
Another important new avenue in the theoretical analysis of IEAs focuses on the political
economy and its effects on coalition formation (Wangler et al., 2013). Chapter 4 contributes to
this as it examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on emissions of individual
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countries and on the stability of IEAs to reduce emissions. In contrast to most of the exist-
ing literature on IEAs the chapter does not assume that governments are independent welfare
maximizing actors but accounts for the influence of lobby groups on the decision of the govern-
ments. In the chapter, two types of lobbies are considered, industry and environmentalists, and
asymmetric countries differ in lobby strengths. In the model, lobby-groups in countries that do
not join the IEA only have an impact on the emissions abatement of the lobby’s host country. By
contrast lobby activities in signatory countries have spillover effects on the abatement decisions
of other member countries. As lobby strength impacts abatement, it will, in turn, impact the
incentives to participate in the agreement. The results of this chapter show that lobby activities
from both lobby groups, industry and environmentalists, can facilitate international cooperation
to abate transboundary pollution. This, however, depends on the distribution of lobby activities
across countries. This chapter is joint work with Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera and Hans-
Peter Weikard and based on Hagen et al. (2016).
1.4.4 Boon or Bane? Trade Sanctions and the Stability of IEAs
This chapter provides insights into the potential of fostering international climate co-
operation by linking IEAs with the trade regime. The search for new means to support coopera-
tion is of even higher importance than before since the decision of the US Trump administration
to withdraw from the Paris agreement has further hampered the efforts to find cooperative solu-
tions on the international level. Trade sanctions in the form of import tariffs are one principal
measure discussed as such a means to push cooperation. Former studies have concluded that
import tariffs are an effective mechanism to establish international cooperation (Lessmann et al.,
2009; Nordhaus, 2015). However, most of these studies rely on the assumption that countries
that do not join the IEA are not able to retaliate, i.e. to implement import tariffs themselves.
In this chapter, a combination of analytical and numerical analysis is used to investigate im-
plications of retaliation. While trade sanctions that members of an IEA put into place against
outsiders stabilize the IEA, retaliatory trade measures from outsiders that target IEA members
have a destabilizing effect so that the introduction of trade sanctions together with retaliatory
measures has ambiguous effects. The results indicate that a threshold effect exists: below a
certain coalition size the effect of retaliation predominates and decreases incentives to be a co-
alition member. In coalitions above the threshold size the effect of trade sanctions that stabilizes
coalitions dominates and enables the formation of larger stable coalitions. The analysis suggests
that only after a sufficiently large climate coalition has already been formed, the threat of trade
sanctions might be an effective stick to establish the grand coalition. This chapter is joint work
with Jan Schneider and based on Hagen and Schneider (2017).
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1.4.5 What the Economics of Climate Change Mitigation May Tell on
Transnational Adaptation
The previous chapters yield insights about new approaches towards cooperation for cli-
mate change mitigation. Chapter 6 takes a broader perspective and revisits important insights
from the mitigation focused IEA literature to assess their implications for climate adaptation. It
contributes to the research agenda on transnational climate adaptation by addressing the cross-
boundary spillovers of local adaptation measures. If adaptation in one country affects other
countries, adaptation can resemble the problem structure at the core of the economic analysis
of climate change mitigation. Like climate change mitigation, adaptation measures can supply
public goods across national boundaries. In such cases these measures are likely to be under-
provided, which can be amended with appropriate governance arrangements. The IEA-literature
has provided insights into such arrangements. From the perspective of adaptation research the
question is therefore whether there are lessons to be learned by applying a mitigation perspect-
ive to the governance of adaptation with cross-boundary spillovers. This chapter illustrates
this approach with reference to the Baltic Sea’s eutrophication problem in the context of cli-
mate change, highlighting the similarity of the problem structure, and subsequently translating
mitigation findings to the specifics of the Baltic context. Focusing on coalition structures, side-
payments, issue linkage, and trade sanctions, the chapter critically reviews available governance
arrangements, providing new perspectives on the issue of transnational climate adaptation. This
chapter is joint work with Matteo Roggero and Leonhard Kähler and currently under review as
Roggero et al. (2018).
1.4.6 Methodology
The thesis is based on analytical game theoretical modeling. While Chapter 6 and the
first part of Chapter 2 are mainly focused on revisiting established results from the game theor-
etic IEA literature and related streams of research to identify important and promising avenues
for future climate cooperation, own models are developed in Chapters 2-5. The basic model
structure of these models follows seminal models of the literature (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco,
1993; Barrett, 1994) and consists of two important game stages. In the first stage of the game
all countries decide if they join a coalition/IEA or not. After that, IEA-members decide cooper-
atively about their emissions but engage in a non-cooperative game with all countries that do
not belong to their coalition. The game is solved by backward induction. The stability analysis
for the coalitions is conducted by applying the concepts of internal and external stability that
were initially borrowed from cartel theory (d’Aspremont et al., 1983). Internal stability implies
that no member country has an incentive to leave its coalition. External stability is given if no
outsider has an incentive to join an existing coalition. A stable coalition is therefore character-
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ized by internal and external stability i.e. no member country can be better off by leaving the
coalition and no outsider country can be better off if it joins the coalition.
This basic model is augmented to account for alternative coalition structures (Chapters 2
and 3) and sub-national actors other than country governments (Chapters 2 and 4). For the
politico-economic analysis in Chapter 4 this is done by applying the political contributions ap-
proach of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995, 1996) which is a standard model to study the
influence of interest groups on policy-making. Used by Grossman and Helpman to study the
effect of lobby contributions on trade policies, this approach considers self-interested policy-
makers who seek to maximize the sum of lobby contributions and the welfare of the median
voter in order to increase their chances to be reelected. It has also been applied to study envir-
onmental policy-making (e.g. Fredriksson, 1997; Aidt, 1998; Conconi, 2003; Fredriksson et al.,
2005; Aidt and Hwang, 2014; Batina and Galinato, 2014).
Additionally, in Chapter 5 the game theoretical model is complemented by a stand-
ard static multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global
trade and energy that was developed for numerical analyses on border carbon adjustments in
sub-global climate policies. For a detailed description of the model including an algebraic for-
mulation see Böhringer et al. (2015). This framework is particularly well suited for the analysis
of the quantitative implications of trade measures on coalition stability, as global and regional
welfare implications of emission abatement and trade policies are fully endogenized. Follow-
ing Armington’s differentiated goods approach, goods in international trade are distinguished
by origin in the model (Armington, 1969). The latest version of the database from the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP version 9) with base-year 2011 (Aguiar et al., 2016) was used
for calibration. This database provides input-output tables, international sectoral trade flows,
sector- and fuel specific CO2 data, and substitution elasticities for production and trade for 140
regions and 57 sectors.
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2 | Transnational Environmental
Agreements with Heterogeneous
Actors
2.1 Introduction
There is unequivocal scientific agreement on the dangerous interference of anthropo-
genic greenhouse gas emissions with the climate.1 But efforts to find cooperative solutions on
an international level have been mostly unsatisfactory so far. The recent UN climate negoti-
ations in Paris have led to some agreement about global targets, but not about the individual
nations’ contributions to the global public good. This state of affairs motivates the search for
complementary approaches for global emissions reductions. Some suggestions are in the air.
For example, some authors think about minilateralism (Eckersley, 2012), climate clubs (Wider-
berg and Stenson, 2013; Falkner, 2015) or a building blocks approach (Stewart et al., 2013a).
Lobby groups and NGOs influence climate and energy policy. City alliances grow in parallel
to nation state based coalitions. This chapter aims at exploring some of such transnational ini-
tiatives or patterns of cooperation. Although there has been some research on those patterns in
the global governance literature (related to political science), we aim at making this topic con-
ducive for economic analysis, in particular game theory. How can such patterns of cooperation
be explained? Can we expect cooperation to be effective?
In this chapter we call a contract that stipulates rules for contributions to a global en-
vironmental good "transnational environmental agreement" (TEA) if it has heterogeneous con-
tracting parties, i.e. of different type. Parties can be national, subnational, international, or of
different quality. Such contracts can be explicit or implicit. They might directly aim at emis-
sions reductions, or only indirectly (e.g. by stipulating monitoring procedures). We chose the
term "transnational" to generalize from the established "international" environmental agreement
(IEA) framing. Transnational agreements are not undertaken within single jurisdictions (which
would not be international either), but the main actors involved do not necessarily need to be
1This chapter is based on Hagen et al. (2017).
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national governments (c.f. Andonova et al., 2009; Hale and Roger, 2014).
TEAs are not an invention from theory. For example, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership
Group (Cities Climate Leadership Group, 2018) with more than 80 megacities (from the South
and the North) took leadership in signing the Greenhouse Gas Protocol for Cities in 2014. As
of December 2015, the number of signatories increased to 428 cities (Greenhouse Gas Protocol,
2015). Weischer et al. (2012) map 17 climate clubs, being non-universal and partially overlap-
ping agreements of nation states that cooperate on climate change. In total, 122 countries are
members of at least one of those clubs. Some of these clubs include non nation state partners.
A first study roughly estimates that non-state initiatives might reduce greenhouse gas emissions
by 3 gigatons in 2020 (UNEP, 2015). Although the empirical fact that many TEAs already
exist might seem impressive at the first glance, some skeptical questions warrant attention. It is
well-known, after all, that global public goods suffer from free-rider incentives. So what does
motivate actors then to be frontrunners and sign a non-universal TEA? And if they do so for
some reason, why shouldn’t they not just pretend to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? These
questions will be further explored in this chapter.
There are only few papers in economic journals that address TEAs, some of which are
discussed in more detail below. The theme of city alliances seems to be broadly neglected
(but see Sippel and Jenssen, 2009; Millard-Ball, 2012, for some data analysis). Subnational
emission reductions are not analyzed, to our knowledge, from the perspective of cooperation
between actors from different countries. The exception is the game theoretic literature on envir-
onmental agreements that explain non-universal cooperation (more on that below). Studies that
admit for multiple climate clubs are sparse (e.g. Chapter 3, Asheim et al., 2006; Finus, 2008).
National lobby groups are addressed by Marchiori et al. (2017); Habla and Winkler (2013) and
Chapter 4, but not from a transnational perspective (for a literature review on the political eco-
nomy of the formation of IEAs see Wangler et al. (2013)). This chapter is not intended to fill
all these gaps, but contributes by arguing for the relevance of this research field. It provides
structure in transferring insights from global governance research, where much more has been
published on transnational climate governance than in economics, to game theory. First, we
report on the global governance literature and empirical examples of emerging transnational
climate agreements. Then we give an overview of the existing economic literature on the scope
and limits of IEAs. Building on these two pillars we follow up with two proposals for game
theoretic models. They analyze strategic effects of climate clubs and city alliances as examples
for TEAs. We then take a look at the larger picture again and contextualize these approaches in
an outlook on promising future research.
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2.2 Current Transnational Approaches in the Global Gov-
ernance Literature
This section puts together some selected and documented empirical observations of
transnational environmental agreements, and summarizes relevant publications from the global
governance literature. Climate clubs can be understood as "Club-like arrangements between
states that share common climate-related concerns, and sometimes in partnership with non-
state actors such as companies and Non-Governmental Organizations [. . . ]" (Widerberg and
Stenson, 2013). Climate clubs are also coined as "minilateralism" (Eckersley, 2012). They
are currently analyzed in the discourse on fragmented global governance (e.g. Biermann et al.,
2009; Keohane and Victor, 2011; Isailovic et al., 2013). This literature acknowledges that there
is no monolithic and rational global governance architecture, but a carpet of loosely-coupled
international institutional arrangements and regimes, not all being universal but many overlap-
ping. Although they may address multiple issues, their scope can be synergistic, cooperative or
conflictive. One set of overarching questions address the conditions under which fragmentation
is conducive or detrimental to regime effectiveness (e.g. Gehring and Oberthür, 2008; Biermann
et al., 2009).
Weischer et al. (2012) analyze existing climate clubs and explore their contribution to
climate action as well as the incentives for becoming club members and taking action. Simil-
arly, Widerberg and Stenson (2013) find different types of clubs, from political and technical
dialogue forums to country strategy and project implementation groups. Examples are the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development (2006-2011, including the US and China) and the
International Energy and Climate Initiative – Energy + (since 2010, International Energy and
Climate Initiative – Energy+, 2015). The latter, led by Norway, has 16 national government
members (from Africa, Asia and Europe), and multiple non-governmental partners, e.g. the
World Bank and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). It aims
at promoting energy efficiency and renewables by incentivizing commercial investments. While
some papers focus on the legitimacy of climate clubs (e.g. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee,
2013), others focus on their effectiveness (see Moncel and van Asselt, 2012, for an overview).
Different arguments are put forward to underpin the potential of climate clubs. It might
be easier to reach agreement in smaller clubs of countries that are more willing to push forward
climate protection (based on the argument of Olson (1965)). Falkner (2015) distinguishes three
dominant rationales of climate clubs. First, club benefits are created for the members. Second,
a re-legitimation of the climate regime by giving great powers a privileged position in the nego-
tiations while acknowledging their greater responsibility at the same time. Third, the potential
of climate clubs to enhance the bargaining efficiency of the international negotiations by facil-
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itating agreement amongst smaller groups of players. Further pros and cons of climate clubs
will be discussed below. Another case for TEAs are contracts between cities from different
countries. City networks on sustainability issue have some tradition. The International Council
for Local Environmental Initiatives (since 1990) has more than 1,000 cities, towns and metro-
polises from all continents as members (ICLEI, 2015). Over 1,700 cities and municipalities are
members of the Climate Alliance (since 1990, Climate Alliance, 2015), and have voluntarily
committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions reductions by 10% every 5 years. The C40 Cit-
ies Climate Leadership Group (since 2005) pushed the Compact of Mayors (2015), which is
currently signed by cities with more than 5% of the global population. The Compact of Mayors
has adopted a common monitoring, reporting and verification standard, the Greenhouse Gas
Protocol for Cities (Greenhouse Gas Protocol, 2015). The standard is built on experience with a
private sector initiative, the Carbon Disclosure Project (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2015), and
has established a joint carbon registry.
As with climate clubs, there is also some research on city alliances. A special issue in
Local Environment reviewed the early studies (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2007). Interesting ques-
tions are the motivations for joining city alliances, and their environmental effectiveness. The
early literature is mostly descriptive in nature and undertakes single or comparative case studies.
For example, Betsill and Bulkeley (2004) show for six case studies of municipalities in the UK
that membership in Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) is mostly motivated by the availability
of additional financial and political resources, and not so much by transfer of technical and best
practice knowledge. International recognition of the local engagement and the re-framing of
existing measures in terms of climate change helps increase legitimacy and place those activit-
ies higher on the local agenda. Gustavsson et al. (2009) explore the potential of city networks
for Swedish cities. Kern and Bulkeley (2009) analyze modes of cooperation in three transna-
tional municipal networks (Climate Alliance, CCP and Energie-CitÃl’s). Members are active
to quite different degrees in terms of information and communication, funding, recognition,
benchmarking and certification.
Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013) collected an impressive database with more than
600 ’urban climate change experiments’ from 100 systematically selected global cities. All
these experiments are explicitly targeted at reducing greenhouse gas emissions or at adapting
to climate change. Most experiments are found in Europe, Latin America and Asia. Less of
them relate to adaptation, but many to urban infrastructure, the built environment and energy.
Half of the experiments involve partnerships, for example between local governments and the
private sector. More recently, Hakelberg (2014) collected a sample of 274 European cities of
which 41% became members of city networks until 2009. The econometric analysis shows that
membership in a city network increases the likelihood of adopting a local climate strategy. In
contrast, there is no such effect on geographically neighboring cities. Top-down governmental
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policies have a stronger effect on local climate strategies than city network membership.
Some studies explore the reasons why city alliance exist and might (not) be effective.
Bulkeley (2010) generally stresses the changing role of cities and states in political systems,
and highlights political economy reasons. Furthermore, urban areas are expected to be par-
ticularly vulnerable to climate change, though some more so than others (e.g. Pachauri et al.,
2014; Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009; Gill et al., 2007; Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 2007).
This might contribute to urgency in climate change adaptation and mitigation in some cities.
Generally the local approach offers potentially easier stakeholder engagement, concrete action,
resource mobilization and investment, mostly because actors are directly involved (e.g. Corfee-
Morlot et al., 2009; Sippel and Jenssen, 2009). On the other hand, urban action cannot be
understood as being disconnected from national law. While the latter sets the context for the
former, the former can help enforcing national action by contracts, building trust and through
the political process. As a further reason, there might be local co-benefits due to investments,
local pollution, or first-mover advantages if a city specializes in technological solutions (al-
though e.g. Urpelainen (2009) shows that local co-benefits are not sufficient to motivate local
frontrunners). Further pros and cons of city alliances will be discussed below.
Approaches to study city alliances, climate clubs, and other modes of transnational en-
vironmental agreements resonate with different literature streams. Some scholars study subna-
tional climate policies from the multi-level perspective (e.g. Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Monni
and Raes, 2008). Hooghe and Marks (2003) disentangle different modes that might be helpful to
characterize different transnational governance patterns. Type I governance refers to hierarch-
ically nested arrangements (like in a classic federal system), while Type II governance refers
to arrangements that cross hierarchies or overlap between jurisdictions. The literature on fiscal
federalism (Oates, 1972, 2005) and environmental federalism (Shobe and Burtraw, 2012) uses
more economic concepts to study the allocation of policies between subsidiarity and centraliz-
ation. This approach might be helpful to study TEAs.
The debate on transnational climate governance got further impetus from Elinor Os-
trom after her Nobel laureate speech (Ostrom, 2010, 2012). She rooted the considerations on
addressing climate change both down from the top and up from the bottom in the concept of
polycentric governance. In such governance modes many centers of decision making, which are
formally independent from each other, make mutual adjustments for ordering their relationships
(Ostrom et al., 1961). This line of inquiry was taken up further by Cole (2011) and recently by
Jordan et al. (2015).
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2.3 Scope and Limits of IEAs
IEAs with a focus on climate agreements have been analyzed in the economic literature
since the 1990s. It has led to the development of various models that serve as a starting point
for the analysis of TEAs. This section gives an overview of this strand of research and its main
assumptions and results.
The literature on IEAs started with the seminal work of Carraro and Siniscalco (1993)
and Barrett (1994). The basic idea is to transfer concepts from the theory of economic cartels
(d’Aspremont et al., 1983; Chander and Tulkens, 1995) to the study of stable coalitions that
contribute to a public good. A large set of publications that refined the first contributions fol-
lowed suit, with further analytical and simulation studies up to date. Most of this research is
based, inter alia, on the following propositions:
1. Global environmental problems are about provision of public goods.
2. Players are aspiring and achieving individually rational decisions in a game theoretic
framework.
3. International environmental agreements need to be self-enforcing.
4. Players are nation states, their payoffs are determined by national welfare.
5. Full global cooperation (the grand coalition) would yield the first-best outcome.
6. The social optimum is ideally achieved, in principle, by a single global policy instrument
(e.g. a uniform carbon tax or an emission trading scheme).
Based on these propositions, some standard insights have been consolidated over a broad range
of settings. Some of them can be stated in a stylized way as follows. [i] The social optimum
cannot be achieved due to free rider incentives. [ii] If some countries or coalitions undertake
unilateral emission reductions, their effect is dissipated due to carbon leakage. [iii] Cooperation
is either broad but shallow, or deep but small. Thus, if we assume that reducing carbon emis-
sions is associated with high mitigation costs and small damage reductions, a stable coalition
will not have many signatories.
Although scientifically robust, these results are politically mostly frustrating. They do a
good job in explaining the long-lasting stalemate and questionable effectiveness of the climate
negotiation process under the UNFCCC.
Taking on that, two questions remain. First, if these results are valid for the climate case,
is there any chance to avert the greatest market failure ever (Stern, 2007) or, more pathetically,
loss of life and quality of life for billions of people? Is there no alternative to accepting the
inevitable? Second, are these results indeed valid for the climate case?
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Some skeptical remarks may deserve attention. For example, some studies have determ-
ined social costs of carbon of just a few dollars per ton (in particular for higher discount rates,
(Pachauri et al., 2014)). Several other studies have shown that the costs of mitigating emissions
to limit greenhouse gas concentrations below 430 - 480 ppm by 2100 lead to a reduction of
consumption growth by 0.04 to 0.14 percentage points over the 21st century (Pachauri et al.,
2014), i.e. these costs might be relatively low. If at least one of these kind of conclusions
is valid, it seems that the gains from cooperation are shallow. The theory would thus imply
broad cooperation. This implication is falsified by over 20 years of slow progress in climate
negotiations.
Furthermore, the empirical examples of TEAs outlined above cannot be explained by the
standard insights. Why should multiple climate clubs on overlapping issued be formed? Why
do some climate clubs engage, although probably on a low level, in unilateral action? Why do
cities from different countries start cooperation on emissions reductions, although most of their
national governments do not, although there is no (single) global policy instrument in place,
and although there are still many cities that do not participate in city networks? Instead, theory
would predict cities to be free riders.
Solving such puzzles seems to be important both for climate protection and for scientific
inquiry. One starting point for analysis could be to reconsider some of the six propositions
outlined above. In the following, we want to explore how proposition (3), (4) or (5) might be
relaxed, while keeping the remaining propositions.
2.4 Proposals for Theoretical Analysis
In this section we give two selected proposals for economic models that concentrate on
transnational environmental agreements: climate clubs and city alliances. Both can be observed
empirically. However both have got little attention in the economic literature so far even though
they offer interesting concepts. We give general outlines for these two approaches that can serve
as seeds for further model development. In addition, we give a detailed outlook on promising
lines of further research in these and related areas.
2.4.1 Climate Clubs
One way to open up the classical approach of one single international environmental
agreement is to allow heterogeneous countries to form climate clubs. As described in the global
governance literature, climate clubs may have different effects and may improve over one mono-
lithic agreement through different rationales (c.f. Falkner, 2015). The aspect of club benefits
for the members of a climate coalition is analyzed by Nordhaus (2015). He finds that a cli-
mate club that imposes trade sanctions on non-participants can induce a larger stable coalition
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with more abatement than a coalition without sanctions. Asheim et al. (2006) model the case
of symmetric countries and two coexisting agreements. The countries are partitioned in two
regions and can choose whether they sign an agreement for that region or not. They conclude
that a larger number of cooperating signatories can be sustained, compared to the standard case
of a single IEA. The case of two coexisting TEAs is further analyzed in a numerical study by
Osmani and Tol (2010) who additionally consider two asymmetric country types in a three-
stage sequence of play between the coalitions and the non-signatories. Their results show that
the possibility of two coalitions could increase as well as decrease emission abatement in com-
parison to the standard case with one coalition. Going beyond numerical examples, Chapter 3
studies the effect of multiple coexisting climate clubs in an analytical game theoretic setting.
The paper allows for asymmetric countries and investigates if global cooperation for emission
abatement can be improved if countries can form coexisting TEAs. This very general analytical
approach to climate clubs helps to get insights in the effects of negotiating coexisting climate
clubs without being bound by specific assumptions on the concrete costs and benefits of coun-
tries emissions abatement. The rationale of this analysis will be introduced for the simplest
version of this game theoretic climate clubs model. Its main results are derived and discussed.
The model is set up in the widely-used two-stage game structure with countries first choosing
to join a coalition or not (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993). In the second stage the members
of a coalition decide cooperatively on the amount of emissions abatement that is undertaken by
the coalition. The game is solved by backward induction. In contrast to the bulk of the existing
literature, coexisting agreements are possible. Each stage of the model is set up as a simultan-
eous Nash-game. The simplest version of the model already allows for important insights to the
idea of climate clubs. It considers two types of asymmetric countries and two possible TEAs.
The number of abating countries of type i (i = 1, 2) is denoted by zi. We assume linear benefits
of global emissions abatement and a binary choice for countries between abatement, which is
associated with abatement costs c, and pollution. An abating country of type i gets the payoff
piai = −c + αi(z1 + z2). Asymmetric benefits of the countries are expressed by the parameter
αi where α2 is normalized to α2 = 1 and α1 ∈ [0, 1]. A type 1 country therefore benefits less
or at most as much as a type 2 country from abatement. The net benefit of own abatement of
each country is negative since c > 1. Thus, playing pollute is the dominant strategy if there
is no TEA and all countries play pollute in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In the first
stage of the game countries decide about their TEA-participation. The case of one agreement
is compared to that of two coexisting agreements. Variables referring to the game equilibrium
with one agreement are denoted with a ∗ superscript, those referring to the equilibrium with two
agreements with a ∗∗ superscript. In the first case countries of both types can choose to join or
not to join the agreement. In the other case each agreement consists of similar countries, repres-
enting e.g. regional agreements (c.f. Asheim et al., 2006). Solving the second stage of the game
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first, the agreements cooperate internally in their decisions about their emissions abatement. In
the two agreements case the agreements take their decisions independently and simultaneously.
Maximization of the respective joint payoffs yields the second stage equilibrium with agreement
i playing
z∗i = ki (abate) if α1k1 + k2 > c, (2.1)
z∗i = 0 (pollute) if α1k1 + k2 < c. (2.2)
with ki denoting the number of type i signatories. This result already shows that the decision of
each agreement depends on the number of its members, but not on the abatement decisions of
the other countries. The application of the criteria of internal and external stability solves the
first stage of the game. As playing pollute is a dominant strategy for non-signatories, internal
stability is only given if the members of an agreement choose to abate and would change from
abate to pollute if one country left the agreement so that c > α1(k∗1 − 1) + k∗2 > α1k∗1 + (k∗2 −
1). The stability conditions together with this linchpin condition indicate that a stable abating
agreement may consist of countries of both types with the number of signatories satisfying
c+ α1 > α1k
∗
1 + k
∗
2 > c. (2.3)
Setting either the number of type 1 or of type 2 members in the agreement to zero we get the
results for the size of the single agreement if it consists only of type 1 (2.4) or of type 2 (2.4)
countries:
c+ α1 > α1k
∗
1 > c, (2.4)
c+ 1 > k∗2 > c. (2.5)
As the abatement decisions in the case of two agreements are mutually independent, the total
number of abating countries in this case can be found by adding (2.4) and (2.5) and thus has to
satisfy
2c+ α1 + 1 > α1k
∗∗
1 + k
∗∗
2 > 2c. (2.6)
By comparing the equilibrium abating stable coalitions in the case of one single and two coex-
isting agreements we find that two agreements lead to a greater number of agreement members
as well as to a greater amount of global emissions abatement and welfare. This effect would
be replicated for any larger number of admitted climate clubs. It is caused by the coalitions’
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and the outsiders’ dominant abatement strategies which stem from the linear payoff-structure of
the model. As shown in Chapter 3 linear benefits of abatement always lead to dominant abate-
ment strategies, while other cost and benefit structures from emissions abatement may lead to
non-dominant reaction functions. In the extreme case of linear costs and concave benefits from
abatement, only one agreement would undertake emissions abatement while all other coun-
tries do not abate any emissions regardless of their potential membership in other agreements.
The findings of Eisenack and Kähler (2015), who show that individual countries with convex
benefits from abatement may have increasing reaction functions so that emissions abatement
becomes a strategic complement, give rise to the question about the strategic behaviour of clubs
that consist of such countries. In light of the previous analysis and the already existing economic
literature we may conclude that climate clubs improve the outcomes of climate negotiations in
some cases. Even in the least desirable cases we find that the outcome of negotiations with
climate clubs leads to the same amount of global emissions abatement as would be achieved
with one single IEA.
2.4.2 City Alliances
Cities are important actors regarding global climate change, both on the emitting and
on the damage side. It might generally make sense that they organize an alliance among them-
selves in order to tackle these problems. In our proposed model we focus on the economic
arguments of vulnerability, local co-benefits and enforceability. The problem of enforcing an
environmental agreement can be greatly diminished as cities are not "above the law" like na-
tion states in the international system. They can be bound to abide to contracts by national
laws. This makes trust, compliance and enforcement less challenging problems. Generally,
there are political, social and cultural links between rural and urban areas of one country. Ad-
ditionally, a city alliance can introduce a voluntary and legal link between urban areas of mul-
tiple countries. The combination of these links might yield more cooperation than the usual
economic approach of considering only a voluntary and self-enforcing agreement between
countries. Cities are potentially more vulnerable to climate change than other regions (Hal-
legatte and Corfee-Morlot, 2011). Therefore they have stronger incentives to reduce climate
change impacts. There can also be local co-benefits in mitigation, e.g. with the removal of
air pollution (Harlan and Ruddell, 2011; Bollen et al., 2009) or a specialization on business
opportunities from technological solutions like green energy (Jochem and Madlener, 2003).
Particularly early movers may have an advantage here. For technical reasons we characterize
the actors in this section by their benefits and damages from emissions (in contrast the model
specifications in the previous section). In our model each country i consists of one city and
one rural region. The payoff of each city piicity(e
i
city, e) = B
i
city(e
i
city) − Dicity(e) and each
rural region piirural(e
i
rural, e) = B
i
rural(e
i
rural) − Dirural(e) depends on the benefits Bicity, Birural
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from its own emissions ei, and, as usual, on the damage Dicity, D
i
rural from global emissions
e = eicity + e
i
rural + e
−i. The local emissions are an essential (but partly substitutable) factor
of industrial production, they are linked to local benefits. Global emissions change the cli-
mate, which in turn creates local damages. In line with standard IEA literature (e.g. Hoel,
1991) we assume for all regions positive but decreasing marginal benefits from local emis-
sions Bi′ > 0, Bi′′ < 0 and positive and increasing marginal damages from global emissions
Di
′
> 0, Di
′′
> 0. We further assume the following properties of the benefit and damage
functions:
D
′
city(e) > D
′
rural(e), (2.7)
B
′
city(e
i
city) < B
′
rural(e
i
rural), (2.8)
B
′′
city(e
i
city) > B
′′
rural(e
i
rural). (2.9)
The first property corresponds to the comparatively higher vulnerability of cities. The second
and third inequalities result from assuming local co-benefits from emissions reductions in cities
(e.g. lower air pollution or a head start in green technology development). These co-benefits
compensate for the loss of benefits from emissions reduction and therefore lead to a lower net
loss of benefits from local greenhouse gas production. The model comprises two stages: First,
each city decides whether it wants to participate in a TEA by entering an alliance with all other
willing cities. Second, each country decides on the emission level of its city and rural region.
The entry decision (ci ∈ {A,¬A}) in the first stage is based only on the payoff of the city: Is
piicity higher as an alliance member? The payoff of the rural regions or the other cities does not
enter consideration here. In the second stage of the game, countries choose the emissions that
maximize their respective payoffs Πi. If the city region of a country has entered an alliance, we
assume that the country considers the damages to foreign cities of the alliance DA\icity to some
degree. This works similar as in stable agreements between nation states that fully internalize
all damages from the emissions to all other agreement members. The degree of internalization
of foreign cities in an alliance where domestic cities are members is represented by a weight
x ∈]0, 1[ because cities may not be able to force their national governments to fully integrate a
city alliance into their emissions planning. The optimization problem of each country i in the
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second stage is:
max
eicity ,e
i
rural
Πi(eicity, e
i
rural, e
−i) =if ci = ¬A : piicity(eicity, e) + piirural(eirural, e)if ci = A : piicity(eicity, e) + piirural(eirural, e)− xDA\icity(e). (2.10)
We assume that all countries simultaneously play a Nash game at this stage. In the first stage
all cities determine simultaneously in a Nash game
max
ci∈{A,¬A}
piicity(e
i
city, e) = B
i
city(e
i
city)−Dicity(e). (2.11)
It is obvious that an alliance between cities is easier to reach than an agreement between coun-
tries. Due to their high vulnerability, cities value emissions reductions more; at the same time
they are more likely to accept emission reductions because they have lower marginal benefits
from emissions. The largest part of the emissions reductions (in comparison to a status without
any agreement) is borne by the cities in the alliance, because their benefits are reduced least if
they lower emissions. They also have the largest reduction in damages. The rural areas (of the
countries in which the cities are in the alliance) have to make some emission reduction effort as
well, but their main contribution is not allowing any leakage. In a negotiation which only allows
for nation states to form an agreement, even rural areas might want an agreement, but free-rider
incentives are much higher for them than for cities. Therefore they would prefer others to form
an agreement and stay singletons themselves. The national government is important in our
model insofar as it ensures that no leakage of "dirty" industry from cities to rural areas occurs.
Of course the willingness of governments to engage in local climate policy is important as well.
However in this model they don’t have to enforce large emission reductions in (unwilling) rural
areas, they only have to prevent them from increasing their emissions. Maintaining a status quo
is more feasible in many political cases than enforcing unwanted change. We conclude that if
cities can form a mitigating alliance which national governments consider to some degree in
their policy decision making, more cooperation and larger emission reductions can result. Cit-
ies have an incentive to enter a city alliance because they expect higher damages from climate
change and have lower costs of emission reduction than other regions (particularly taking into
account co-benefits from greenhouse gas mitigation).
2.5 Outlook
There are many further approaches tor transnational environmental agreements in addi-
tion to the analysis of those proposed above. We think that they offer promising extensions of
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the state of the art in research on IEAs. We sketch some of them in the following. Concerning
climate clubs, one could think of overlapping clubs as an alternative to the proposed setting of
coexisting disjoint clubs. If countries would be signatories of more than one climate club, this
would change the strategic interaction of the clubs and possibly also the reaction functions in
the game. Another way to include climate clubs as disjoint coalitions in the climate negotiations
is to allow countries to form sub-coalitions in a first stage, followed by multilateral negotiations
between the coalitions and remaining non-signatories. Possible effects of climate clubs in a
broader sense include the generation of club-benefits as proposed, e.g., by Nordhaus (2015). By
the creation of such benefits that only favor signatories of a climate agreement, the incentives to
join are strengthened. This could be implemented through issue-linkage. Existing international
agreements on other topics as, e.g. trade, would then be linked to climate agreements. Existing
research on IEAs and trade (e.g. Eichner and Pethig, 2015) could serve as a starting point here.
Such multi issue clubs as well as climate clubs that do not negotiate on emission reductions but
other issues like monitoring or technology sharing are a challenging but interesting modeling
task. With regard to transaction costs we can say that, on the one hand, a shift towards smaller
clubs of negotiating countries could possibly lower the transaction costs of forming a climate
agreement, while possible interactions between clubs could impose additional transaction costs.
There are several economic arguments for an alliance between cities for emissions reductions.
In our modeling approach we use vulnerability, local co-benefits and enforceability. In addition
to these assumptions, we suggest three more possible reasons in favor of city alliances. First,
transaction costs are potentially lower. The implementation of policy measures might be easier
on a subnational than on a national level. Second, there is presumably less reason to behave op-
portunistically in moral hazard situations. The problem of individually rational but collectively
harmful behavior can be reduced if people directly observe each other. It might even be argued
that urban areas are more likely to have a clientele that shares common norms, such as a collect-
ive commitment to behave responsibly and to abstain from opportunistic behavior. Within such
a group, information asymmetries are less problematic in a moral hazard configuration. Third,
there can be learning effects. Transfer of policies between cities or even from a subnational to
a national level could be modeled. Our modeling proposal for city alliances can be combined
with research on climate clubs. Cities within countries with low ambition could join climate
clubs and exert their influence on the respective countries to join such agreements and take cli-
mate action. We actually observe that there are multiple city alliances in place, so these are,
in our terminology, coexisting climate clubs of cities. What is the rationale and environmental
effectiveness of cities forming coexisting TEAs, and how might cities strategically interact with
national governments in heterogeneous TEAs where both cities and countries are members?
Apart from city-alliances and climate clubs there are many other actors that could participate
in TEAs. Non-state-actors play an important role for adaptation to climate change as well as
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for mitigation of emissions. Industry lobbies and transnational NGOs influence governments
and groups of countries in different ways while subnational governments and internal politics
also play an important role for the decisions national governments take. Involving these actors
in transnational agreements might open up new possibilities for negotiations and climate action
but also raise threats to effective agreements. Whether they are within an agreement between
nation states or within a coalition only consisting of non-nation state actors, their interests differ
substantially so that the effects of heterogeneity on their outcomes are not clear. These effects
should not be neglected and deserve more attention in further research.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter provides an exploration of some transnational initiatives for climate co-
operation. The global governance literature finds ample empirical evidence for emerging TEAs.
These can be only partially explained by the conventional economic literature which emphasizes
the role of nation states with free-rider incentives. We thus propose that more research is needed
to understand and evaluate the role of TEAs in order to contribute to deal with climate change.
We argue that this particularly requires to consider the strategic interaction of heterogeneous
actors, not only nation state governments, and to consider coexisting and possibly overlapping
contracts that stipulate emission reductions or other institutions that are conducive to this aim.
To illustrate and underpin this claim, we extend already existing game theoretic approaches to
IEAs in order to analyze the strategic effects of TEAs. Our two examples show that both cli-
mate clubs and city alliances may be able to lead to an increase in emissions abatement and in
global welfare. Climate clubs offer an opportunity to cooperate in more than one agreement at
the same time. Cites can form alliances in which they agree to mitigate greenhouse gases; the
effectiveness of such TEAs will depend on the political influence cities have on national govern-
ments. We find that cooperation can be individually rational, even in the presence of free-rider
incentives. Depending on the characteristics of the actors, negotiation structures can facilitate
cooperation. Multiple agreements, for example, can stimulate more countries to cooperate than
a single IEA. National political and legal institutions can be used to avoid the problem of non-
binding agreements if actors other than nation states cooperate. Cities, rural regions and other
subnational actors can be compelled by law to enact an agreement. Both examples of TEAs have
shown that such agreements may indeed be effective and improve over the standard single IEA
consisting only of nation states. Depending on the structure of costs from mitigation efforts and
damages from climate change, the example of climate clubs shows that it is not in any case clear
if TEAs take climate action beyond lip service. Beyond these two examples, there are various
other settings of heterogeneous actors that might be conducive to tackle climate change. Other
forms, mechanisms, and players in transnational environmental agreements, like NGOs, issue
2.6. Conclusions 25
linkage, policy learning, moral hazard and political economy warrant further attention. Also
cooperative game theory may be used to model TEAs. Although we have shown that game
theoretic analysis might well be helpful to better understand the formation and effects of TEAs,
it is clear that it also has its limitations. Some aspects like the re-legitimation of the climate
regime (c.f. Falkner, 2015) or potentially irrational behavior of agents are difficult to analyze in
a game theoretic setting and might be better researched by other means. One can also question
the legitimacy of TEAs with non-state actors in contrast to multilateral IEAs negotiated by na-
tional governments. Nevertheless, we argue that especially with regard to the slow progress of
the international climate negotiations, and in light of the empirical development already going
on, it is important to include non-state actors complementary to an IEA. Non-cooperative game
theory offers a conservative view on agreements, i.e. it tends to underrate cooperation incentives
(Carbone et al., 2009). Therefore our positive findings carry a particularly heavy meaning; we
expect a real potential for TEAs. Institutions and negotiation structures for climate governance
can improve if they allow for transnational actors. A combination of different scientific ap-
proaches sharpens the view. The global governance literature widens the horizon for economic
analysis and challenges the conventional theory of IEAs, as it offers observations that cannot
easily be explained by existing models. This is both a provocation and great opportunity for
further theory building. Economics offer rigorous methods for the analysis of incentives for co-
operation, and model results can give new ideas for TEA-structures and negotiation processes.
Understanding TEAs is of the highest importance, particularly in the light of the Paris agree-
ment of 2015 which does not provide binding emission reduction targets for nation states. This
challenges both the negotiating actors and research. This chapter sketches several promising
policy options and avenues for further research.
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3 | Climate Clubs vs. Single Coalitions:
The Ambition of IEAs
3.1 Introduction
Most game theoretical studies on IEAs assume that there is (at most) one self-enforcing
agreement on emissions abatement (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 2001; McGinty, 2007; Pavlova and
de Zeeuw, 2013).2 Another frequent assumption in the theoretical literature is that countries
are symmetric (e.g. Barrett, 1994; Asheim et al., 2006). In light of the slow progress in interna-
tional climate negotiations up to the Paris agreement, and due to the new types of partnerships
being sought, the idea of climate clubs is drawing increasing attention (e.g. Weischer et al.,
2012; Ostrom, 2012; Widerberg and Stenson, 2013). Some authors argue that the focus on
a single universal agreement has been the main obstacle to global emission reductions under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (e.g. Stewart et al.,
2013b; Falkner et al., 2010). Multiple parallel agreements among nation-states might promise
greater contributions to the global public good3.
We study the effects of climate clubs by allowing for multiple coalitions and relaxing
the symmetry assumption at the same time. In the broad literature on IEAs (see also Bloch,
1997; Finus, 2001; Benchekroun and Long, 2012, for earlier overviews), there is, to our know-
ledge, only a small strand of literature investigating multiple IEAs and asymmetric countries.
Theoretical studies with asymmetric countries (but at most one agreement) show that in some
cases, global cooperation can be improved (Barrett, 2001; Fuentes-Albero and Rubio, 2010;
Heugues, 2012; Pavlova and de Zeeuw, 2013; Eisenack and Kähler, 2015). These insights are
roughly mirrored in simulation studies (e.g. McGinty, 2007; Biancardi and Villani, 2010; Ruis
and de Zeeuw, 2010). There are also theoretical studies with multiple coalitions (but symmetric
countries) which show that a larger number of cooperating members may be sustained (Yi, 1997;
2This chapter is based on Hagen and Eisenack (2015).
3We use the concept of climate clubs, which is used in the literature (e.g. Weischer et al., 2012; Widerberg
and Stenson, 2013) to denote a non-universal agreement that comprises some but not all UNFCCC member states.
This is different from the notion of climate clubs proposed by Nordhaus (2015), defined as a single agreement that
provides club benefits to its members.
27
28 Climate Clubs vs. Single Coalitions: The Ambition of IEAs
Ray and Vohra, 2001; Bloch, 2003; Finus and Rundshagen, 2006; Asheim et al., 2006). Both
multiple coalitions and asymmetric countries are investigated by Bauer (1992). She assumes
linear benefits from emission reductions and allows for countries that are identical in structure
but asymmetric in size. Coalitions of two countries form. If these coalitions are allowed to en-
gage jointly in further coalition building, larger coalitions are possible. Other contributions (e.g.
Osmani and Tol (2010), Bosello et al. (2003), Eyckmans and Finus (2006)) use simulations to
analyze asymmetric countries with more than one coalition and find that the situation can be
improved compared to the standard case with one agreement. In contrast to previous studies,
this chapter contributes to the theoretical literature by analyzing multiple climate clubs in the
presence of structurally different countries.
Our model features an arbitrary number of country types and coalitions. Each country
can choose whether to join one of a number of agreements or not to sign any of them. Each
agreement is framed as a (stable or unstable) coalition, and its members act cooperatively. The
simultaneous play game between the coalitions and the outsiders is non-cooperative. Our re-
search thus extends the seminal work of Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) as
part of the latter strand of the literature in that it analyzes the internal and external stability of
coalitions (d’Aspremont et al., 1983) in a setting with simultaneous play. We derive analytical
results for a large class of damage and benefit functions (decreasing marginal benefits of emis-
sions or increasing marginal damages of emissions). In this respect, we take a more general
approach than previous work, which has often used a specific parametrization of damage and
benefit functions. For the case of both benefits and damages being non-linear, we obtain results
for a standard quadratic case. By analyzing simultaneous play of multiple coalitions, we avoid
arbitrary assumptions about which of the coalitions moves first. In doing so, we confirm but
also qualify some of the results from existing studies with different assumptions.
We find that for the expository case with constant marginal benefits and damages, total
emissions decrease with the number of possible coalitions. In equilibrium, multiple stable co-
alitions emerge and have dominant emission strategies. This result still holds if we relax the
assumption of linear benefits and allow for arbitrary (and asymmetric) concave benefits of emis-
sions. The results differ drastically in the case of arbitrary (asymmetric) convex damages func-
tions and linear benefits: global emissions are identical to the standard case with only a single
coalition. There can only be one stable and abating coalition. Finally, we explore a case with
both convex damages and concave benefits. We find that also in this case, global emissions can
be reduced by allowing for more than one coalition.
The next section is devoted to the expository case of linear damages and benefits of
emissions. The subsequent Section 3.3 analyzes the effect of multiple coalitions for the different
cases. A summary and discussion concludes the chapter.
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3.2 Climate Clubs with Linear Benefits and Damages
For exposition, we start with simplest formulation of benefits and damages from emis-
sions. We consider the case of two country types and compare the standard setting that allows
at most one coalition with a new setting where two parallel coalitions are in place. The model
assumptions for the case of one coalition follow Barrett (2001, 2003), extended by allowing for
two disjoint parallel coalitions.
There are N countries of either type 1 or type 2. Emissions of a country of type i are
denoted by ei ∈ [0, 1], and total emissions by E. A type i country (i = 1, 2) gets the payoff
Πi(ei, E) = βei − δiE, with β > 1. The parameter β might also be understood as marginal
abatement costs. The asymmetry of the countries is expressed by the parameter δi ∈ [0, 1]. For
convenience and without loss of generality, we normalize δ2 = 1. A type-2 country therefore
suffers at least as much damage as a type-1 country from emissions. Due to the linear payoffs,
each country of type i chooses between playing pollute ei = 1 and playing abate ei = 0.
Since β > 1, the net benefit of playing pollute, β − δi, is positive for every country. Thus,
playing pollute is the dominant strategy if there is no coalition: in the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, all countries play pollute, i.e., ei = 1. The model is set up as a standard two-stage
game (following Barrett, 2001). In the first stage of the game, countries choose between joining
and not joining an international coalition. In the second stage, the members of each coalition
choose their level of emissions cooperatively in a simultaneous play game between all (given)
coalitions and the outsiders.
First, let us look at the simplest case of one coalition. As usual, we proceed by backward
induction, solving the second stage of the game first. In the case of one coalition with k1 type-
1 members and k2 type-2 members, the outsiders all play pollute as a dominant strategy. We
denote the aggregate emissions of all outsiders by Eout and the number of polluting members
of type i with kpi ≤ ki. The joint payoff of the members of a coalition denoted by J is thus
ΠJ = β(kp1 + k
p
2)− (δ1k1 + k2)(kp1 + kp2 + Eout). (3.1)
The members maximize their payoff ΠJ cooperatively with respect to kp1, k
p
2 . Here and in the
following, variables referring to a game equilibrium are denoted by ·∗. The linear payoff func-
tion implies the corner solutions
kp∗i = 0 (abate) if δ1k1 + k2 > β, (3.2)
kp∗i = ki (pollute) if δ1k1 + k2 < β. (3.3)
30 Climate Clubs vs. Single Coalitions: The Ambition of IEAs
For the first game stage, we determine stable coalitions (d’Aspremont et al., 1983). A coali-
tion is stable if no outsider has an incentive to join (external stability) and no member has an
incentive to leave (internal stability).
As playing pollute is a dominant strategy for outsiders, this condition is only fulfilled
if the members choose to abate and would change to pollute if one member left the coalition.
This happens if the withdrawal of one country would diminish the gains from cooperation for
the remaining members so much that they would jointly change their strategy to pollute. We
call such cases "linchpin" equilibria (cf. Barrett, 2001; Chander and Tulkens, 1995).
From condition (3.2) and (3.3), we see that (k∗1, k
∗
2) represents a stable and abating
coalition if condition (3.2) holds and if β > δ1(k∗1 − 1) + k∗2 > δ1k∗1 + (k∗2 − 1). Thus, internal
stability for a single coalition is given if
β + δ1 > δ1k
∗
1 + k
∗
2 > β. (3.4)
Such a coalition is also externally stable because playing pollute is a dominant strategy for
outsiders, so that an outsider has no incentive to join an abating and internally stable coalition.
It would be interesting to know the conditions under which only countries of the same
type would join the coalition. According to (3.4), an abating coalition with only type-1 members
(k2 = 0) is possible for
β + δ1 > δ1k
∗
1 > β, (3.5)
and with only type-2 countries (k1 = 0) if
β + 1 > k∗2 > β. (3.6)
Conditions (3.4) to (3.6) show that a stable coalition could consist of either both types of
countries or countries of only one type.
Now consider that we admit up to two parallel and disjoint coalitions that make their abate-
ment decisions independently but cooperate internally. For expository reasons, we assume
in this section that each coalition admits only countries of the same type (coalition 1 de-
noted by J1 consists of k1 type 1 countries and coalition 2 denoted by J2 of k2 type 2 coun-
tries; this assumption is relaxed in the next section). The aggregate payoff of coalition Ji is
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ΠJi = βkpi − δiki(kp1 + kp2 + Eout), which is maximized by the corner solution
kpi =
0 (abate) if δiki > β,ki (pollute) if δiki < β. (3.7)
Recall that δ2 = 1. We see that the decision of each coalition Si depends on the number of its
members ki and on the benefits from emissions β, but not on the members of the other coalition.
The first stage of the game is solved by applying the criteria of internal and external
stability in analogy to the case of one coalition. As the abatement decisions of the two
coalitions are mutually independent, the conditions for both coalitions to be internally stable
can be reduced to (3.5) and (3.6). As in the case of one coalition, the criterion of external
stability is always satisfied because playing pollute is a dominant strategy for outsiders so that
they have no incentive to join an abating coalition.
Finally, compare the equilibria with one and two coalitions. Denote a set of two stable and
abating coalitions by (k∗∗1 , k
∗∗
2 ). By adding (3.5) and (3.6), we find that
2β + δ1 + 1 > δ1k
∗∗
1 + k
∗∗
2 > 2β. (3.8)
For convenience, we use the notation K∗∗ := δ1k∗∗1 + k
∗∗
2 to represent a measure for the total
emissions abatement by all coalitions. We see from (3.4) and (3.8) that K∗∗ > K∗, so we can
summarize:
Proposition 3.1. If the marginal benefits and damages of emissions are constant, the total
number of abating countries in the case of two coalitions is greater than in the case of one
coalition.
Further, it is of interest to know whether two stable and abating coalitions are also
intercoalition-stable, that is, whether they have no incentive to swap coalitions (cf. Osmani and
Tol, 2010). If one member country of type i would swap coalitions, the number of members ki
would decrease by one, while the number of members of the other coalition would increase. We
saw that a decrease in the number of members ki would change the decision of the remaining
members from abate to pollute. As a consequence, the total number of abating countries would
decrease from k∗∗i + k
∗∗
j to k
∗∗
j + 1. Every country would lose. Thus, intercoalition stability is
guaranteed.
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3.3 Multiple Climate Clubs with Non-linear Damages or Be-
nefits
In the following sections, we analyze the more general case of i ∈ I different types
of countries that are admitted to be asymmetric in terms of both their benefits and damages
of emissions. Countries are admitted to join one of multiple coalitions J ∈ J , where J is a
family of disjoint subsets of all countries. Each country of type i has emissions ei ∈ [−∞, e¯i]
with e¯i being its non-cooperative business-as-usual emissions. We thus admit negative emis-
sions (which might be reasonable in the light of carbon capture and storage technologies), but
not more emissions than could be produced given economic capacities in the non-cooperative
business-as-usual scenario.
After introducing the basic assumptions and notation, the first subsection focuses on
non-linear benefits of emissions, the second on non-linear damages from emissions, and the
third on both non-linear benefits and damages from emissions. The number of type-i mem-
bers of coalition J is denoted by kJi . Countries that do not join any coalition may simply be
regarded as coalitions of size 1 as their choice of emissions is not relevant for the following
argumentation. The amount of emissions of each coalition J is characterized by the vector
eJ := (eJ1 , . . . , e
J
|I|), where e
J
i is the quantity of emissions for each member country of type i
in coalition J . Total emissions are therefore given by E :=
∑
i,J k
J
i e
J
i , whereas the total emis-
sions of coalition J are denoted by EJ :=
∑
i k
J
i e
J
i , and the emissions all other countries by
E−J := E − EJ .
In the second stage, the members of each coalition choose their level of emissions co-
operatively, simultaneous with all (given) coalitions and the outsiders. We denote the second-
stage equilibrium emissions of all countries by E∗(kJ1 , . . . , k
J
|I|). In the first stage of the game,
countries choose between joining (exactly) one of the multiple coalitions or being an outsider.
In this decision, they anticipate the effects on the second-stage game equilibrium.
3.3.1 Climate Clubs with Decreasing Marginal Benefits
In this section, we assume that the marginal benefits of emissions are decreasing, and
that the marginal damages are constant. The latter is a common assumption in part of the liter-
ature (e.g. Pavlova and de Zeeuw, 2013; Beccherle and Tirole, 2011). The former assumption
generalizes a typical quadratic or logarithmic formulation towards an arbitrary concave benefit
function. The payoff for one country i in coalition J is
ΠJi (e
J
i , E) = bi(e
J
i )− δiE, (3.9)
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with bi(eJi ) being a differentiable, monotonically increasing concave function of the amount of
emissions eJi produced by the country i in coalition J , and δi > 0. The aggregated payoff for
the members of coalition J is therefore given by
ΠJ(eJ , E) =
∑
i
kJi bi(e
J
i )−
∑
i
kJi δiE. (3.10)
Then, the following propositions show that multiple coalitions can include a larger number of
cooperatively abating countries in stable coalitions than a single IEA. The proof also shows that
multiple individually stable climate clubs can coexist. If the countries in these stable coalitions
were forced to join a single coalition, it would not be stable.
Proposition 3.2. If the marginal benefits from emissions are decreasing and the marginal dam-
ages are constant, total emissions abatement increases with the number of individually stable
coalitions.
Proof. Each coalition J maximizes ΠJ with respect to all members’ emissions eJi by taking the
total emissions of all others E−J as given. The first-order condition for each country type l in a
coalition J is
dΠJ
deJl
= kJl b
′
l(e
J
l )−
∑
i
kJi δik
J
l = 0, (3.11)
so that
∀l ∈ I : eJl = b′−1l
(∑
i
kJi δi
)
. (3.12)
Thus
EJ =
∑
l
kJl b
′−1
l
(∑
i
kJi δi
)
, (3.13)
does not depend on E−J : Every coalition has a dominant strategy, making its own emission
decision independently of the decisions of all other coalitions. Consequently, the internal and
external stability conditions are not affected by any abatement decisions of outsiders of coali-
tion J , i.e., the stability of coalition J is independent of the existence of other individually
stable abating coalitions. The maximum number of countries that are members of internally
and externally stable coalitions increases with the number of coalitions.
If there exists at least one individually stable abating coalition satisfying internal and
external stability with
∑
i k
J
i > 1, and if there are enough countries to form a further individu-
ally stable abating coalition, they will do so. Their emissions abatement will be additional to
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other countries’ abatement amounts, without causing existing coalitions to increase their emis-
sions.
The question of abatement in our case thus boils down to the existence of at least one
individually stable coalition, and it can be answered positively: With asymmetric countries,
linear damages, and concave benefits from emissions, it is known that an internally and ex-
ternally stable coalition exists (e.g. Bauer, 1992; Fuentes-Albero and Rubio, 2010; Pavlova and
de Zeeuw, 2013). We can also show an additional property:
Corollary 3.1. If multiple internally and externally stable coalitions exist, these coalitions are
intercoalition-stable.
Proof. Whenever a country has neither an incentive to leave its coalition and become a free-
rider (internal stability) nor an incentive to join another existing coalition (from its potential
position as a free-rider, external stability), it would not switch coalitions as this would combine
the two unprofitable decisions into one even more disadvantageous step. Note that this argument
only works since damages are linear.
The results obtained in this subsection can be roughly summarized as follows. With
any concave benefits from emissions and constant marginal damages, each coalition makes an
independent decision on its emissions. Some countries prefer a stable coalition (of a size larger
than one member) to reap some benefits of cooperation. We know from the existing literature
that such stable coalitions tend to be small. If additional countries joined such a coalition, the
benefits of cooperation would diminish. However, countries that are not part of an existing
coalition may be willing to form another small coalition with larger benefits from cooperation.
Due to the dominant strategies, these benefits are not affected by the number of countries that
are already members of other stable coalitions. Thus, as long as there is at least one set of
countries left that would form a stable coalition (even if there were no other coalitions), these
countries would cooperate, leading to emissions abatement that is additional to that of other
coalitions.
3.3.2 Climate Clubs with Increasing Marginal Damages
We now assume constant marginal benefits from emissions and increasing marginal
damages. The former is common in some strands of the literature (c.f. Marrouch and Ray
Chaudhuri, 2016), while the latter assumption generalizes a typical quadratic formulation to-
wards an arbitrary convex damage function. The payoff of a country i in coalition J thus
depends on the total emissions and on its own decision according to
ΠJi (e
J
i , E) = βie
J
i − fi(E), (3.14)
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with fi(E) being a differentiable, monotonically increasing convex function of the total emis-
sions E, 0 ≤ eJi ≤ e¯i, with βi > 0, f ′i(E¯) < βi and fi(0) = 0. This implies ei = e¯i as a
dominant strategy for outsiders. Denote E¯ :=
∑
i,J k
J
i e¯i
J . We restrict our attention to those
settings where
∃l, E < E¯ :
∑
i,J
kJi fi(E) ≥ βlE, (3.15)
meaning that there is at least some emissions abatement in the fully cooperative case. Otherwise,
our whole investigation would be pointless. The aggregate payoff of a coalition J is given by
ΠJ(eJ , E) =
∑
i
kJi βie
J
i −
∑
i
kJi fi(E). (3.16)
We obtain a result under these conditions that is in stark contrast to the case with constant
marginal damages.
Proposition 3.3. If marginal benefits of emissions are constant and marginal damages are
increasing, total emissions will be identical for both one and multiple coalitions.
Proof. Define the functions gJ implicitly by E = gJ(
∑
i k
J
i f
′
i(E)). Then the first-order condi-
tions for the optimal emission decision of coalition J yield
∀i : E = gJ(kJi βi). (3.17)
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions also yields
∀i : dE
dkJi
= − f
′
i(E)∑
l k
J
l f
′′(E)
< 0. (3.18)
Total emissions can be expressed as EJ + E−J = E = gJ(kJi βi), so that the best response
function of coalition J is given by
EJ = gJ(k
J
i βi)− E−J . (3.19)
Recall that countries that are not members of any coalition dominantly choose emissions e¯i.
The best response function has a slope of −1. Every unit of emissions that is reduced by one
coalition will be followed by one unit of additional emissions from another coalition. Thus,
total emissions do not depend on the number of existing coalitions.
The proposition shows that considering multiple climate clubs does not lead to any ad-
ditional abatement. While the previous results in this chapter hold without any assumptions on
burden-sharing, the existence of a stable coalition with constant marginal benefits of emissions
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and increasing marginal damages rests on a burden-sharing rule of the coalition. In the fol-
lowing we therefore assume proportional burden-sharing, meaning that the burden of foregone
benefits becomes proportional to the members’ benefits of reduced damages. The countries i∗
with the smallest βi within each coalition reduce their emissions as indicated by the joint de-
cision and are refunded for their foregone benefits by the countries with higher marginal benefits
of emissions.
We now turn to the existence of at least one stable coalition that reduces emissions. As
all outsiders dominantly play e¯i, the total emissions are de facto determined by the decision
of the coalition. Let E∗ be the total emissions chosen by coalition J of which country l is
a member, and ΠJl the payoff of country l in this situation. Let E
∗−l be the amount of total
emissions if country l leaves the coalition, and Π−l the associated payoff.
Proposition 3.4. Assume asymmetric countries, convex damages, and linear benefits from emis-
sions. Then, with proportional burden-sharing, an abating and internally stable coalition exists.
Proof. First, condition (3.15) implies that at least in the fully cooperative case the coalition
abates some emissions. The question is whether an abating coalition is internally stable. The
total amount of emissions E∗ increases with decreasing coalition size due to (3.18).
We show in the following that internal stability is achieved when the coalition size rep-
resents a linchpin equilibrium. We can be sure that such an equilibrium exists since a coalition
of size 1 (a single country) dominantly plays e¯i. The coalition at the linchpin equilibrium is
characterized by
∀l : E∗ < E¯ and E∗−l = E¯. (3.20)
Each country leaving would cause the remaining members to switch to E¯ as joint payoff-
maximization does not incentivize emission reductions. The members in the linchpin equi-
librium are better off by jointly deciding to reduce emissions to E∗, i.e., ΠJ(E∗) > ΠJ(E¯). If
all members share the burden of foregone benefits of emissions proportionally to their benefits
of reduced damages, no country has an incentive to leave the linchpin-coalition.
We can further show that there is no incentive to form two or more coalitions: As the
members can jointly decide which of them have to undertake the emission reductions (and then
be refunded by the others), this will be done by those countries i∗ with the smallest βi within
each coalition. Thus every coalition has only one condition to fulfill:
E = gJ(βi∗k
J
i∗). (3.21)
If we exclude the boundary case with two coalitions having exactly the same βi∗ , this implies
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two contradicting conditions for the same variable E. Any club of countries would free-ride if
another one already abates.
To sum up, this section shows that in case of linear benefits and convex damages, total
emissions cannot be reduced by increasing the number of admitted coalitions to more than one.
By virtue of the general formulation of the model in Sec. 3.1 and Sec. 3.2, the results include
the special cases of symmetric countries, but also hold for countries that are asymmetric in their
benefits and damages of emissions. Thus, these results are more general than previous findings
in studies with symmetric countries (e.g. Yi, 1997; Ray and Vohra, 2001; Bloch, 2003; Finus
and Rundshagen, 2006; Asheim et al., 2006) or simulation studies (e.g. Osmani and Tol, 2010;
Bosello et al., 2003; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006).
3.3.3 Clubs with Increasing Marginal Damages and Decreasing Marginal
Benefits
The results of the sections above hold for rather general conditions for either damages
or benefits, but restrictive conditions for the other variable. These two cases lead to opposing
results: admitting clubs leads either to no advantage at all or to an extreme advantage. Thus, if
both damages and benefits are non-linear, we might expect results that lie in between. We are yet
not able to analytically solve the most general situation in which each country is different from
the others and may have any convex damage and any concave benefit function. We thus explore
in the following a case with a specific parametrization of asymmetric countries to discuss the
scope and limits of clubs. First the specific game is introduced and some general notation and
features of clubs are described. We use this to compare the situations of one and two stable
clubs, and illustrate it with a numerical example.
Let N denote the set of all countries. The payoff of each country n ∈ N follows e.g.
Barrett (1994) and Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) with quadratic damages and benefits,
Πn(en, E) = bn(e¯nen − 12e2n) − 12cnE2, where each country can have idiosyncratic parameters
e¯n, bn, cn ≥ 0. Define e−n = E − en. For convenience, we further define aS :=
∑
n∈S e¯n for
any subset of countries S ⊆ N . Let γn := cnbn and γS :=
∑
n∈S γn. Finally, define γ
l
n :=
cl
bn
and γSS :=
∑
n,l∈S γ
l
n > γ
S . We first collect some helpful features of the emissions game. It is
known that the single countries’ first-order conditions lead to
en =
e¯nbn − cne−n
bn + cn
=
e¯n
1 + γn
− γn
1 + γn
e−n = e¯n − γnE. (3.22)
Now determine the aggregate emissions of a coalition J , supposing that the emissions of all
countries that are not members of the coalition are given, i.e., the coalition’s reaction function.
We need to determine maxen,n∈J ΠJ =
∑
n∈J Πn(en, E), where the first-order conditions yield
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for all n ∈ J the implicit characterization
en = e¯n −
∑
l∈J
cl
bn
(EJ + E−J),
EJ =
∑
n∈J
en = a
J − γJJE. (3.23)
Note that the implicit characterization of this aggregate’s reaction function has the same struc-
ture as that of single countries (3.22), except that emissions and parameters are replaced by the
appropriate aggregates.
It is also possible to express the aggregate emissionsENC of a group of countriesNC ∈
J that play non-cooperatively (among one another) for given aggregate emissions of other
countries E−NC . Each non-cooperative country decides according to (3.22). Thus
ENC =
∑
n∈NC
en =
∑
n∈NC
e¯n − γnE = aNC − γNCE. (3.24)
As before, the linear structure from single countries or coalitions is retained, but note the differ-
ence in the coefficients γNC that do not account for external effects. Again, this can be solved
explicitly to obtain the reaction function by
ENC =
aNC
1 + γNC
− γ
NC
1 + γNC
E−NC . (3.25)
Now, after these preparations, let us turn to the analysis of climate clubs. Assume that there
are up to two disjoint coalitions J,K ∈ J (whether they are stable or not). Does this reduce
emissions compared to the case with just a single coalition J or K (as in the case with linear
damages), or not (as in the case with linear benefits)?
Let there be a third group of outsiders NC with NC ∪ J ∪ K = N . Without any
coalition, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is characterized according to (3.25) by
E =
aN
1 + γN
. (3.26)
In the case of a single coalition J , (3.23) characterizes the members’ aggregate reaction
function, while (3.24) characterizes the outsiders’ K ∪ NC aggregate reaction function by
EK∪NC = aK∪NC − γK∪NCE. The game equilibrium is thus characterized by
E = EJ + EK∪NC = aN − (γJJ + γK∪NC)E, (3.27)
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so that total emissions become
E =
aN
1 + γJJ + γ
K∪NC . (3.28)
There are less emissions in this case than in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (3.26) since
the denominator is larger. Now suppose that, in addition to J , the coalition K also forms.
Proposition 3.5. If damages and benefits of emissions are quadratic, the existence of two par-
allel climate clubs leads to a lower level of global emissions than the case in which only one of
these clubs is admitted.
Proof. We use the implicit characterization of three aggregate reaction functions from (3.23)
and (3.24) to obtain
E = EJ + EK + ENC = aN − (1 + γJJ + γKK + γNC)E. (3.29)
Since γJJ + γ
K
K + γ
NC > γJJ + γ
K∪NC , total emissions are smaller than (3.28).
If we extend this proposition to more than two stable clubs, each additional club would
further reduce emissions, but it would reduce them less than the previous new club did. This
case is thus, as expected, between the two extreme cases considered in Sec. 3.1 and Sec. 3.2.
The last results leave aside the question of whether two stable climate clubs can exist in
parallel. It only makes sense to ask this question if there are at least five countries and at least
two country types. Then each coalition’s conditions for internal, external, and intercoalition
stability make up a list of six inequalities with rational functions that are difficult to interpret.
No. J K NC Π1 Π2 Π3 Π4 Π5 E
(0) · · N -.55 -.55 -.90 -.90 .50 6.65
(1) {1, 2} {3, 4} {5, . . . , 8} -.34 -.34 -.70 -.70 .50 5.69
(2) {1, 2} · {3, . . . , 8} -.53 -.53 -.73 -.73 .50 6.22
(3) · {3, 4} {1, 2, 5, . . . , 8} -.35 -.35 -.86 -.86 .50 6.05
(4) {1, 2, 3} · {4, . . . , 8} -.43 -.43 -.74 -.42 .50 5.38
(5) · {2, 3, 4} {1, 4, . . . , 8} -.12 -.42 -.73 -.73 .50 5.25
(6) {1, 2, 5} {3, 4} {6, . . . , 8} -.22 -.22 -.55 -.55 .36 5.31
(7) {1, 2} {3, 4, 5} {6, . . . , 8} -.20 -.20 -.52 -.52 .30 5.24
Table 3.1: Numerical example of stable coalitions with b1 = b2 = 1.2,∀n = 3, . . . , 8 : bn = 1.0, c1 =
c2 = 0.05, c3 = c4 = 0.06, ∀n = 5, . . . , 8 : cn = 0.0. Payoffs that need to be compared to assess
stability (without loss of generality) are in bold face. For reference, No. (0) is the non-cooperative
equilibrium, and No. (1) the coalition structure we want to asses. Numbers (2) and (3) confirm the
internal stability of J and K, respectively. Numbers (4) and (5) confirm intercoalition stability, while
No. (6) and (7) external stability. Payoffs for countries {6, 7, 8} are not written, as these have identical
payoffs to those of country 5 (except in Numbers (6) and (7), where they are irrelevant for comparison).
Here we want to provide one numerical example for our game structure. Suppose there
are eight countries N = {1, . . . , 8}, all with e¯n = 1, two countries 1, 2 with comparatively
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larger benefits from emissions, two countries 3, 4 with comparatively larger damages, while
the four remaining countries only suffer negligible damage. Table 3.1 shows that the coalition
structure J = {1, 2}, K = {3, 4}, NC = {5, . . . , 8} is stable and leads to less emissions than
structures with just the club J or K. The example also shows that other structures with just one
coalition may perform better in terms of emission reductions, but those cases in the example are
not internally stable.
This subsection thus shows that in the case of increasing marginal damages and decreas-
ing marginal benefits, two stable clubs can exist in parallel. It is possible that they abate, in total,
more than if only one club is admitted.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed the case of multiple disjoint IEAs when there are asymmetric
countries. In a two-stage game, countries first choose whether to sign exactly one agreement or
to be an outsider. In the second stage, each coalition acts as a unitary actor in a non-cooperative
simultaneous play game between the coalitions and the outsiders. We compare emissions abate-
ment and coalition stability in the multiple IEAs case with the standard case, in which at most
one IEA is possible. We investigate this for constant as well as increasing marginal damages
from emissions and for constant as well as decreasing marginal benefits of emissions.
For constant marginal damages, multiple coalitions lead to lower global emissions and
to a larger number of cooperating countries in multiple “climate clubs”. Interestingly, this effect
does not depend on the shares of the country types within the set of all countries in the game.
These results follow from the dominant emission strategies of the coalitions. A coalition is
stable if all countries would choose to pollute, if one more country left the coalition. This effect
is replicated for each coalition. Thus multiple coalitions are stabilized with lower emissions
than just one. When marginal damages increase and marginal benefits are constant, this picture
changes dramatically. As there is no equilibrium structure with more than one abating stable
coalition in the second stage, only one coalition will abate emissions cooperatively. All other
countries would refrain from cooperation regardless of their potential membership in another
coalition. Therefore, the possibility of multiple agreements does not lead to improvements
compared to the case with only one agreement. With both convex damages and concave benefits
of emissions, an extension of a standard parametrization towards asymmetric countries provides
results in between these extreme cases. We find that the existence of two stable parallel climate
clubs leads to a lower level of global emissions than the existence of only one coalition. A
numerical experiment shows that two stable coalitions can exist.
The comparison of the different cases shows that the effect of climate clubs substantially
depends on qualitative properties of the benefit and damage functions, even if they are quite
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simple. In this general sense, our results are in line with the ambiguous results in the examples
of Osmani and Tol (2010). In contrast, however, we can generally show for our assumptions
that climate clubs are at least not detrimental to global cooperation. It would require further
investigation to determine whether the positive effects shown by, e.g., Asheim et al. (2006)
and Bauer (1992) stem mainly from the constant marginal damage assumption. Nevertheless,
our results need to be taken with caution. Although our analysis is more general than single
numerical examples, the analytical results reach their limits when both benefits and damages
are nonlinear. It is then unclear whether parallel and stable climate clubs with more abatement
than in the standard case always exist. This calls for further generalization.
On the other hand, the chapter already shows how the shape of costs and benefits leads
to quite different prospects of climate clubs. We think that our analysis thus offers an important
stepping stone towards a more detailed understanding of the determinants of beneficial or det-
rimental effects of climate clubs. In any case, we must conclude that the idea that climate clubs
do benefit global climate protection has to be taken with caution, but that it deserves more ana-
lytical attention. Our results show that the idea of climate clubs points in useful directions for
further research. Allowing for overlapping coalitions with countries that are members of more
than one coalition could provide further insights. Apart from that, issue linkage is discussed
in the literature on climate clubs (e.g. Weischer et al., 2012; Widerberg and Stenson, 2013)
and would offer an interesting field for further game theoretic analysis. The design of different
transfer mechanisms, intra- and inter-coalitional, is a further extension of the analysis that could
provide insights for a more effective climate regime. Finally, the timing in the emissions game
could be changed to a sequential Stackelberg game with one coalition moving before the other,
or the timing might even be endogenized (cf. Heugues, 2012; Eisenack and Kähler, 2015).
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4 | The Influence of Political Pressure
Groups on the Stability of IEAs
4.1 Introduction
Game theoretical studies on the formation and stability of IEAs have pointed out that
strong free-rider incentives exist and that these prevent agreements from being effective (e.g.
Hoel, 1992a; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994, 1997b; Jeppesen and Andersen,
1998).4 A common characteristic of these studies is that the participants in international ne-
gotiations are treated as monolithic and benevolent governments that truly represent the com-
mon interests of their nations.5 Furthermore, it is assumed that governments only care about
the aggregated welfare level of their respective country. Thus, in this view, welfare maximiz-
ation is the main force that drives environmental policy decisions. However, recent events in
the international policy arena have illustrated the fact that national political actors (e.g. lobby
groups and voters) are able to affect environmental policy-making, both at the national and the
international level.6
Even though the game theoretical analysis of IEAs has yielded many important insights, it has
so far largely ignored the fact that governments often have interests not in line with those of
their constituency. Moreover, it has not been considered in this literature that the electoral
process and the lobby groups may influence what governments would do at the international
negotiation tables. In particular, lobby groups (e.g. business associations and environmental
NGOs) may be able to affect the behavior of politicians by providing information, by financing
election campaigns, or by bringing environmental concerns to the forefront of the minds of the
4This chapter is based on Hagen et al. (2016).
5Chapter 2 and Wangler et al. (2013) argue for extending the game theoretical analysis of IEAs to consider
actors that are not nation state governments.
6Although there are some corporations that support the US climate agenda adopted during Obama’s presidency,
e.g. Mars, Ikea, Kellogg’s and Unilever, these are outnumbered by the efforts of powerful lobbies like the US
Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers and the many lobbyists from the coal, oil
and natural gas industries (Gunther, 2015). Only recently, in 2015, the oil company BP announced that it will stop
funding the American Legislative Exchange Council, a lobbying group that presented biased reports about climate
science to US state legislators (Frumhoof and Oreskes, 2015).
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voters (Grossman and Helpman, 2001). These political factors play an important role when
the national representatives meet at the international level and will in turn impact the decision
whether or not to participate in an IEA.
Most of the studies on the influence of interest groups on policy-making focus on the role of
producer groups in the determination of trade policies. In this area, the political contributions
approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995, 1996) is a standard model. Grossman and
Helpman study the effect of lobby contributions on trade policies. They consider self-interested
policy-makers who seek to maximize the sum of lobby contributions and the welfare of the me-
dian voter in order to increase their chances to be reelected. The political contributions approach
has further been applied to study environmental policy-making (e.g. Fredriksson, 1997; Aidt,
1998; Conconi, 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2005; Aidt and Hwang, 2014; Batina and Galinato,
2014). Fredriksson (1997) shows that there is a relation between the strength of lobby activ-
ities and the deviation from an optimal pollution tax. Aidt (1998) explains that lobby groups,
through the competitive political process, are important to internalize production externalities.
Conconi (2003) shows that the impact of lobby groups on environmental policy depends on
the trade policy regime and the size of the transboundary environmental spillovers. Fredriks-
son et al. (2005) report empirical evidence for OECD countries that there is an effect of lobby
actions on policy-making and that it is more likely to occur in countries with sufficiently high
levels of political competition. Aidt and Hwang (2014) study the effects of foreign lobbying
on another country’s welfare; they find that lobby efforts, as a means of political internalization
of cross country externalities, only maximize global social welfare under very restrictive as-
sumptions but usually inefficiencies prevail. Batina and Galinato (2014) describe the tradeoffs
between the influence of the environmental damage caused by the resource extraction and the
contributions received from lobbies, when these contributions affect a government’s tax and ex-
penditure policies in the presence of tax competition with other governments. Empirical work
by Fredriksson et al. (2007) shows that the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has been facilit-
ated by environmental lobbying in particular in countries with a lower integrity of government.
Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2007) have studied the impact of lobby groups on the stability of
climate agreements in a empirically calibrated simulation model. They find that although lobby
contributions may help to stabilize IEAs the additional greenhouse gas abatement is insigni-
ficant. Anger et al. (2015) use a theoretical and empirical framework to assess the effect of
lobbies on emission allowance allocations under the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). They
find that because of lobbying of energy-intensive firms within the ETS, the regulatory burden
of emission abatement is shifted to non-ETS sectors that might be subject to inefficiently high
emission taxes.
There are few examples of theoretical studies that combine an analysis of the influence of in-
terest groups (e.g. using the political contributions approach) with an analysis of the stability
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of IEAs. Such combined approach is adopted, for instance, by Soo-Kim (2013) who analyzes,
in a two-country, two-goods model, the conditions under which politically viable IEAs could
evolve; he finds that two critical factors for viable IEAs are the price elasticity of supply and
the weight the politicians place on the general welfare versus lobby contributions. Closest to
this chapter is the work by Haffoudhi (2005) and Marchiori et al. (2017) who have studied the
impact of lobby groups on the size and stability of IEAs for homogeneous countries. Haffoudhi
(2005) finds that a global agreement would be sustained by means of industry lobby contri-
butions. Similarly, Marchiori et al. (2017) find that a strong industry lobby may increase the
incentives of the government to participate in an agreement. This result is driven by the as-
sumption that the government can commit to a stricter abatement policy by joining the IEA and
thereby collect larger lobby contributions from industry.
This chapter extends this work. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that lobbies
try to influence government’s policy decisions and we abstract from the election process. We
represent lobbies’ influence as prospective contributions that enter into the government’s polit-
ical revenue function and are made conditional on a change of government’s policy decisions.
Different from Haffoudhi (2005) and Marchiori et al. (2017), we relax the assumption that coun-
tries are symmetric. We allow for different lobby strength in different countries. This allows us
to study impacts of changing lobby strength in a particular country on the stability of an IEA.
For that we employ the concept of internal and external stability (d’Aspremont et al., 1983).
The formation of IEAs is modeled as a game in which governments decide about their par-
ticipation before they choose their abatement strategies - considering both net benefits from
abatement and the prospective lobby contributions. We assume that there are two lobbies from
which governments can obtain contributions: industry and environmentalist. We consider that
the level of contributions depends on each lobby’s payoff function and the abatement strategy
chosen by the government. The payoff of an environmentalist lobby depends on the additional
abatement efforts undertaken. We assume that the industry lobby is always harmed if the gov-
ernment increases abatement. Our results show that the influence of lobby-groups has an effect
on the abatement decisions of the respective countries. This influence can be observed for mem-
bers of an IEA as well as for outsiders. However, in the case of IEA-members, the effects of
lobbying are not restricted to the lobby’s host-country but spill over to other member countries
and have ambiguous effects on the IEA-stability.
First, we lay out our model and explain the stages of the game. We then solve the game by
backward induction and focus on the abatement decisions of the countries and the stability of
the IEA before the chapter concludes with a summary and discussion.
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4.2 Description of the Model
We study the impact of lobbying on the formation and stability of IEAs in a sequential
game. The players in our game are lobbies and governments in n countries. The set of countries
is denoted N . An IEA is a subset of all countries S ⊆ N . Our game starts with (1) the
announcements of the lobby-contributions. This is followed by the workhorse model of IEA
formation with two stages (2) governments’ participation decision and (3) the transboundary
pollution game. Finally, (4) lobby contributions are paid according the announcements at stage
1. We describe these stages in more detail in turn.
4.2.1 The Announcement of the Lobby-Contributions and Formation of
an IEA
Lobbying takes place in all countries i ∈ N and affects national policies. In our model
the policy space is the level of abatement, reflecting the strictness of the environmental policy
adopted. Hence, a particular policy is described by a variable qi ∈ [0, e¯i] , where index i refers
to an individual country and e¯i is the level of business-as-usual emissions of a country. We
denote the policy of a signatory country i ∈ S by qsi and the policy of i ∈ N \ S, an outsider,
by qouti . Following a common assumption in the literature (c.f. Grossman and Helpman, 1996;
Aidt, 1998; Conconi, 2003), we assume two exogenously given lobby groups, (i) the industry,
referred to as "firms" f , and (ii) the environmentalists, referred to as "greens" g. The firms’
preferred policy is qi = 0, i.e. their preferred level of abatement is zero as this avoids abatement
costs. By contrast the greens’ preferred policy is full abatement, i.e. qi = e¯i. Hence both lobbies
pull in opposite directions. The government maximizes a political revenue function that reflects
social welfare and the influence of lobby groups. We model lobby pressure as prospective
contributions that reflect the willingness to pay of a lobby to influence the government’s policy
decisions in their favor.
Contributions represent the monetary value assigned to all lobbying activities that influence the
government’s decisions.7 The political revenue function thus has two components. First, it is
a function of a country’s net benefits from the climate policy adopted. This may include the
net benefits resulting from participating in an IEA. Second, political revenue depends on the
contributions from lobby groups.
The political revenue function of the government in country i, pii, reflects the benefits and
costs of greenhouse gas abatement and the prospective contributions, L, from lobby groups
7Some authors argue that contributions may be interpreted as bribes in order to influence government policies
(see Schulze and Ursprung, 2001).
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supporting the government’s policy. The political revenue function is
pii(qi, q) = Bi(q)− Ci(qi) + λiLi(qi, q) (4.1)
where Bi(q) are the total benefits from global abatement denoted by q =
∑
i∈N qi, and Ci(qi)
are the total abatement costs from own abatement qi. We assume that Bi(q) is concave, i.e.
∂Bi
∂q
> 0 and ∂
2Bi
∂q2
≤ 0, Ci(qi) is strictly convex, i.e. ∂Ci∂qi > 0 and ∂
2Ci
∂q2i
> 0. The parameter λi
captures the relative weight of contributions compared to net benefits from abatement. Finally,
Li(qi, q) ≥ 0, represents the total contributions from local lobbies. Total lobby contributions are
the sum of firms’ and greens’ contributions, Li(qi, q) ≡ Lfi (qi)+Lgi (q) with firms’ contributions
∂Lfi
∂qi
< 0 and ∂
2Lfi
∂q2i
< 0 and greens’ contributions ∂L
g
i
∂q
> 0 and ∂
2Lgi
∂q2
≤ 0. Lobby contributions
will be further specified below.
In the first stage lobby groups announce their prospective contributions to their coun-
tries’ governments that are contingent on the governments’ abatement decisions. At stage 2 all
countries i ∈ N decide simultaneously whether or not to join an IEA. We denote a country i’s
choice to join and become a signatory by σi = 1. If country i does not join, σi = 0, it remains a
singleton player. The signatories S ⊆ N act jointly at stage 3, i.e. they act like a single player
in the subsequent transboundary pollution game. If no country or only a single country joins
the IEA, then there is no effective agreement. We refer to this situation as "‘All Singletons"
and denote it by S = ∅. If S = N , we have the Grand Coalition. We assume that signatories
make a binding agreement. Hence, we restrict our attention to participation and do not discuss
enforcement.8
4.2.2 The Transboundary Pollution Game and Payment of the Lobby-
contributions
Our model of transboundary pollution is standard in the literature and has been used
in recent contributions (e.g. Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009). We consider a uniformly mixing
pollutant (such as greenhouse gases). In this setting, abatement is a pure public good. At the
abatement stage the IEA has been formed and, as indicated before, we assume that it behaves
like a single player. Hence the players of the transboundary pollution game are the IEA and
the remaining singletons. Each non-signatory government chooses abatement to maximize its
political revenue given by (4.1). To arrive at closed form solutions we assume that benefits are
linear and costs are quadratic in abatement. Further we aim to focus our study on the effects of
lobby-groups on governments’ abatement and participation decisions and therefore assume in
the following that countries are symmetric in their direct costs and benefits from abatement but
8McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) and Yu (2017, Ch. 5) introduce models that address both issues.
48 The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of IEAs
governments attach different relative weights to contributions. Thus we have
pii(qi, q) = bq − 1
2
cqi
2 + λiLi(qi, q). (4.2)
Signatory governments cooperatively decide about their abatement to maximize the joint pay-
offs, including lobby contributions. The abatement decisions are taken in a simultaneous-move
game. After the governments have decided about their emissions abatement, payoffs are de-
termined on the basis of abatement costs and benefits, and lobby groups pay the contributions
according to their announcements. Given our specifications this game has a unique Nash equi-
librium.
4.3 Emission Abatement
The game is solved by backward induction. We start the analysis at the last stage of the
game. At this stage, lobbies pay their contributions depending on the abatement decisions of
the countries. Lobbies are committed to the contribution schedules announced in the first stage
of the game. Here the analysis can draw on results by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) who have
shown that lobby-groups do not lose by announcing truthful contribution schedules. A truthful
contribution schedule is one that reflects the gains of a lobby from influencing the government’s
policy decisions in their favor. In our game firms gain from lower abatement as they save costs;
environmentalists gain from higher (global) abatement as pollution damages are reduced. Thus
the lobby contributions can be described as follows.
Firms in country i face additional abatement costs. They bear a fraction φi of these costs while
a fraction 1 − φi is passed on to consumers. Hence we stipulate that firms’ willingness to pay
for reducing abatement is given by
Lfi (qi) = Lˆi
f − φi1
2
cqi
2 (4.3)
where Lˆf denotes the contribution that firms are willing to make if their preferred policy option
qi = 0 is adopted.9 The greens appreciate any avoided damage from emissions, i.e. the benefits
of abatement. Their willingness to pay for additional abatement is as follows
Lgi (q) = γiq (4.4)
9Other assumptions for the firms are also possible and do not change the results as long as both lobby groups
choose to pay lobby contributions and we have an interior solution. Since we observe both environmentalists’ and
firms’ lobbying activities in the international policy arena this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
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where γi is a scaling parameter that captures the greens’ preference for money vis-à-vis the
avoided damage. In contrast to the firms the greens offer contributions that depend on global
abatement as they are concerned with damages from pollution. We consider only positive lobby
contributions (c.f. Habla and Winkler, 2013) so that lobbies are not compensated for potential
losses from the government’s decisions.
In the third stage of the game the amount of emissions abatement is chosen. All non-
signatories maximize their political revenue functions simultaneously with the signatories’ joint
decision. Maximization of (4.2) yields the non-signatories’ abatement decision dependent on
the lobby-contributions proposed in the first stage:
qouti =
b+ λiL
′
i(q
out
i , q)
c
. (4.5)
The signatories of the IEA coordinate their environmental policies to maximize the joint polit-
ical revenues of the governments involved piS(qsi , q), i.e.
piS(qsi , q) =
∑
i∈S
pii(q
s
i , q) =
∑
i∈S
[bq − 1
2
c(qsi )
2 + λiLi(q
s
i , q)]. (4.6)
The solution of this maximization problem yields the abatement decision for each member
country i dependent on the lobby contributions
qsi =
∑
j∈S (b+ λjL
′
j(q
s
j ))
c
. (4.7)
Inserting (4.3) and (4.4) in (4.5) gives the quantities of emissions abatement that are undertaken
by outsiders
qouti =
b+ λiγi
c(1 + λiφi)
. (4.8)
We see that non-signatories have dominant abatement strategies that do not depend on the num-
ber of IEA-signatories nor on the abatement of others. The quantities of emission abatement of
a signatory country i can be found by inserting (4.3) and (4.4) in (4.7) and reads
qsi =
∑
j∈S (b+ λjγj)
c(1 + λiφi)
. (4.9)
Comparing (4.8) and (4.9) we directly see that signatories abate a larger amount of their emis-
sions than the non-signatories assuming the strength of lobby contributions is the same across
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countries.
Proposition 4.1. The inclusion of lobby groups has an effect on the optimal abatement quant-
ities of signatories and non-signatories. (1) The inclusion of firms’ lobby contributions in any
country i ∈ N \S results in lower abatement in that country. (2) The inclusion of green lobbies
in country i ∈ N \ S results in higher abatement in that country. (3) In signatory countries
green lobbying has a spillover effect on abatement decisions in all other signatory countries,
i.e. other signatories abate more as a response to green lobby contributions in some member
country i.
Proof. Appendix 4.6.1.
Already at this stage we see from part (1) of Proposition 4.1 that lobby groups influence
global emissions abatement in the "All Singletons" situation with S = ∅ and in the case of
partial coalitions S ⊆ N . While the presence of greens leads to a larger amount of globally
abated emissions, firms’ lobbying reduces global efforts to mitigate climate change. From part
(3) of Proposition 4.1 we see an effect of green lobbying on the abatement of not only the
lobby’s host country but also other members. We refer to this as the leverage effect of green
lobbying in member countries.
4.4 IEA Formation
To solve the participation stage of the game we apply the concept of potential internal
stability (Carraro et al., 2006; Weikard, 2009) which employs the idea that transfers between
coalition members can guarantee internal stability if and only if the coalition payoff (weakly)
exceeds the sum of outside option payoffs. The outside option payoff is the payoff that accrues
to a member when it leaves the coalition while the others maintain membership (as we only
consider single deviations). Potential internal stability is a refinement of the concepts of internal
and external stability that are widely used in IEA analysis. These concepts, initially borrowed
from cartel-theory (d’Aspremont et al., 1983), define a stable coalition as one in which no
member is better off by leaving the coalition and no non-member gains by joining the coalition.
To ease the analysis and drawing on the fact that the subgame starting at stage 3, the abatement
game with lobbying, has a unique equilibrium, we can define a partition function, that is, we
can write each government’s payoff as a function of the coalition that has been formed at the
previous stage.
Vi(S) ≡ piSi (qsi , q), i ∈ S
Vi(S) ≡ piouti (qouti , q), i ∈ N \ S.
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In a setting with symmetric countries an analysis of IEA stability is usually based on a stability
function that describes the incentives of a country to be a member of a coalition as a function
of the size of the coalition. In our setting with asymmetric countries incentives of a country to
be in coalition S may depend on the characteristics of the members of S. A country’s incentive
Γi to participate in S is defined as Γi ≡ Vi(S) − Vi(S−i). Potential internal stability is defined
as follows.
Definition 4.1. Coalition S ⊆ N is potentially internally stable if and only if∑i∈S Γi ≥ 0.
Given the specifications we have adopted, and using notation q∗(S) for the equilibrium
abatement at stage 3, we can write the condition of potential internal stability as follows.
Γ(S) ≡
∑
i∈S
Γi =
∑
i∈S
bq∗(S)−
∑
i∈S
1
2
c(q∗i (S))
2 +
∑
i∈S
λi[L
f
i (q
∗
i (S)) + L
g
i (q
∗(S)))]
−
∑
i∈S
bq∗(S−i) +
∑
i∈S
1
2
c(qouti )
2 −
∑
i∈S
λi[L
f
i (q
out
i ) + L
g
i (q
∗(S−i))]. (4.10)
Since in absence of lobbying countries are symmetric by assumption, we obtain in this case
from equation (4.10)
Γ(S) =
∑
i∈S
b[q∗(S)− q∗(S−i)]−
∑
i∈S
1
2
c[(q∗i (S))
2 − (qouti )2]. (4.11)
By substituting q∗i (S) =
∑
j∈S b
c
and qouti =
b
c
into (4.11) we obtain the well-known result that a
coalition of three countries is internally stable (c.f. e.g. Barrett, 1994). We can now turn to the
effects of lobbying activities on the stability of IEAs through further inspection of (4.10).
We can show the following.
Proposition 4.2. Lobbying activities in free-riding countries have no effect on coalition stabil-
ity.
Proof. Appendix 4.6.2.
Both green and firm lobbying activities in non-signatory countries have no effect on
the coalition stability. This holds although lobbying in these countries changes their emissions
abatement and in turn also the benefits of coalition members. The incentives to join or leave the
coalition are unaffected by non-signatories’ lobbying because the change of benefits through
spillovers affects the coalition payoff and the outside option payoff in the same way.
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Proposition 4.3. (i) Contributions of a green lobby in a signatory country with (sufficiently)
high political revenues from abatement have a positive effect on coalition stability. (ii) Contri-
butions of a green lobby in a signatory country with (sufficiently) low political revenues from
abatement have a negative effect on coalition stability.
Proof. Appendix 4.6.3.
To understand the intuition for Proposition 4.3 it is helpful to think about the different
types of gains from cooperation that occur when a country joins the coalition in relation to its
gains as a free-rider. On the one hand, welfare gains are achieved by internalizing the posit-
ive externalities among the members. However, these gains also benefit free-riding countries.
Finus and McGinty (2015) argue that a second type of gains from joining a coalition exists and
is of high importance for the stability of the coalition: the gains from cost-effective cooperation
which are exclusive to the members and thus increase the gains from cooperation relative to the
gains from free-riding10. Finus and McGinty (2015) show that those gains increase with the
degree of asymmetry of benefit shares. For singletons, large asymmetries of marginal benefits
will result in abatement choices characterized by large differences of marginal costs between
countries. The latter implies an inefficiency, that can be removed when countries form a coali-
tion. In our case we see that green lobby-contributions in a country with already existing strong
lobbies increase coalition stability. This results from an increase of the asymmetry of marginal
political revenues that member countries get from abatement, as this increases cooperative gains
that are exclusive to the coalition. Conversely, additional green lobby contributions in a mem-
ber country with low green lobby contributions decrease asymmetry of political revenues from
abatement and thus have a negative effect on the gains from cooperation and coalition stability.
Proposition 4.4. The effects of firms’ lobbying activities in a signatory country on coalition
stability depend on the distribution of green lobby activities across other member countries.
Firms’ lobby activities will have a positive effect on coalition stability if political revenues from
abatement are evenly distributed. If political revenues of other member countries are sufficiently
dispersed, firms’ lobbying activities will have a negative impact on coalition stability.
Proof. Appendix 4.6.4.
This result can best be understood in light of the findings of Finus and McGinty (2015).
They show that highly asymmetric benefits between members may help to stabilize large coali-
tions. Here we see that in these cases where strong green lobbying in just few countries (strong
asymmetry of political revenues between member countries) stabilizes larger coalitions, firms’
lobby contributions counteract the stabilization. Firms’ lobby contributions can then effectively
10Note that these gains hinge on the existence of transfers as discussed by Weikard and Dellink (2014).
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reduce the size of the IEA and, in turn, lower the abatement of both the remaining members
and of countries leaving the coalition. In contrast, when green lobby contributions are similar
in member countries (weak asymmetry of political revenues between member countries) then
firms’ contributions may increase coalition stability. This could generate larger coalitions, but
with modest abatement targets of the member countries as firms’ contributions drives political
revenues.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emis-
sions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of IEAs. We study IEAs as a coalition
formation process. The formation of an IEA is modeled as a game in which lobbies announce
their contributions at the first stage before governments choose their participation. In the next
stage countries choose their abatement strategies considering both net benefits of abatement
and lobby contributions. Finally lobby contributions are paid contingent on the governments
abatement decisions. We assume that there are two lobbies from which governments obtain
contributions: industry and environmentalist. We consider that the levels of the respective con-
tributions depend on each lobby’s payoff function and the abatement strategy chosen by the
government. The payoff of an environmentalist lobby depends on the additional abatement
efforts undertaken by the government. Further we assume that the industry lobby is always
harmed if the government increases abatement.
In our model, lobby contributions have an effect on the abatement decisions of IEA sig-
natories and outsiders. Firms’ contributions reduce emissions abatement of the host country of
the lobby while environmentalists’ contributions give incentives for more ambitious abatement
targets. While firms’ lobbying activities only influence the abatement levels of the host country,
be it a coalition member or a free-rider, we observe a leverage effect of green lobbying activities
in member countries: a stronger green lobby increases the abatement levels not only of the host
country but also of all other members.
The effects on the coalition stability in contrast are ambiguous. Lobbying activities in
free-riding countries have no effect on the stability of IEAs whereas lobby-groups in coun-
tries that are coalition members affect the coalition’s stability. Firms’ lobby-contributions have
a stabilizing effect on the coalition if benefits from abatement are evenly distributed among
members. If benefits from abatement are sufficiently dispersed among other members, firms’
contributions will have a negative impact on coalition stability. The effect of green lobby con-
tributions also depends on the distribution of benefits that governments gain from abatement:
if the host country has sufficiently high revenues from abatement they have a positive effect
on coalition stability. However, if the host country has sufficiently low revenues from abate-
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ment green lobby-contributions have a destabilizing effect. Our results qualify the findings of
Marchiori et al. (2017) by allowing for asymmetric countries. In case of symmetric countries
we also find a stabilizing effect of firm’s lobby contributions on the coalition. However, this
effect changes when countries are sufficiently asymmetric in their benefits from abatement in
which case increasing firm contributions decrease coalition stability. We can conclude that the
influence of lobby groups does not only change the abatement decisions of countries but also
affects the stability of IEAs. It indeed may have a positive effect on the stability of IEAs but the
effects on coalition stability crucially depends on the composition of the coalition and is often
not straightforward. Further extensions of our work could include the analysis of transnational
lobby activities. This can include industry lobby groups and green NGOs at an international
scale as well as national lobby groups that have direct influence on other than their home coun-
tries.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
As the abatement decisions are given by (4.8) for singletons and (4.9) for IEA-
signatories, comparative statics show that (1) firms’ lobby activities lower abatement:
∀i ∈ N \ S : ∂q
out
i
∂φi
= −λi(b+ λiγi)
c(1 + λiφi)2
< 0,
∀i ∈ S : ∂q
s
i
∂φi
= −λi
∑
i∈S (b+ λiγi)
c(1 + λiφi)2
< 0.
(2) Greens’ lobby activities increase abatement:
∀i ∈ N \ S : ∂q
out
i
∂γi
=
λi
c(1 + λiφi)
> 0
∀i ∈ S : ∂q
s
i
∂γi
=
λi
c(1 + λiφi)
> 0
(3) Green lobby activities of signatories have positive spillover effects on other members
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∀i, j ∈ S, j 6= i : ∂q
s
i
∂γj
=
λj
c(1 + λiφi)
> 0.
It is also clear that singletons are not affected by any spillovers
∀j 6= i : ∂q
out
i
∂φj
= 0,
∀j 6= i : ∂q
out
i
∂γj
= 0,
and that firms’ lobbying in country i ∈ S does not affect other members
∀i, j ∈ S, j 6= i : ∂q
s
i
∂φj
= 0.
4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Substituting the specifications of lobby contributions in eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) into equa-
tion (4.2) we obtain pii = bq − 12cq2i + λiγiq + λi(L̂fi − φi 12cq2i ). Rearranging gives pii =
(b+ λiγi)q − 12c(1 + λiφi)q2i + λiL̂fi . Now define βi ≡ b+ λiγi and αi ≡ c(1 + λiφi) in order
to write
pii = βiq − 1
2
αiq
2
i + λiL̂
f
i . (4.12)
This shows that our game with lobbying can be represented as a linear quadratic goods game
with asymmetric players. Using (4.12) and the optimal abatement levels (4.8) and (4.9) we can
rewrite eq. (4.10), the condition for potential internal stability as follows11:
Γ = −1
2
(∑
i∈S
βi
)2∑
i∈S
1
αi
− 3
2
∑
i∈S
β2i
αi
+
∑
i∈S
βi
∑
i∈S
βi
αi
+
∑
i∈S
β2i
∑
i∈S
1
αi
. (4.13)
11Condition (4.13) has also been established by Weikard (2009, eq. 10).
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It is clear from (4.13) that coalition stability only depends on parameters αi and βi with i ∈ S
and, thus, is independent of lobby activities of non-signatories.
4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
We examine the effect of green lobby activities in a member country on coalition sta-
bility by checking the sign of ∂Γ
∂γi
. Notice that ∂βi
∂γi
= λi and ∂αi∂γi = 0. Hence we can simply
consider ∂Γ
∂βi
. Taking derivatives of (4.13) we obtain
∂Γ
∂βi
=
∑
j∈S
1
αj
(
2βi −
∑
j∈S
βj
)
+
∑
j∈S
βj
αj
+
1
αi
∑
j∈S
βj − 3βi
αi
=
 1
αi
+
∑
j∈S−i
1
αj
βi − ∑
j∈S−i
βj
+ ∑
j∈S−i
βj
αj
+
1
αi
∑
j∈S−i
βj − βi
αi
= βi
∑
j∈S−i
1
αj
−
∑
j∈S−i
1
αj
∑
j∈S−i
βj +
∑
j∈S−i
βj
αj
=
∑
j∈S−i
1
αj
βi − ∑
j∈S−i
βj
+ ∑
j∈S−i
βj
αj
.
We can see from the first term that it has a positive sign if βi is sufficiently large. This is the
case if γi is sufficiently large, given the strengths of the lobby contributions in all other signatory
countries.
4.6.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4
We examine the effect of firms’ lobby activities in a member country on coalition sta-
bility by checking the sign of ∂Γ
∂φi
. Notice that ∂Γ
∂φi
= ∂Γ
∂αi
∂αi
∂φi
,∂αi
∂φi
= cλi > 0 and ∂βi∂φi = 0 . Hence
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we can simply consider ∂Γ
∂αi
. Taking derivatives of (4.13) we obtain
∂Γ
∂αi
= − 1
α2i
−1
2
(∑
j∈S
βj
)2
+
∑
j∈S
β2j + βi
∑
j∈S
βj − 3
2
β2i

= − 1
α2i
−1
2
βi + ∑
j∈S−i
βj
2 + β2i + ∑
j∈S−i
β2j + β
2
i + βi
∑
j∈S−i
βj − 3
2
β2i

= − 1
α2i
−1
2
β2i − βi
∑
j∈S−i
βj − 1
2
∑
j∈S−i
βj
2 + ∑
j∈S−i
β2j + β
2
i + βi
∑
j∈S−i
βj − 1
2
β2i

= − 1
α2i
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The term in brackets is negative for an even distribution of other member countries’ green lobby
activities. Hence ∂Γ
∂φi
> 0 and the impact of firms’ lobby contribution on coalition stability is
positive. As green lobby activities in other member countries are sufficiently dispersed, the term
brackets will be positive and, hence, ∂Γ
∂φi
< 0. Then the impact of firms’ lobby contribution on
coalition stability is negative.
58 The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of IEAs
5 | Boon or Bane? Trade Sanctions and
the Stability of IEAs
5.1 Introduction
In spite of scientific agreement on the negative effects of anthropogenic climate change,
efforts to find cooperative solutions at the international UN climate negotiations have been
unsatisfactory so far.12 Game theoretic strands of economic literature have studied the form-
ation and stability of international environmental agreements and found that it is difficult to
reach large stable climate coalitions due to strong free-rider incentives (see Marrouch and Ray
Chaudhuri, 2016, for a comprehensive overview of the literature).13
Given the global public bad characteristics of greenhouse gas emissions, the absence
of global cooperation gives rise to two important questions for countries intending to enhance
global emission abatement: (i) How to design second-best unilateral policies and (ii) how to
incentivize broader cooperation? A principal approach to both questions is to link climate
and trade policy: the use or the threat of trade measures against countries without emission
regulations.
As to (i), the policy debate is concerned with drawbacks of unilateral policies associated
to carbon leakage, i.e. an emission increase in unconstrained regions triggered by domestic
climate policy. Two interrelated mechanisms can lead to carbon leakage (Felder and Rutherford,
1993): a shift of emission-intensive production to competitors abroad due to cost-disadvantages
from carbon pricing for domestic firms. Likewise, international prices for fossil fuels might
drop due to climate policies, thereby incentivizing higher fossil fuel consumption in unregulated
economies. Anti-leakage measures are discussed, among others, in the form of border carbon
adjustments: countries with a domestic carbon price could tax carbon embodied in imports from
unregulated regions, and likewise rebate carbon payments to exports to unregulated regions.14
12This chapter is based on Hagen and Schneider (2017).
13Recent extensions of the game theoretic literature include inter alia multiple agreements (Chapter 3) or min-
imum participation constraints (Weikard et al., 2015; Carraro et al., 2009).
14In policy proposals, border carbon adjustments are primarily considered for sectors that show high emission
and trade intensities.
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A major finding of applied studies on border carbon adjustments is that they shift substantial
parts of the burden of emission reduction to developing countries. The burden shifting effect is
related to the economic theory on optimal tariffs (Limão, 2008): countries are able to benefit
from the introduction of import tariffs in terms of domestic welfare, while their trading partners
suffer losses. The basic mechanism is a change in the ratio of export and import prices – the
terms of trade – in favor of the tariff imposing country.
The rationale for trade sanctions to approach question (ii) builds on the aforementioned
insight from trade theory that import tariffs can benefit the importer and hurt the exporting
country, as this could make import tariffs a credible threat in the international game for green-
house gas reductions. Tariffs in this case are imposed as sanctions and are meant to be punitive
to non-participants.15 The rationale for the use of trade sanctions is thus rather rooted in stra-
tegic considerations: cooperation on free trade is made conditional on cooperation on emission
abatement.
To date, there are no trade measures in climate policy in place.16 Nonetheless, trade
measures in the form of border carbon adjustments are mentioned as possible complementary
measures in the EU Emissions Trading Directive (2009/29/EC) as well as in all the major US
climate bills, i.e. the Waxman-Markey bill (US Congress, 2009), the Kerry-Boxer bill (Larsen
et al., 2009), and the Cantwell-Collins bill (Larsen and Bradbury, 2010). The justification of
trade measures in these climate policy legislations and bills has focused on carbon leakage and
related concerns on competitiveness losses of emission-intensive and trade-exposed domestic
industries.
In recent years, the focus of the debate on trade measures has shifted from tariffs as a
second-best instrument combating carbon leakage to the appeal of tariffs as a strategic stick to
foster cooperation. In particular, the announced withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement
has opened a new debate on the role of punitive tariffs (Kemp, 2017).17
Previous studies on trade sanctions as a strategic means in climate policy have concluded
that even low import tariffs are an effective tool to reach larger coalitions (Lessmann et al., 2009;
Nordhaus, 2015). However, these studies rely on the assumption that outsiders of the coalition
are not able to retaliate by imposing import tariffs themselves.18 This is a crucial assumption
15Prominently, Joseph Stiglitz has explicitly argued in this vein, stating “Fortunately, we have an international
trade framework that can be used to force states that inflict harm on others to behave in a better fashion.” (Stiglitz,
2006)
16In contrast, in the Montreal Protocol from 1987, which controls substances that deplete the ozon layer, the
incorporation of trade measures is considered to have been successful as a threat to ensure full cooperation (Barrett,
2011).
17Former French President and then presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy: “And so I ask that Europe construct
a carbon tax at Europe’s borders, a tax of one to three percent for all the products that come from the United States,
if the United States exempts itself from the environmental regulations that we ourselves have imposed on our
businesses.” (Harvey, 2016).
18An exception is Böhringer et al. (2016), who include retaliation but don’t use a concept of internal coalition
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given that China has already threatened with trade war should it be subjected to border carbon
adjustments (Voituriez and Wang, 2011) and given increased concerns over protectionism and
trade war (Denyer, 2017).
In this paper, we take a more comprehensive approach and compare implications for co-
alition stability under three principal policy regimes: (i) A regime without trade sanctions; (ii) a
regime in which coalition members use trade sanctions in the form of import tariffs against out-
siders; and (iii) a regime in which coalition members use trade sanctions and outsiders retaliate
with import tariffs.
We combine stylized theoretical analysis in a non-cooperative game theoretic model and
numerical analysis in a static multi-region, multi-sector CGE model of global trade and energy
use. Our theoretical findings suggest that trade sanctions increase the incentives to cooperate
when retaliation is prohibited, which is in line with former findings in the literature. Consid-
ering retaliation by outsiders, however, leads to a “threshold”-effect: coalitions above a certain
size are stabilized compared to the regime without trade sanctions, while coalitions below this
threshold are destabilized. This leads to multiple equilibria. In particular, non-cooperation (the
empty coalition) is always stable in the regime with retaliation. Our numerical analysis indic-
ates that prospects for cooperation are reduced substantially when outsiders are able to retaliate;
the size of the smallest internally stable coalition (other than the empty coalition) in scenarios
with trade sanctions and retaliation is well above the size of the stable coalition in the absence
of trade sanctions for most scenarios.
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, former analyses of trade
sanctions as a means to foster cooperation in climate policy largely relies on the assumption
that outsiders are not able to respond to trade sanctions with retaliation. We consider a re-
gime in which outsiders do retaliate in a theoretical model of an international environmental
agreement. Second, we use a multi-sector, multi-region CGE model with a full representa-
tion of international trade. This allows a quantification of our analytical findings in a setting
with asymmetric regions and where regional and global welfare effects due to climate and trade
policies are fully endogenized.19 This is of particular virtue as the basic mechanism affecting
incentives for cooperation is welfare changes through trade policy.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In Section 5.2, we review related
theoretical and applied literature. In Section 5.3, we briefly discuss the economic rationale for
the use of trade sanctions. After that, we lay out the assumptions in our three policy regimes
in detail. In Section 5.4, we formulate the theoretical model. We subsequently present results
on coalition stability under the three regimes. Section 5.5 introduces the CGE model and data.
stability.
19Nordhaus (2015) argues that including a full international trade model is unnecessarily complex. Instead he
uses what he calls “reduced-form tariff benefit functions” to represent regional welfare changes induced by tariffs
in his C-DICE model. These functions are calibrated using a trade model by Ossa (2014).
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The quantitative results are discussed in Section 5.6 before we conclude in Section 5.7.
5.2 Literature Review
This chapter relates both to the game theoretic literature on the nexus of coalition sta-
bility and trade and to the applied literature on trade measures in subglobal climate policies.
We give an overview of these strands of literature where we focus on work that is more closely
related to our considerations.
The game theoretic literature on IEAs started to analyze the logic of coalition formation
in the 1990s with seminal papers by Hoel (1992b), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and Barrett
(1994). Barrett (1997a) shows in a model with symmetric countries that a trade ban accompan-
ied by a minimum participation clause may help to sustain full cooperation on the provision of
a global public good. In contrast, Dong and Zhao (2009) allow for endogenous tariffs which do
not serve as a sanction to enforce higher cooperation in their model of an IEA. They find that
the total effect of trade on IEA-participation can be positive or negative so that it is not clear if
trade increases cooperation. Conconi and Perroni (2002) show in a cooperative game theoret-
ical setting with three symmetric countries that linking decisions on trade and environment can
have positive effects on cooperation if environmental costs and benefits are small compared to
the costs and benefits of trade policies but can rather hinder cooperation for broader issues like
climate change. Neumayer (2002) and Egger et al. (2011) empirically study determinants of co-
operation in environmental agreements and find that trade openness has a positive influence on
participation. Eichner and Pethig (2013) analyze IEA-formation in a model with consumption
and production of fossil fuel and a composite consumer good and international trade. They find
that with free trade larger coalitions may be sustained than under autarky, but achieve only slight
emissions reductions. The model is extended in Eichner and Pethig (2014) where they show that
the additional option of a fossil-fuel supply tax may increase global emissions reductions.
The applied literature has thoroughly studied border carbon adjustments as a measure to
overcome drawbacks of unilateral carbon pricing associated with carbon leakage – for overview
articles see Böhringer et al. (2012) and Branger and Quirion (2014). The focus of this literat-
ure has been on the ability of border measures as a means to combat carbon leakage, improve
the global cost effectiveness of emission abatement, and reduce adverse impacts on domestic
emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries being subjected to unilateral emission regula-
tion. The main findings on border carbon adjustments are that they markedly reduce carbon
leakage but their impact on global costs is only moderate. Their main effect is a strong burden
shifting from abating to unregulated regions through changes in relative prices of traded goods
(terms of trade).
Recently, the focus in applied research has shifted towards the idea of using trade meas-
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ures not as means to improve sub-global policies given a certain climate coalition, but as a stick
to incentivize cooperation and to enlarge the coalition. To our best knowledge, only two papers
explicitly take into account possible retaliation by regions subjected to tariffs. Böhringer et al.
(2016) use a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and set up a game between a
coalition that is going forward with carbon pricing and non-coalition regions. The coalition can
use carbon tariffs against outsiders. Non-coalition regions can either join the coalition, retaliate,
or do nothing. They show that – even under the threat of retaliation – trade measures can spur
prospects for cooperation. However, they do not use a concept of internal stability of the climate
coalition. Böhringer and Rutherford (2017) investigate prospects of trade sanctions against the
US in order to coerce the US back into the Paris Agreement. They find that even trade war is
no credible threat against the US, as the market power of the US on international markets is too
large.
Most closely related to our analysis are the studies by Lessmann et al. (2009) and Nord-
haus (2015). Lessmann et al. (2009) develop a dynamic model of cooperation and study the
effect of trade sanctions in the form of import tariffs on participation in an IEA. They find that
low tariff rates of 1.5 to 4% are sufficient to induce full cooperation. By assumption, however,
outsiders are not able to retaliate.
In a more recent study, Nordhaus (2015) also suggests trade sanctions in his proposal
for a mechanism that may help to stabilize an international environmental agreement that he
calls ’climate club’.20 These sanctions – in the form of uniform import tariffs – are put in place
against outsiders to increase cooperation and stabilize the climate agreement. From numer-
ical simulations he concludes that prospects for international cooperation increase substantially
when abating regions impose small trade sanctions against non-participants. As in Lessmann
et al. (2009), his results rely on the assumption that outsiders are not able to respond to trade
sanctions by members, assuming the treaty would prohibit retaliation.
5.3 Trade Sanctions, Policy Regimes, and Stability
In order to lay out policy regimes we need to be clear about the economic rationale
behind import tariffs as a sanctioning mechanism, which traces back to Bickerdike (1906). We
discuss this in a non-technical way and describe the details of the policy regimes we analyze in
subsequent sections. This forms the basis for our analytical and numerical considerations.
Assume a large importing region in an undistorted equilibrium. In theory, the domestic
welfare effect of imposing import tariffs is driven by two opposing factors: (i) The tariff reduces
demand for the imported good, which puts a downward pressure on the respective import price.
20Note that there exist other definitions of the concept of climate clubs – see e.g. Weischer et al. (2012),
Widerberg and Stenson (2013), and Chapter 3.
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Consequently, the ratio of export and import prices changes in favor of the tariff imposing
country, which can now pay for more physical units of imports with the same physical amount
of exports. This is the terms-of-trade effect. In that sense, the tariff works as a substitute for the
exertion of market power by consumers on the demand side. (ii) Starting from an undistorted
equilibrium, the tariff creates a deadweight loss.
In a linear demand and supply structure, domestic welfare improvements due to the first
effect are proportional to the tariff rate, while the deadweight loss is quadratic in the tariff rate.
This implies that for low tariff rates the former effect dominates the latter, i.e. there is scope
for welfare improvements for tariff rates up to an “optimal tariff” for the taxing country. Global
welfare, however, will unambiguously decline compared to the undistorted equilibrium due to
the deadweight loss.
We represent these effects in a very stylized way in our analytical model. In the CGE
framework, price changes – and thus terms-of-trade effects – as well as costs due to trade
distortions are endogenous to the represented production, consumption, and trade activities.
We investigate three different policy regimes for international climate policy analytically
and numerically. In all regimes, we assume a global social cost of carbon (SCC) as an exogen-
ous parameter. The global SCC translates into regional SCCs via GDP-shares which can be
interpreted as a regional constant marginal benefit of emission abatement. In a non-cooperative
setting each region has an incentive to abate emissions up the point where marginal abatement
cost equal marginal benefits, i.e. to introduce a CO2 tax equal to its regional SCC. We refer to
this reference situation as the empty coalition.
In our first policy regime – denoted NTRF – we allow cooperation but no trade sanctions.
In this case, regions can form coalitions in order to jointly maximize their net payoffs. In the
second regime – denoted UTRF – coalition members unilaterally impose trade sanctions on
outsiders in the form of uniform import tariffs. Outsiders are prohibited from retaliating. Under
the third regime – denoted RTRF – coalition members impose trade sanctions and outsiders
retaliate by imposing uniform import tariffs themselves.
To investigate coalition stability under different regimes, we apply the concepts of in-
ternal and external stability (d’Aspremont et al., 1983) which are standard in the literature of
IEAs (Hoel, 1992b; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Marchiori et al., 2017). Internal stability
implies that no member country has an incentive to leave the agreement whereas the external
stability condition is satisfied if no outsider has an incentive to join the existing coalition.
5.4 Analytical Model
To study the qualitative effects of trade sanctions and retaliation on the stability of IEAs
we setup a stylized non-cooperative game theoretical model which follows standard assump-
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tions in the IEA-literature (Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri, 2016; Finus, 2001, Chapter 2) before
the simulations in the calibrated CGE model allow for a quantification of the impacts. The
policy regimes without trade sanctions (NTRF) and with unilateral trade sanctions (UTRF) are
completely in line with former work. We develop them here for the sake of completeness and
in order to set up definitions and function specifications to arrive at our main result on coalition
stability under trade sanctions and retaliation ( RTRF). We analyze stable coalitions in the NTRF
regime and then study the impact of a policy regime shift to UTRF and RTRF on the stability
of coalitions.
5.4.1 The Two-Stage Game
The model is set up as a two-stage game (e.g. Barrett, 2001). At the first stage, countries
decide if they join the climate coalition or not. At the second stage, the members of the coalition
decide cooperatively about the amount of emission abatement in a simultaneous game between
the coalition and the outsiders. Assume there are N symmetric regions with individual payoffs
from emission abatement given as
Π(qi, Q) = bQ− C(qi), (5.1)
where qi is the amount of abatement undertaken by region i = 1, . . . , N , and Q =
∑
i qi is
the global amount of abatement. Parameter b ≥ 0 denotes the constant marginal benefit of
emission abatement for an individual region. Hence, we can interpret b as the regional social
cost of carbon, and bN as the global social cost of carbon, accordingly. The abatement cost
function C is a thrice differentiable, monotonically increasing convex function with C(0) = 0,
C ′ > 0, C ′′ > 0, and C ′′′ ≥ 0. We assume that trade sanctions don’t affect abatement costs,
thus results on optimal abatement for individual outsiders and coalition members are valid for
all of our three policy regimes.
The model is solved by backward induction, solving the abatement stage first. At this
stage of the game the number of coalition members k is taken as given and thus not considered
as a decision variable. In the following, we use out as an index for outsiders and coa as an
index for coalition members. First, we determine the outsiders’ abatement decisions q∗out. Each
outsider country chooses qout to maximize (5.1), so that
q∗out = C
′−1(b). (5.2)
It follows that the abatement decision of outsider countries is a dominant strategy and does not
depend on other countries’ decisions.21 To determine the member countries’ abatement decision
21Note that the dominant strategies of outsiders imply that the model results also hold for a sequential Stackel-
berg version of the game (as in e.g. Barrett, 1994; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006; Rubio and Ulph, 2006) with
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q∗coa we consider the joint payoff for a coalition with k members, which is given by
kΠ(qcoa, Q) = kbQ− kC(qcoa). (5.3)
Maximization of (5.3) determines the amount of abatement q∗coa that is undertaken by any mem-
ber country of the agreement as
q∗coa = C
′−1(kb). (5.4)
Comparing (5.2) and (5.4) shows that members of the coalition abate more emissions than
outsiders do. A member country’s emissions abatement depends on the size of the coalition but
is independent of the outsiders’ abatement decisions. Effectively, each member abates up to the
point where marginal abatement cost equal joint marginal benefits in the coalition.22
Now we turn to the membership stage. Let Πcoa(k) denote the payoff of an individual
member in a coalition of k and Πout(k) the payoff for an outsider. Formally, the stability condi-
tions for a coalition of k then read
Πcoa(k) ≥ Πout(k − 1) for internal stability, and
Πout(k) > Πcoa(k + 1) for external stability.
Following Hoel and Schneider (1997) we define the stability function Φ in general as
Φ(k) := Πcoa(k)− Πout(k − 1). (5.5)
Thus, a coalition of size k is internally and externally stable if Φ(k) ≥ 0 and Φ(k + 1) < 0.
In the following, we use superscripts to distinguish between the three policy regimes NTRF,
UTRF, and RTRF.
5.4.2 Policy Regime NTRF: Agreement Stability Without Trade Sanc-
tions
We can use the the abatement decisions of coalition members (5.4) and outsiders (5.2)
in the stability function for the regime without trade sanctions
ΦNTRF (k) = ΠNTRFcoa (k)− ΠNTRFout (k − 1) (5.6)
and state the following Lemma, which assures the existence of a unique internally and externally
stable coalition of at least 2 countries under NTRF .
the coalition deciding first and the outsiders behaving as Stackelberg-followers.
22We mirror this in our numerical analysis, where coalition members set a carbon tax equal to the sum of regional
SCCs in the coalition, see Section 5.5.
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Lemma 5.1. 1. The stability function ΦNTRF (k) is monotonically decreasing in k for all
coalition sizes k ≥ 1.
2. Coalitions of two countries are internally stable.
Proof. Appendix 5.8.1.
It follows that an internally and externally stable coalition is characterized by the largest
integer k that satisfies ΦNTRF (k) ≥ 0. In case of a linear-quadratic specification of the payoff-
function the size of an internally and externally stable coalition under NTRF is 3. Note that
this result hinges on the assumption of linear benefits of abatement (as in e.g. Fuentes-Albero
and Rubio, 2010; Pavlova and de Zeeuw, 2013). Other specifications of the model, as in Barrett
(1994), find the possibility for large coalitions if benefits from cooperation are small. This
effect is known as the paradox of cooperation. As we focus our analytical model on the effects
of trade sanctions on the stability of IEAs we employ a linear-convex specification instead of
emphasizing a more complex payoff structure.
5.4.3 Policy Regime UTRF: Trade Sanctions as a Means for Stability
Now assume that members of the coalition impose unilateral trade sanctions in the form
of import tariffs at rate θ ≥ 0 on the outsiders. We assume throughout this section that the
imposed tariff rate is below the optimal tariff rate. In line with our considerations from Section
5.3, each member will enjoy a welfare gain β(θ,N − k) ≥ 0 from the tariff while outsiders
face a cost ζ(θ, k) ≥ 0 and β and ζ are monotonically increasing in θ (up to the optimal tariff
rate). The magnitude of gains and costs for a specific tariff rate depend on the coalition size. We
can assume that for an individual coalition member, the welfare gain will be greater in smaller
coalitions, as more import flows are taxed at the border. Likewise, losses for outsiders will
increase in the coalition size.
Thus, the stability function becomes23
ΦUTRF (k, θ) = ΠNTRFcoa (k) + β(θ,N − k)− ΠNTRFout (k − 1) + ζ(θ, k − 1). (5.7)
What can we say about moving from NTRF to UTRF, i.e. what is the effect of an imposition of
unilateral trade sanctions on coalition stability? For a clear-cut comparison between NTRF and
UTRF, we take a look at the net stability function, which we define as:
∆ΦUN(θ, k) := ΦUTRF (θ, k)− ΦNTRF (k) = β(θ,N − k) + ζ(θ, k − 1). (5.8)
We can interpret the net stability function as the change in the basic incentive structure when
moving from one regime to the other at a specific coalition size: positive values of the net
23Recall the assumption that trade sanctions don’t affect abatement costs.
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stability function ∆ΦUN indicate that under the UTRF regime it is more attractive to be a
member of a coalition of size k than under NTRF , thus the coalition would be stabilized
through the regime shift; likewise, negative values indicate that the respective coalition would
be destabilized. The net stability function ∆ΦUN is unambiguously positive, which indicates
that for every coalition size k the incentive to be member of the coalition is higher under UTRF
than under NTRF for any tariff rate θ.24
5.4.4 Policy Regime RTRF: Agreement Stability with Trade Sanctions
and Retaliation
The picture changes if outsiders react with retaliatory policies (regime RTRF). Assume
that outsiders raise retaliatory trade sanctions at the same rate as the sanctioning tariff θ. These
in turn benefit the outsiders who gain β(θ, k). The members of the coalition who are now
targeted by trade sanctions themselves lose ζ(θ,N − k). The loss for coalition members thus
increases with the level of retaliatory trade sanctions as well as with the number of outsiders that
apply those sanctions. Including trade sanctions and retaliation, the stability function becomes
ΦRTRF (k, θ) = ΠNTRFcoa (k) + β(θ,N − k)− ζ(θ,N − k)
− ΠNTRFout (k − 1) + ζ(θ, k − 1)− β(θ, k − 1). (5.9)
It is apparent that retaliation has a destabilizing effect compared to unilateral trade sanctions
only (UTRF), as the net stability function
∆ΦRU = ΦRTRF − ΦUTRF = −β(θ, k − 1)− ζ(θ,N − k) (5.10)
is unambiguously negative. The effect is the largest for small coalitions and decreases with the
coalition size.
The more relevant question is: What can we say about a change from NTRF to RTRF?
For simplicity, we make the further assumption that a tariff-imposing region receives the same
benefit β(θ) from each region it taxes, i.e. β(θ,N − k) = (N − k)β(θ). A similar assumption
about the loss of targeted countries implies ζ(θ, k) = kζ(θ). With these additional assumption,
we can formulate our key analytical finding.
Proposition 5.1. The effect of trade sanctions and retaliation on coalition stability compared
to a no-tariff regime depends on the coalition size. Coalitions below a threshold size of k¯ =
(N + 1)/2 are destabilized. For coalitions larger than size k¯ the stabilizing effect of trade
sanctions dominates.
24Recall that we are assuming tariffs rates below the optimal tariff, i.e. sufficiently low to imply welfare gains
for the imposing region.
5.5. Numerical Model, Data, and Scenarios 69
Proof. Appendix 5.8.2.
The stylized analytical representation of an IEA shows the main effects of the introduc-
tion of trade sanctions and the possibility of retaliation by outsiders on the agreement stability
compared to the no-tariff regime. Trade sanctions serve as a means to stabilize coalitions if
retaliation is prohibited. The stabilizing effect increases with the coalition size. However, re-
taliation has a destabilizing effect which is decreasing in the coalition size. The total effect of
both sanctions and retaliation depends on the coalition size: for larger coalitions, the stabilizing
effect of trade sanctions dominates, while for small coalitions the destabilizing effect of retali-
ation dominates. These opposed effects are to be quantified in a numeric modeling approach.
Using a CGE model allows us to endogenize abatement costs as well as welfare effects triggered
by trade measures and to quantify and visualize the effects of trade sanctions and retaliation with
asymmetric countries based on real-world data.
5.5 Numerical Model, Data, and Scenarios
5.5.1 Numerical Model
For our quantitative assessment, we use a standard static multi-region, multi-sector CGE
model of global trade and energy that was developed for numerical analyses on border carbon
adjustments in sub-global climate policies. The CGE framework is particularly well suited to
analyze quantitative implications of trade measures on coalition stability, as global and regional
welfare implications of emission abatement and trade policies are fully endogenized. In this
section, we provide a brief non-technical summary of the model. A detailed description includ-
ing an algebraic formulation can be found in Böhringer et al. (2015).
Primary factors of production comprise labor, capital, and fossil resources. Labor and
capital are assumed to be mobile across sectors within each region but not internationally mo-
bile. Fossil resources (gas, crude oil, and coal) are sector-specific capital in fossil fuel produc-
tion. Factor markets are perfectly competitive.
Final consumption in each region is represented through a representative agent who
receives income from primary factors and maximizes welfare subject to a budget constraint and
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility.
The production of goods other than fossil resources is represented through a standard
nested CES function, where at the top level a composite of value added, energy and material
intermediate inputs trades off with a transport composite of international transport services. In
fossil resource production, the specific resource factor trades off with a Leontief composite
of all other inputs at a constant elasticity of substitution. Output of each production sector is
allocated either to the domestic market or the export market according to a constant-elasticity-
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of-transformation function.
Government and investment demand are fixed at real benchmark levels. Investment is
paid by savings of the representative agent while taxes pay for the provision of public goods
and services.
International trade is modeled following Armington’s differentiated goods approach,
where goods are distinguished by origin (Armington, 1969). The Armington composite for a
traded good is a CES function of domestic production for that sector and an imported composite.
The import composite, in turn, is a CES function of production from all other countries. A
balance of payment constraint incorporates the base-year trade deficit or surplus for each region.
CO2 emissions are linked in fixed proportions to the use of fossil fuels, with region- and
sector-specific CO2 coefficients. Restrictions to the use of CO2 emissions in production and
consumption are implemented through exogenous CO2 taxes. CO2 emission abatement then
takes place by fuel switching or energy savings – either by fuel-non-fuel substitution or by a
scale reduction of production and final demand activities.
5.5.2 Data
For the calibration of model parameters, we use the latest version of the database from
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP version 9) with base-year 2011 (Aguiar et al., 2016).
The GTAP database provides multi-region, multi-sector input-output tables, international trade
flows on the sectoral level, sector- and fuel specific CO2 data, as well as substitution elasticities
for production and trade for 140 regions and 57 sectors. We aggregate the database according to
our research questions, as summarized in Table 5.1. On the regional level, we follow Nordhaus
(2015) and aggregate to the 15 major economic world regions including the USA, Europe,
Japan, Russia, and China. On the sectoral level, we represent the most important sectors when it
comes to the combination of carbon and trade policy: we individually represent the primary and
secondary energy goods coal, crude oil, natural gas, and electricity. Additionally, we include
aggregated sectors for energy- and trade- intensive industries, transport industries, and all other
goods, respectively.
We calibrate the model to base-year input-output data, i.e. we determine the parameters
such that the economic flows represented in the data are consistent with the optimizing behavior
of the economic agents. The responses of agents to price changes are determined by a set of
exogenous elasticities taken from the econometric literature. Elasticities in international trade
(Armington elasticities) and substitution possibilities in production (between primary factor
inputs) are directly provided by the GTAP 9 database. In fossil fuel production, elasticities
of substitution between the resource and all other inputs are calibrated to match exogenous
estimates of fossil-fuel supply elasticities (Graham et al., 1999; Krichene, 2002; Ringlund et al.,
2008).
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Table 5.1: Model sectors and regions
Sectors and commodities Countries and regions
Energy sectors United States of America
Coal Europe
Crude oil China
Natural gas India
Refined oil products Russia
Electricity Japan
Aggregated sectors Canada
EITE* South Africa
Transport Brasil
All other goods Mideast and North Africa
Eurasia
Latin America
Tropical Africa
Middle-income Asia
Rest of the World
* EITE – energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors: chemical products; non-metallic minerals; iron and steel
industry; non-ferrous metals; paper, pulp, and print.
5.5.3 Scenarios
One particular scenario in our simulations is composed of assumptions along four di-
mensions: the global social cost of carbon (SCC), the climate coalition, the policy regime, and
the tariff rate, as summarized in Table 5.2.
Global Social Cost of Carbon
We include four different assumptions about the global SCC – 12.5, 25, 50, and 100
USD per ton of CO2.25 These assumptions are in line with Nordhaus (2015) and with recent
recommendations by the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices chaired inter alia by Joseph
Stiglitz and Lord Nicholas Stern (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017). We denote the
assumptions with SCC-12.5, SCC-25, SCC-50, and SCC-100.
Coalitions
Our analysis comprises 15 regions, which implies 32767 possible coalitions. Each re-
gion has an assigned regional SCC, which is calculated as its base-year share of global GDP
times the global SCC. In the same way as laid out in the analytical model in section 5.4, co-
alitions are specified as follows: within a coalition, individual members take the sum of their
regional SCC’s into account, while outsiders act solely according to their own regional SCC. Ef-
fectively, coalition members apply a tax on CO2 emissions equal to the sum of regional SCC’s of
25For a comprehensive overview of simulations and applications of the concept of the social cost of carbon, see
Metcalf and Stock (2017).
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members, and outsiders apply a CO2 tax equal to their own regional SCC. In the non-cooperative
solution (equivalently: empty coalition) each region applies a CO2 tax equal to their regional
SCC.
Policy Regimes and Tariff Rates
Our policy regimes in the numerical analysis exactly refer to those laid out in Sec-
tion 5.3: In the first regime NTRF, there are no trade sanctions, i.e. regions are solely applying
CO2 taxes, where the tax level depends on whether or not they are part of the coalition. In
the second regime UTRF, we introduce trade sanctions in the form of import tariffs imposed
by the climate coalition against outsiders. The import tariffs apply uniformly over all sectors
of the economy. We include ad-valorem tariff rates from 1% to 10%. This range is in line
with the political discussion, Nordhaus’ analysis and – as the presentation in the next section
reveals – covers the spectrum of results conceivable from our analytical analysis.26 The third
regime RTRF comprises trade sanctions as in UTRF and additionally retaliation by outsiders.
In the case of retaliation (RTRF), our convention is that outsiders retaliate by applying the same
uniform import tariff rate on imports from members that members apply for their part.
Table 5.2: Overview of simulation scenarios
Dimension Description and specification
Global social cost of
carbon
We include four different assumptions about the global social cost of carbon:
SCC-12.5, SCC-25, SCC-50, SCC-100
Coalition We include all possible 32767 coalitions
Policy regime We include three different regimes: NTRF, UTRF, RTRF
Tariff rate Under policy regimes UTRF and RTRF, we include ad-valorem import tariff
rates of 1% to 10%
Business-as-Usual
The non-cooperative solution serves as our business-as-usual for the assessment of wel-
fare changes in the different scenarios.27 Obviously, we have a different business-as-usual for
each assumption about the global SCC. Table 5.3 gives an overview of our business-as-usuals
under the four different assumptions about the global SCC. The first column shows the GDP
shares in our base-year data, which together with the global SCC define the regional SCC, and
26An interesting extension would be a setting in which regions apply the welfare maximizing – i.e. optimal –
tariff rate as e.g. in (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2017). For our analysis, however, the simpler assumption of fixed
tariff rates is more appropriate as it relates to the political discussion, the analytical part and to former analysis by
Nordhaus (2015).
27We calculate welfare as Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV): the amount of USD that has to be added to the
representatives agents’ business-as-usual income such that she enjoys the same utility level as in the counterfactual.
In our case – as real government demand and real investment demand are fixed – regional HEV is the sum of the
change in real private consumption and the change in global emissions valued at the regional SCC.
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thus the regional CO2 taxes in the business-as-usual. Consequently, the regional CO2 taxes
add up to the exogenous global SCC (row “Total”). Additionally, we report the global aver-
age CO2 price, which is the emission-weighted sum of regional CO2 taxes. We see that in the
non-cooperative solution, the global average CO2 price is only slightly above one tenth of the
assumed global SCC.
Table 5.3: Business-as-usual regional GDP shares and CO2 taxes under different assumptions about the
global social cost of carbon
SCC-12.5 SCC-25 SCC-50 SCC-100
GDP share CO2 tax CO2 tax CO2 tax CO2 tax
Europe 26.4 3.30 6.60 13.21 26.41
United States of America 21.7 2.72 5.43 10.87 21.73
China 10.6 1.32 2.65 5.29 10.59
Japan 8.3 1.03 2.07 4.13 8.26
Mideast and North Africa 5.6 0.70 1.40 2.79 5.58
Latin America 4.8 0.61 1.21 2.42 4.85
Middle-income Asia 3.7 0.47 0.93 1.86 3.72
Brasil 3.5 0.43 0.87 1.73 3.47
Eurasia 3.3 0.42 0.83 1.66 3.32
Russia 2.7 0.33 0.67 1.33 2.67
India 2.6 0.33 0.66 1.32 2.63
Canada 2.5 0.31 0.62 1.24 2.49
Rest of the World 2.2 0.28 0.56 1.12 2.24
Tropical Africa 1.5 0.19 0.37 0.74 1.48
South Africa 0.6 0.07 0.14 0.28 0.57
Total 100 12.5 25 50 100
Global average 1.48 2.95 5.86 11.60
Note.— GDP share is given in % of world GDP; CO2 tax is given in USD per ton of CO2; Global average –
emission-weighted average of regional CO2 taxes.
Under each assumption about the global SCC, the policy regime, and the tariff rate, we
calculate regional welfare changes for each of the 15 regions under all possible 32767 coalitions.
In the next step, we check each coalition for internal and external stability, i.e. we compare
for each member region whether it would be better off by leaving the coalition and for each
outsiders region whether it would be better off by joining the coalition.
5.6 Results
In this section, again we discuss the results of our numerical analysis and relate them
to insights from the analytical model in Section 5.4. First we provide an insight to the basic
incentive structure under the three considered policy regimes. In the next part, we analyze
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findings on stable coalitions, before we take a closer look at how the incentive structure changes
when moving from NTRF to RTRF. Finally, we discuss implications for global welfare and
emission levels in stable coalitions under the different policy regimes.
5.6.1 Basic Incentive Structures
Before we present quantitative results on stable coalitions under the three policy regimes
NTRF, UTRF, and RTRF in detail, we present the basic incentive structure with regards to
cooperation. Figure 5.1 shows indicators for these incentives for the four major model regions
in terms of GDP – the United States (US), the European Union (EU), China (CHN), and Japan
(JPN): the “Benefit of in” and the “Cost of out” at an assumed global social cost of carbon
of 25 USD and a tariff rate of 2%. The “Benefit of in” is the welfare change of a region if it
forms a coalition of 1. The “Cost of out” is the welfare change of a region if it leaves the grand
coalition.28
In the absence of trade sanctions (regime NTRF), the “Benefit of in” is zero in all regions,
as a coalition of 1 is technically identical to the non-cooperative equilibrium. The EU is the
only region with a positive “Cost of out”, indicating they would even prefer to stay in the grand
coalition. While the US and Japan would slightly benefit from leaving the grand coalition (in
the form of negative cost), China has by far the strongest incentive to leave the grand coalition.
They would save almost 20 billion USD when going from the grand coalition to the coalition of
14 without China. The underlying reason is the Armington structure of the model. Due to the
differentiation of goods by origin, regions are able to pass costs due to carbon pricing through
to trading partners. In that respect, carbon pricing can to some extent be a substitute for optimal
tariffs and change the terms of trade in favor of the taxing region. Obviously, substitution
possibilities for European goods are rather limited, thus Europe even prefers to remain in the
grand coalition and apply higher carbon prices.29
In case of unilateral tariffs by the coalition (regime UTRF), we clearly see the unam-
biguously positive effect on individual regions incentives. All regions would now prefer to form
a coalition of 1, as they would enjoy welfare gains from taxing all there incoming imports. On
the other hand, all regions would suffer dramatically under leaving the grand coalition and thus
be subjected to tariffs by all 14 remaining coalition members.
Now we turn to the comparison between the unilateral tariff regime (UTRF) and the
retaliation regime (RTRF), i.e., incentives that may be misrepresented when retaliation is pre-
cluded by assumption. Under RTRF, we find that the “Cost of out” is smaller compared to
28These indicators where introduced in Nordhaus (2015).
29The ability to pass through increased production costs might be exaggerated in the Armington structure com-
pared to trade models relying on Melitz’ formulation of firm heterogeneity, where average firm productivities adjust
endogenously (Melitz, 2003). For structural sensitivity analyses on impacts of carbon pricing and trade policies
under different trade formulations see Balistreri and Rutherford (2012); Balistreri and Markusen (2009).
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Figure 5.1: “Benefit of in” and “Cost of out” at a global social cost of carbon of 25 USD and a tariff rate
of 2% under NTRF, UTRF, and RTRF. US – United States; EU – Europe; CHN – China; JPN – Japan;
Benefit of in – welfare change of a region if it forms a coalition of 1; Cost of out – welfare change of a
region if it leaves the grand coalition.
UTRF, yet still the represented regions clearly prefer to maintain the grand coalition. The in-
centive to starting coalitions, however, that was quite large under UTRF, has turned around and
all the regions face substantial cost of between roughly 10 billion USD (US) and 30 billion
USD (China) when forming a coalition of 1. In particular, this shows that the empty coalition
is stable now.
This finding is exactly in line with our conclusion from the analytical part: Under a
regime with unilateral trade sanctions, coalitions are stabilized unambiguously. But under a
regime with trade sanctions and retaliation, larger coalitions tend to be stabilized, while smaller
coalitions tend to be destabilized compared to regimes without trade sanctions.
5.6.2 Stable Coalitions
We now turn to stable coalition structures that result from the different policy regimes.
Figure 5.2 shows the size of the stable coalitions in percentage share of world GDP in the
policy regimes NTRF, UTRF, and RTRF for different assumptions about the global social cost
of carbon and the different considered tariff rates from 1% up to 10% for the regimes UTRF
and RTRF.
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Figure 5.2: Percentage share of world GDP of stable coalitions in the policy regimes NTRF, UTRF,
and RTRF for different assumptions about the global social cost of carbon RTRFmax refers to the largest
stable coalition under RTRF; RTRFmin refers to the smallest stable coalition under RTRF.
Policy Regime NTRF: Stable Coalitions in the Absence of Tariffs
In the absence of tariffs our simulations quantify the basic results from our analytical
model in Section 5.4. In contrast to the expository simple analytical model with symmetric
regions the costs of abatement are fully endogenized in a model calibrated to real world data.
Figure 5.2 shows the size of the stable coalition in terms of percentage of world GDP for the
different scenarios of global social costs of carbon (SCC) in the policy regime without trade
sanctions (NTRF). It indicates that with rather low global SCC of 12.5 USD per ton of CO2 a
stable coalition covering 58% of world GDP can be maintained.30 With increasing social costs
of carbon the size of the stable coalition decreases. For a global social cost of carbon of 50
USD only a coalition covering 32% of world GDP is stable. This coalition remains stable for a
global social cost of carbon of 100 USD.
Policy Regime UTRF: Stable Coalitions with Uniform Tariffs
Introducing trade sanctions against outsiders of the coalition imposes a strong incentive
to join. We find this effect, which has been extensively discussed by Nordhaus (2015), in the
UTRF regime. Figure 5.2 shows the size of the stable coalition for the different tariff-scenarios
30We find a rather large stable coalition of 58% of world GDP under NTRF. This is due to the assumed Arm-
ington structure of international trade (see footnote 29). Furthermore, our discussion on costs and emissions in
Subsection 5.6.3 reveals that while the coalition seems quite large, effectively it only achieves an emission reduc-
tion of 1% compared to the business-as-usual (see Table 5.4).
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from 1% up to 10% for the different assumptions about the global social cost of carbon. For
low global social costs of carbon of 12.5 USD the threat of trade sanctions of 1% is already
high enough to stabilize the grand coalition. Of course, if the grand coalition is stabilized by
means of sanctions no region is actually subjected to the tariffs. All regions are members of the
coalition while the trade sanctions serve as a threat for regions in case of leaving the coalition.
With higher global social costs of carbon, the tariff rate which is necessary to stabilize the grand
coalition increases so that in case of social costs of carbon of 100 USD only a substantial tariff
of 10% could stabilize the grand coalition.
Policy Regime RTRF: Stable Coalitions with Tariffs and Retaliation
Allowing outsiders of the coalition to retaliate with the same tariff rate markedly changes
the results (policy regime RTRF). Figure 5.2 shows the sizes of stable coalitions in percentage of
world GDP for these scenarios. While the grand coalition can still be stabilized by sufficiently
high trade sanctions, retaliation reduces the threat of being targeted. As a consequence, in case
of social costs of carbon above 12.5 USD the size of stable coalitions that can be maintained
with low trade sanctions decreases in comparison to the scenarios without retaliation. For social
costs of carbon above 25 USD the effect of retaliation is sufficient to destabilize all possible
coalitions for a tariff rate of 1%. More strikingly, in all scenarios with retaliation the non-
cooperative outcome is an equilibrium: the non-cooperative solution. In the same way the threat
of trade sanctions against outsiders can prevent members from leaving the coalition, retaliatory
trade measures can prevent outsiders regions from joining small coalitions that impose trade
sanctions on outsiders.
A Closer Look
The results for the scenarios with retaliation call for a closer look. The existence of two
stable equilibria for almost all of these scenarios raises the question which of the two equilibria
might be reached. Although our analysis does not explicitly consider the dynamics of coalition
formation, our results deliver some insights regarding this question. Our numerical results
mirror our insight from Proposition 5.1.
The threat of being targeted by trade sanctions of coalition members and thus the stabil-
izing effect of tariffs increases with the size of the coalition as the volume of traded goods that
is covered by tariffs increases for outsiders. By the same argument small coalitions are destabil-
ized by retaliatory trade measures of outsiders: in small coalitions members have a high volume
of trade with outsiders which makes them prone to retaliation. Retaliatory trade measures then
have the potential to incentivize coalition members to leave the coalition to avoid retaliation.
As a consequence, small coalitions are internally instable (and externally stable) which means
that further regions want to leave the coalition while big coalitions are externally instable (and
internally stable) so that further regions want to join the coalition. On the one hand, this means
that if an already larger coalition exists, the introduction of trade sanctions could lead to an
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Figure 5.3: Percentage share of world GDP of stable coalitions in the policy regime NTRF and of the
smallest internally stable coalitions under RTRF for different assumptions about the global social cost
of carbon. RTRFmint refers to the smallest internally stable coalition under RTRF other than the empty
coalition.
even bigger and possibly grand coalition, even in the presence of retaliation. On the other hand,
starting from a small coalition the introduction of trade sanctions diminishes cooperation and
the non-cooperative equilibrium results. In other words: the introduction of both trade sanc-
tions and retaliatory trade measures induce a threshold effect in the coalitional game. Below a
certain coalition size the destabilizing effect of retaliation predominates and leads to the non-
cooperative equilibrium whereas in coalitions above a certain size the stabilizing effect of trade
sanctions enables the formation of even bigger stable coalitions.
Figure 5.3 shows the size of the smallest internally stable coalition (other than the empty
coalition) in the scenarios with trade sanctions and retaliation (RTRF) and the size of the stable
coalition in the absence sanctions (NTRF) in percentage of world GDP. These results show that
the introduction of trade sanctions and retaliation with an already existing coalition that is stable
without sanctions would lead to the non-cooperative equilibrium in most of the scenarios. Only
for low global social costs of carbon of 12.5 USD per ton of CO2 and for global social costs of
carbon of 25 USD per ton of CO2 with tariffs higher than 7% the introduction of trade sanctions
with retaliation could help to stabilize a growing coalition that could ultimately become the
grand coalition.
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5.6.3 Costs and Emissions in Stable Coalitions
We report results on global costs and benefits, global emission changes, and global
average CO2 prices in all stable coalitions across our three policy regimes and four assumptions
about the global social cost of carbon (SCC). Table 5.4 summarizes the results under NTRF and
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the results for the regimes with uniform trade sanctions (UTRF) and
with retaliation (RTRF).31 Global welfare is composed of two factors: (i) economic adjustment
costs due to the CO2 tax, i.e. the change in real consumption (item Cost CN in the tables); (ii)
environmental benefits due to the change in global emissions, i.e. the global emission reduction
times the respective global social cost of carbon (Benefit EM). Global welfare is the difference
of environmental benefits and economic costs (Hicksian EV).32 Cost and welfare items are
reported as percentage share of business-as-usual GDP. The global average CO2 price is given
in USD per ton of CO2, and global emissions are given as percentage change from the business-
as-usual.33
Under NTRF (Table 5.4), we find that cooperation reduces the global emission level by
0.6% to 1.4% compared to the respective business-as-usual. The global average CO2 price is
about 30% of the efficient level for SCC-12.5 and decreases to roughly 15% of the efficient
level for SCC-100 as the size of the stable coalition is smaller. If we focus on the economic
adjustment costs, we find that they are slightly negative under SCC-50. This is again due to the
terms of trade.34 As we move to SCC-100, where we find the same stable coalition as in SCC-
50, economic costs have turned positive. The global welfare gain due to cooperation increases
with the assumed SCC.
Table 5.4: Global cost and emission impacts in stable coalitions under NTRF
SCC-12.5 SCC-25 SCC-50 SCC-100
Cost CN 0.005 0.010 -0.001 0.003
Benefit EM 0.005 0.013 0.011 0.039
Welfare 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.036
CO2 Price 3.86 6.42 7.61 15.08
Emissions -1.0 -1.4 -0.6 -1.0
Note.— All costs are given as a percentage share of business-as-usual GDP; Cost CN – change in real con-
sumption; Benefit EM – change in global emissions times the global social cost of carbon; Welfare – Hicksian
equivalent variation (difference of Benefit EM and Cost CN); CO2 Price – global average price on CO2 emis-
sions in USD/tCO2; Emissions – percentage change in global emissions.
Now we turn to the comparison of effects under UTRF and RTRF. We find that in each
31In the case of RTRF, we report outcomes for the largest stable coalitions.
32We take a utilitarian (Benthamite) perspective on global welfare accounting where welfare changes of indi-
vidual regions are perfectly substitutable.
33Be aware that each assumption about the global social cost of carbon constitutes a different business-as-usual.
34Recall the discussion of Figure 5.1.
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constellation where the grand coalition is established, emission reductions are substantial com-
pared to cooperative solutions under NTRF: it ranges from 6.8% for SCC-12.5 to 24.9% for
SCC-100. In these cases, global welfare improves compared to the business-as-usual, except
for SCC-12.5. The reason is initial tax distortions in the business-as-usual: we set the CO2 at the
Pigouvian rate irrespective of interactions with pre-existing taxes. For lower assumptions about
the externality (SCC), the externality is relatively small compared to initial tax distortions.
Table 5.5: Global cost and emission impacts in stable coalitions under UTRF and RTRF for SCC-12.5
and SCC-25
SCC-12.5
Trf 1% Trf 2% Trf 3% Trf 4% Trf 5% Trf 6% Trf 7% Trf 8% Trf 9% Trf 10%
UTRF
Cost CN 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
Benefit EM 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
Welfare -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
CO2 Price 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50
Emissions -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8
RTRF
Cost CN 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
Benefit EM 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
Welfare -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
CO2 Price 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50 12.50
Emissions -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8
SCC-25
Trf 1% Trf 2% Trf 3% Trf 4% Trf 5% Trf 6% Trf 7% Trf 8% Trf 9% Trf 10%
UTRF
Cost CN 0.091 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103
Benefit EM 0.092 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113
Welfare 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
CO2 Price 22.20 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Emissions -9.5 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6
RTRF
Cost CN 0.060 0.101 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103
Benefit EM 0.039 0.108 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113
Welfare -0.022 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
CO2 Price 14.36 24.50 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00
Emissions -4.0 -11.1 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6 -11.6
Note.— All costs are given as a percentage share of business-as-usual GDP; Cost CN – change in real con-
sumption; Benefit EM – change in global emissions times the global social cost of carbon; Welfare – Hicksian
equivalent variation (difference of Benefit EM and Cost CN); CO2 Price – global average price on CO2 emis-
sions in USD/tCO2; Emissions – percentage change in global emissions; Trf – Tariff rate.
Let’s turn to the cases where the grand coalition is not achieved. For assumptions about
the global SCC of below 100 USD/t CO2, RTRF unambiguously entails lower global emission
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reductions and lower global welfare levels than UTRF. Under SCC-100, however, the picture is
mixed. For the cases with a tariff rate higher than 6%, where a very high level of cooperation
is achieved, global welfare implications are rather similar. For tariff rates of 6% and lower, the
comparison of welfare impacts between UTRF and RTRF hinges on the exact composition of
the stable coalition. The coalition is larger under UTRF throughout these cases, which translates
into a higher CO2 tax inside the coalition. From a global efficiency perspective, this drives a
larger wedge between marginal abatement cost inside and outside the coalition. Under RTRF,
the CO2 tax is lower inside the coalition, but additional trade distortions lead to more emission
reductions outside the coalition. As a manifestation of this effect, the global average price for
CO2 is higher for a tariff rate of 4% under RTRF compared to UTRF, although the coalition is
smaller. The overall effect plays out positive under RTRF for tariff rates between 2% and 4%,
where the global welfare impact is greater than under UTRF.
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Table 5.6: Global cost and emission impacts in stable coalitions under UTRF and RTRF for SCC-50
and SCC-100
SCC-50
Trf 1% Trf 2% Trf 3% Trf 4% Trf 5% Trf 6% Trf 7% Trf 8% Trf 9% Trf 10%
UTRF
Cost CN 0.106 0.135 0.250 0.250 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256
Benefit EM 0.116 0.138 0.332 0.332 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346
Welfare 0.009 0.004 0.082 0.082 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
CO2 Price 24.99 29.74 48.90 48.90 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Emissions -6.0 -7.2 -17.3 -17.3 -18.0 -18.0 -18.0 -18.0 -18.0 -18.0
RTRF
Cost CN 0 0.130 0.237 0.251 0.252 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.256
Benefit EM 0 0.111 0.288 0.332 0.332 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.346
Welfare 0 -0.020 0.052 0.081 0.080 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
CO2 Price 5.86 23.77 44.09 48.91 48.91 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Emissions 0 -5.8 -15.0 -17.3 -17.3 -18.0 -18.0 -18.0 -18.0 -18.0
SCC-100
Trf 1% Trf 2% Trf 3% Trf 4% Trf 5% Trf 6% Trf 7% Trf 8% Trf 9% Trf 10%
UTRF
Cost CN 0.104 0.228 0.328 0.336 0.345 0.547 0.549 0.595 0.596 0.607
Benefit EM 0.172 0.312 0.432 0.434 0.437 0.808 0.809 0.925 0.925 0.962
Welfare 0.068 0.084 0.104 0.098 0.092 0.261 0.259 0.330 0.329 0.355
CO2 Price 27.49 43.24 58.51 58.56 58.61 87.09 87.12 97.49 97.49 100.00
Emissions -4.6 -8.4 -11.6 -11.7 -11.7 -21.7 -21.7 -24.9 -24.9 -25.8
RTRF
Cost CN 0 0.203 0.362 0.391 0.351 0.408 0.570 0.598 0.599 0.600
Benefit EM 0 0.328 0.504 0.523 0.351 0.423 0.814 0.926 0.926 0.927
Welfare 0 0.126 0.142 0.132 0.001 0.015 0.244 0.328 0.327 0.327
CO2 Price 11.60 36.09 57.50 62.27 46.49 55.94 87.25 97.53 97.54 97.55
Emissions 0 -8.8 -13.5 -14.1 -9.4 -11.4 -21.9 -24.9 -24.9 -24.9
Note.— All costs are given as a percentage share of business-as-usual GDP; Cost CN – change in real con-
sumption; Benefit EM – change in global emissions times the global social cost of carbon; Welfare – Hicksian
equivalent variation (difference of Benefit EM and Cost CN); CO2 Price – global average price on CO2 emis-
sions in USD/tCO2; Emissions – percentage change in global emissions; Trf – Tariff rate.
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5.7 Conclusion
Former studies of import tariffs as a means to stabilize climate coalitions have concluded
that they are an effective mechanism to foster international cooperation. However, most of these
studies have relied on the assumption that outsiders are not able to retaliate, i.e. to use trade
measures themselves. To close this research gap we use combined analytical and numerical
analysis to investigate implications for internal and external stability under three policy regimes:
(i) a regime without trade sanctions, (ii) a regime in which coalition members use trade sanctions
in the form of uniform import tariffs against outsiders, and (iii) a regime in which coalition
members use trade sanctions and outsiders retaliate with uniform import tariffs.
Our analytical model shows that while trade sanctions without the possibility to retali-
ate might stabilize coalitions, incorporating retaliation entails a “threshold” effect: Below a
certain coalition size the destabilizing effect of retaliation predominates and leads to the non-
cooperative equilibrium whereas in coalitions above a certain size the stabilizing effect of trade
sanctions enables the formation of larger stable coalitions.
For our quantitative assessment we use a standard multi-sector, multi-region CGE
model, where regional and global welfare effects due to policy interference is fully endogenized.
Our assessment for scenarios with retaliation shows that while it is still possible to maintain lar-
ger stable coalitions, also the non-cooperative solution becomes stable. In our simulations, the
“threshold” coalition size is well above 50% of world GDP across all assumptions about the
global social cost of carbon.
We conclude that the consideration of retaliatory measures substantially decreases pro-
spects for international cooperation through the threat of trade sanctions. Only after a suffi-
ciently large climate coalition has already been formed, the threat of trade sanctions might be
an effective stick to establish the grand coalition.
5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
ad 1.
We assume here that the coalition size k is a continuous variable, effectively allowing
for arbitrary shares of countries to be part of the coalition.35 Inserting (5.4) and (5.2) in the
35The same results could be obtained by keeping k integer-valued and examine the differences ΦNTRF (k) −
ΦNTRF (k − 1) for k ≥ 1 for monotonicity. We opt for the nicer representation of a continuous k and using the
derivative of ΦNTRF .
84 Boon or Bane? Trade Sanctions and the Stability of IEAs
stability function (5.6) leads to
ΦNTRF (k) =
b
(
kC
′−1(kb) + (N − k)C ′−1(b)
)
− C
(
C
′−1(kb)
)
−b
(
(k − 1)C ′−1 ((k − 1) b) + (N − k + 1)C ′−1 (b)
)
+ C
(
C
′−1 (b)
) (5.11)
Differentiation of (5.11) with respect to k leads to
∂ΦNTRF (k)
∂k
= bC
′−1(kb)− bC ′−1 ((k − 1) b)− bb (k − 1) ∂C
′−1 ((k − 1) b)
∂k
. (5.12)
Concavity of C ′−1 implies
C
′−1(kb)− C ′−1 ((k − 1) b) ≤ b∂C
′−1 ((k − 1) b)
∂k
, (5.13)
so that (5.12) is negative for all k ≥ 1.
ad 2.
For a coalition of two countries the stability function is
ΦNTRF (2) =b
(
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′−1(2b) + (N − 2)C ′−1(b)
)
− C
(
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′−1(2b)
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=2b
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.
(5.14)
Since
2b = C
′
(
C
′−1(2b)
)
(5.15)
this can be written as
ΦNTRF (2) = C
′
(
C
′−1(2b)
)(
C
′−1(2b)− C ′−1(b)
)
−
(
C
(
C
′−1(2b)
)
− C
(
C
′−1 (b)
))
(5.16)
C is strictly convex so that
C
′
(
C
′−1(2b)
)(
C
′−1(2b)− C ′−1(b)
)
>
(
C
(
C
′−1(2b)
)
− C
(
C
′−1 (b)
))
(5.17)
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and thus ΦNTRF (2) > 0.
5.8.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1
The net stability function reads as
∆ΦRN(θ, k) = ΦRTRF (θ, k)− ΦNTRF (k) = (N − 2k + 1)(β(θ)− ζ(θ)). (5.18)
Differentiating with respect to coalition size k gives us
∂∆ΦRN(θ, k)
∂k
= −2β(θ) + 2ζ(θ). (5.19)
We can assume that trade sanctions decrease global welfare due to trade distortions – recall the
discussion in section 5.3. Thus, the total benefits from trade sanctions are lower than the total
costs which, in our specification, boils down to the condition that benefits from putting tariffs
on one trade-flow are lower than the costs, i.e. β(θ) < ζ(θ). Thus, we see that ∂∆Φ
RN (θ,k)
∂k
> 0
and that ∆ΦRN(θ, k) has a single zero at k = (N+1)
2
for all θ > 0.
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6 | What the Economics of Climate
Change Mitigation May Tell on
Transnational Adaptation
6.1 Introduction
Previously a "taboo" within climate policy and research (Pielke et al., 2007), climate
adaptation has gathered momentum in the last few years, acknowledging that climate change
will be unavoidable even under the most ambitious mitigation goals.36 Most recently, the Paris
Agreement has put further emphasis on climate adaptation: it has promoted it from a funda-
mentally local endeavor to the object of international cooperation (Lesnikowski et al., 2017).
Up to now, the international dimension of climate adaptation has been limited to environmental
justice considerations related to adaptation finance (Grasso, 2010; Paavola and Adger, 2006;
Persson, 2011). This chapter contributes to broadening such perspective by exploring the case
where adaptation by some countries affect other ones.
In such a case, adaptation resembles the problem structure at the core of climate change
mitigation economics: opportunistic free-riding on other nations’ efforts to address a common
problem. It is thus worthwhile to explore findings from more than two decades of economic
research on IEAs for climate change mitigation (from here on referred to as "IEA literature"),
and see what implications they may have for the sort of adaptation envisioned here. We do so
with reference to climate-change induced eutrophication in the Baltic Sea – an issue which is
paradigmatic both as a case where adaptation by some countries affects other ones, and for its
similarity with climate change mitigation challenges.
Applying insights from the IEA literature leads to rather counterintuitive implications
for governance architectures in the Baltic Sea. Conveniently, such implications fit particularly
well the transnational adaptation agenda as they involve multiple nation states and a plurality
of governance architectures. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 conceptualizes
cross-boundary adaptation spillovers and establishes a conceptual bridge to the IEA literature.
36This chapter is based on Roggero et al. (2018).
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Section 6.3 explores the Baltic Sea case and applies IEA insights to its adaptation problem.
Section 6.4 discusses the chapter’s findings at a more general level. Finally, Section 6.5 provides
some concluding remarks.
6.2 Literature Review
Central to the present work is the concept of "cross-boundary adaptation spillover": it
describes externalities that occur if adaptation measures by one country affect other countries.
Relying on that, the present section aims at establishing conceptual bridges between transna-
tional adaptation and the IEA literature. Doing so requires several steps, addressing whether: 1)
adaptation has spillovers; 2) such spillovers are cross-boundary; 3) cross-boundary adaptation
spillovers generate a problem structure that resembles climate change mitigation; and 4) it is
possible to leverage IEA knowledge in order to address cross-boundary adaptation spillovers.
With that in mind, the present section features four subsections, respectively providing argu-
ments in support of each of the four steps above. The remainder of this subsection, instead,
introduces climate adaptation in a transnational context.
Climate adaptation describes the many ways individuals, groups and societies adjust
to the observed and/or expected end of a stationary climate (Smit and Wandel, 2006). Within
such definition, scholars distinguish "spontaneous" adaptation by individuals from "planned"
adaptation as a part of climate policy (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001). The present work focuses on
planned adaptation. Scholarly debates in these respects have focused on the appropriate "level"
of politico-administrative organization at which adaptation is best delivered (Dodman and Sat-
terthwaite, 2008; Few et al., 2007). They are thus anchored to an understanding of adaptation
as a task for either local or national governments – at best something requiring cooperation
between the two. Adaptation, in other words, has been so far understood as a domestic affair,
without any international dimension.
The reader may object the international dimension of climate adaptation exists, and per-
tains adaptation finance (Barrett, 2013; Klein, 2010). Adaptation finance, however, is based on a
"pollutionist" perspective (Persson, 2011) in which certain nations care for adaptation in and by
other nations only on the basis of moral commitment. The role of adaptation within the Kyoto
Protocol reflects this very same understanding (Grasso, 2010). By contrast, the present work
is based on the premise that climate adaptation by one country affects other ones (Liverman,
2016; Moser and Hart, 2015). Here, adaptation acquires an international dimension for reasons
other than moral commitment. Most importantly, there is a different problem structure at play,
where moral commitment leaves way to self-interest and, possibly, opportunism.
Acknowledging this, Benzie et al. (2016) propose the concept of transnational adapta-
tion. It is defined as adaptation taking place across the boundaries of nation states and involving
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non-state actors to some degree. Calling the "domestic", national-to-local understanding of
climate adaptation into question, such a definition acknowledges a more complex and hetero-
geneous set of interactions and governance arenas than previously accounted for (Benzie et al.,
2016).
Against this background, the present contribution seeks to advance our understanding of
the link between the problem structure inherent to transnational adaptation and the institutional
arrangements shaping it. It does so by tapping into the IEA literature – a body of scholarly work
centered on the same problem structure as the one identified herewith, where climate adaptation
acquires an international dimension because of cross-boundary spillovers. The IEA literature
may thus deliver insights that apply to transnational adaptation as well. Crucially, such insights
will fit with the transnational adaptation agenda as they open up to different architectures and
multi-level arrangements. To that end, the following subsections establish a conceptual bridge
with the IEA literature.
6.2.1 Does Adaptation Have Spill-Overs?
The first step in establishing a bridge between transnational adaptation and the IEA lit-
erature concerns the question whether adaptation has spillovers altogether. Adaptation scholars
have so far had little interest in the possibility that adaptation by some may have spillovers
(Benzie et al., 2016). That is not surprising: scholars addressing "barriers" to adaptation (Eis-
enack et al., 2014; Moser and Ekstrom, 2010) have shown that adaptation has so far taken place
too little rather than too much and/or in the wrong place. Spillovers (cross-boundary or not) are
more likely to become evident once adaptation has been implemented at a sufficient scale, not
before.
Evidence of spillovers from adaptation can nevertheless be found, with reference to the
concept of "no-regret" adaptation measures: adaptations that are beneficial regardless of the
actual on-setting of the respective climate impacts. Typical examples are green areas in cities
that, next to protecting citizens against heat waves (Oberndorfer et al., 2007; Bowler et al.,
2010), also have a recreational value (James et al., 2009; Tzoulas and James, 2010), together
with positive effects on e.g. local air quality (Bolund and Hunhammar, 1999; Jim and Chen,
2008). These measures qualify as "no-regret" in light of the effects they have apart from their
main purpose of reducing climate vulnerability. They do have spillovers, then.
Spillovers from adaptation, furthermore, are not always positive. The concept of malad-
aptation (Klein et al., 2007; Barnett and O’Neill, 2010; Juhola et al., 2016) describes situations
where adaptation takes place, but fails to reduce vulnerability. Adaptation efforts can end up
shifting vulnerability rather than reducing it, and that as a product of unintended effects and
external spillovers (Atteridge and Remling, 2018).
Several examples can be found in the literature. Flood control measures in the Mekong
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delta allow for agricultural harvesting to continue well into the flood season, leading however to
fish decline, and to the loss of the fertilizing function of the floods (Birkmann, 2011; Chapman
et al., 2016). The poor design of coastal erosion measures in Cape Town, South Africa, led to
the very same measures (sandbags), breaking apart and releasing plastic debris into the coastal
environment (Magnan et al., 2016). These examples support the view that adaptation may have
negative spillovers as well.
6.2.2 Are Adaptation Spillovers Cross-Boundary?
The second step in establishing a bridge between transnational adaptation and the IEA
literature lies in the cross-boundary dimension of adaptation spillovers. Evidence for that is
available too. Consider adaptation measures such as the urban green mentioned above. The very
same climate impacts (e.g. heat waves, heavy rains) can also be tackled through green belts,
wetlands and other types of natural habitats in the outskirts of urban centers – an approach that
goes under the header of "ecosystem-based adaptation" (Roberts et al., 2012; Wamsler et al.,
2014). Next to addressing climate impacts, ecosystem-based adaptation contributes positively
to global public goods such as bird migration and biodiversity (Jones et al., 2012; Munang et al.,
2013). There are thus adaptations with cross-boundary spillovers.
Negative cross-boundary spillovers can be found too. Raising dykes to tackle floods
tends to shift the problem further downstream. That is particularly problematic in the case of
transboundary rivers, which are a typical case for international cooperation (Mitchell, 2006).
Internationally shared resources such as transboundary rivers are certainly not immune to the
need to adapt to climate change (Kistin and Ashton, 2008; Goulden et al., 2009). At the very
least, adaptation is constrained by the architectures shaping the shared management of such
resources. Unless adaptation is negligible viz. such arrangements, adaptation measures are
bound to be subject to the same degree of international cooperation.
An easy objection may be that adaptation spillovers affecting internationally shared re-
sources are likely to be negligible. Evidence is available that this is not the case. One good
example is the Baltic Sea. Rivers flowing into it are rich in nutrients from agriculture (Ducrotoy
and Elliott, 2008). Climate change will alter precipitation patterns across Baltic states (Kun-
dzewicz, 2009), increasing nutrient runoff from agriculture, worsening the state of their inland
waters, and increasing nutrient loads into the Baltic Sea. Unless adaptation takes place, mainly
in the form of changed agricultural practices and wetland restoration in the countries at stake,
the Baltic Sea may experience up to 18% more natrum and 21% more phosphor under par-
ticular scenarios (Huttunen et al., 2015), which doesn’t seem negligible. The Baltic Sea case
will be addressed in detail in Section 6.3. For the moment, it is enough to bear in mind that
cross-boundary spillovers from adaptation action are a possibility.
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6.2.3 What Is the Problem Structure in Mitigation Economics?
The third step in establishing a bridge between transnational adaptation and the IEA
literature concerns the problem structure. We hereby refer to the game theoretic literature on
IEAs. Since the early 1990s, this branch of the climate economics literature studies interna-
tional cooperation for climate change mitigation (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994).
Based on concepts from the theory of economic cartels (d’Aspremont et al., 1983; Chander
and Tulkens, 1995) it frames IEAs as stable coalitions whose members contribute to a public
good. Later on, the analysis was extended to different policy measures that may help to reach
an outcome as close as possible to the social optimum (Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri, 2016).
The problem structure thus analysed revolves around the provision of a pure public good.
In a mitigation setting, the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions is costly (Stern, 2007), and
the benefits also depend on the abatement of others (Pachauri et al., 2014). That already disin-
centives abatement. Furthermore, other countries can free-ride on the efforts of those countries
that do reduce their emissions, sharing the thus obtained benefits (Hoel, 1991). An important
mechanism for that is carbon leakage, which means that carbon-intensive industry relocates pro-
duction to countries with fewer restrictions (Felder and Rutherford, 1993). That disincentives
abatement even further. Local co-benefits, instead, can motivate actors to abate (e.g. Bollen
et al., 2009; Harlan and Ruddell, 2011), shifting the problem structure to one of an impure
public good.
In the absence of a supranational authority prescribing a certain degree of effort by all
beneficiaries of climate change mitigation, progress relies on voluntary agreements, involving
coalitions of countries willing to abate. Uncertainty here takes the shape of countries possibly
seeking renegotiation at later stages (Weikard et al., 2010). Against this background, the literat-
ure addresses questions relating to the size and stability of such coalitions, in general as well as
in light of specific policy instruments being used. As we will show for the case of the Baltic Sea,
in presence of cross-boundary adaptation spillovers, a problem structure emerges that resemble
the one sketched herewith. If the problem structure is similar, we argue, insights from the one
context can be transferred analogously to the other.
6.2.4 What Insights Can Be Drawn from the IEA Literature?
The fourth step in establishing a bridge between transnational adaptation and the IEA
literature concerns the insights to be borrowed. The general finding is that, because of free-
riding, coalitions will tend to be small and achieve little. This is the "paradox of cooperation":
stable coalitions achieve little when cooperation matters most in terms of improvement over
the non-cooperative outcome (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Finus and McGinty, 2015). The
literature has gone a long way since then, though, exploring several approaches to overcome
this problem. These are inter alia: coalition structures, side-payments, issue-linkage, and trade
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sanctions.
Concerning coalition structures, a notable example here is that of "climate clubs". Coun-
tries can form coalitions that are not exclusive but coexist, i.e. several coalitions can be formed
in parallel. Both theoretical (e.g. Asheim et al., 2006, Chapter 3) and simulation studies (e.g.
Osmani and Tol, 2010; Bosello et al., 2003; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006) find, that under certain
circumstances, multiple, small coalitions may lead to higher participation and greater supply
of the public good compared to what would have been achieved with a single coalition. Each
of the formed small coalitions decides to contribute to the public good, so that the sum of the
contributions exceeds that of a single coalition (which would be subject to the "paradox of
cooperation"). Here there are clear implications for the Baltic case, as the reader will see in
Section 6.3.
Side-payments were introduced in seminal papers by Hoel (1992a) and Carraro and Sin-
iscalco (1993). They showed that welfare transfers between countries can increase cooperation.
When benefits from abatement are asymmetric across countries, those with high benefits from
abatement can increase the size of the coalition by providing side-payments to countries with
lower benefits from abatement, leading to higher levels of global abatement and welfare (Bar-
rett, 2001; Fuentes-Albero and Rubio, 2010; McGinty, 2007; Dellink, 2011; Lessmann et al.,
2015).
As an alternative to side-payments, issue linkage can also increase cooperation. Pre-
condition for that is the presence of different sources of externalities between the countries
involved, so that cooperation on one issue can be made conditional to cooperation on another
one (Folmer and Mouche, 1994). Interestingly, this needs not to be of environmental nature
(Folmer et al., 1993). Care is due, however, since linkage may as well decrease cooperation
(Carraro and Marchiori, 2004). Issues that seem particularly suitable for linkage with envir-
onmental negotiations include research and development (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1995;
Katsoulacos, 1997), international debt swaps (Mohr, 1995; Mohr and Thomas, 1998) and trade
sanctions (e.g. Barrett, 1997a).
The latter case has received particular attention recently (Barrett, 2011; Lessmann et al.,
2009; Nordhaus, 2015; Böhringer et al., 2016, Chapter 5). Here the idea is to apply trade sanc-
tions to encourage participation in the IEA. By including trade penalties against outsiders in
the climate agreement countries are incentivized to join. Lessmann et al. (2009) and Nordhaus
(2015) find that already small penalties can be sufficient to stabilize a large climate coalition
with high abatement levels. If retaliation occurs, however, trade sanctions may prove counter-
productive (see Chapter 5).
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6.3 Applying Mitigation Insights to an Adaptation Case: Eu-
trophication in the Baltic Seas
The previous section has established a bridge between transnational adaptation and the
IEA literature. Doing so has highlighted four approaches that could be applied to adaptation
cases in the presence of cross-boundary spillovers: coalition structures, side-payments, issue-
linkage, and trade sanctions. The present section provides an illustrative example of the way
these approaches could be applied to an actual case: eutrophication in the Baltic Sea (Sec-
tion 6.3.1). Emphasis will be put to present the case 1) as an adaptation case; 2) with cross-
boundary spillovers; in order to 3) outline the resulting problem structure and 4) compare it to
the one mitigation economics is concerned with. The arrangements in place in the Baltic context
will then be briefly presented (Section 6.3.2), and subsequently analysed through the lenses of
the IEA literature (Section 6.3.3). As the emphasis lies on Section 6.3.3, Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2
will necessarily be kept at a minimum. Detailed accounts on the governance architectures in
place at the Baltic Sea can be found in Gilek et al. (2016) and Hassler (2017).
6.3.1 The Problem Structure
The physical environment of the Baltic Sea is under severe anthropogenic pressure (Jo-
hannesson et al., 2011). Eutrophication due to agricultural nutrient runoff is "perhaps the biggest
problem confronting the Baltic" (Ducrotoy and Elliott, 2008). Climate change makes things
worse: by increasing precipitations, it increases nutrient runoff from the fields to the rivers
and towards the sea (Andersson et al., 2015; Graham, 2004; Friedland et al., 2012). Simula-
tions foresee change in nutrient loads between -9% and +18% for natrum and between -7% and
+21% for phosphor (Huttunen et al., 2015). Crucially, variation depends on the socio-economic
scenarios and modeling uncertainties, but adaptation can significantly reduce the resulting im-
pact upon the Baltic Sea (Huttunen et al., 2015).
The nutrients at stake originate from agriculture and reach the Baltic Sea through the
inland and coastal waters of the different states within the drainage basin. The available options
for reducing how much nutrients reach the sea mainly consist of preventing nutrient leakage at
the source (that is, less agriculture or at least less fertilizers), or creating wetlands that absorb
nutrients as close as possible to the source. Countries have an interest in doing so, because
nutrients from their own agriculture affect their own inland waters first. Agricultural nutrients
are thus a domestic nuisance before they even affect the Baltic Sea. To the extent climate
change leads to increased precipitations, and nutrient loads increase because of that, adaptation
corresponds to additional restrictions in the use of fertilizers, and to the creation of additional
wetlands absorbing the additional load.
Let us now gauge the problem structure. Consider the individual Baltic state’s decision
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whether to curb nutrient runoff from agriculture. For each state, abatement costs stand against
eutrophication-related losses in the environmental quality of both inland waters and the Baltic
Sea as a whole. Benefits from cleaner inland waters (e.g. scenic beauty, tourism revenues,
inland fisheries), constitute a private good for the individual state in which they are located.
Benefits derived from the environmental quality of the Baltic Sea constitute instead a public
good affected by the cumulative effort of all Baltic states.
Facing a tradeoff between abatement costs and environmental benefits, Baltic states can
make their choices. At present, efforts vary, with Finland and Sweden at the more proactive
end of the spectrum, and Russia at the more reluctant one (Hassler, 2017). Results are cumu-
latively not enough to significantly decrease nutrient loads in the Baltic Sea (Elmgren et al.,
2015). Against such status quo, climate change alters precipitation patterns, raising the amount
of nutrients being discharged into the water bodies and thus increasing the underprovision of
eutrophication abatement. Adaptation represents the efforts necessary to counterbalance the
effects of the additional nutrient runoff caused by climate change.
Let us now consider the different elements of the problem structure just laid out. These
are: a public good (1); a baseline level of anthropogenic pollution (2); private benefits from the
abatement of such pollution (3), which are not enough to avoid underprovision (4). Since full
abatement in one state would not compensate for no abatement in another state, there is a need
for cooperation (5) and a corresponding risk of free-riding (6), since every country can hold
back abatement and enjoy the fruits of the efforts of the other states. Finally, the nuisance at
stake is problematic per se (7), but becomes even more problematic in light of future trends:
increased precipitation due to climate change (8).
The reader will have noted that the problem structure is more complex than that of a
pure public good. The same holds climate change mitigation, though. Next to the atmosphere
as a public good (1) and the corresponding collective action challenges (5, 6), climate change
mitigation also features: baseline CO2 emissions (2); private benefits through e.g. better air
quality (3), leading however to insufficient abatement (4); and future trend worsening the prob-
lem: demographic and socioeconomic growth (8). In presence of cross-boundary spillovers, the
problem structure of adaptation resembles thus that of climate change mitigation.
6.3.2 Baltic Sea Governance Arrangements from a Mitigation Economics
Perspective
Having laid out the basic elements of the eutrophication problem in the Baltic Sea, some
words are due on the institutional arrangements in place. Almost all of the Baltic Sea falls within
the Exclusive Economic Zones of the various countries around its coasts: Sweden, Denmark,
Germany, Poland, Russia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland (Backer et al., 2010). All
such countries belong to the European Union (EU), with the notable exception of Russia. Fur-
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thermore, about half of them are former Soviet countries, with a history of lax environmental
regulation and intensive agricultural production. The EU accession has dramatically improved
environmental standards in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, yet not enough to lower the
concentrations of nutrients in the Baltic (Elmgren et al., 2015).
The major, but not exclusive presence of EU Member states in the Baltic Sea region
leads to a complex architecture shaping the management of the sea’s waters. A central piece
of legislation is the EU’s Water Framework Directive (WFD), requiring the achievement of a
Good Ecological Status in the whole basin, including both Baltic Sea’s waters and the inland
water bodies of the surrounding member states. Furthermore, the EU has developed a regional
approach to the management of the Baltic Sea. First of its kind, the Baltic Sea Region Strategy
(BSRS) consists of a framework coordinating EU projects addressing the state of the Baltic Sea,
ideally facilitating cooperation in the region.
Within the BSRS, a recently updated Action Plan spells out goals and objectives for
the region, water quality and eutrophication featuring prominently therein. It has however a
non-binding character. Similarly, the Helsinki Convention spells out goals and objectives for
the management of the Baltic Sea, giving a prominent role to combating eutrophication, again
without a binding character. Compared to the BSRS, the Helsinki Convention and its secretariat
(the Helsinki Commission: HELCOM) have the merit of including Russia. Furthermore, the
polluter-pays-principle and the precautionary principle introduced therein never translated into
operational management tools (Ducrotoy and Elliott, 2008).
In all of the above, the effects of climate change upon the Baltic Sea and the states
surrounding it are featured only peripherally (Backer et al., 2010; Elliott et al., 2015). In
the absence of coordinated and agreed-upon adaptation measures, the governance architec-
ture addressing cross-boundary adaptation spillovers is the one resulting from the interplay
of WFD, BSRS and HELCOM. Specifically, the question emerges whether national adapta-
tions are somehow coordinated with an eye on their effects upon the Baltic Sea eutrophication
problem. Hassler (2017) provides evidence in these respects: his analysis of national imple-
mentation plans addressing eutrophication under the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan shows
little willingness to cooperate among signatories.
Karlsson et al. (2016) and Elmgren et al. (2015) come to similar conclusions, while
Bengtsson (2009) points at the lack of an external perspective, particularly concerning the role
of Russia. Furthermore, Piwowarczyk et al. (2012) show how key decision-makers are preoc-
cupied with more pressing social and economic issues, deeming climate change as secondary.
As a result, the available governance architecture is presently only able to achieve consensus
on abstract strategies and on the need of a dialogue on national implementations. Ambitious
initiatives seem out of reach (Backer, 2011).
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6.3.3 Applying an IEA Perspective
Having sketched both the problem structure and the institutional arrangement, it is now
possible to explore the implications of coalition structures, side-payments, issue-linkage, and
trade sanctions for the Baltic case. In terms of coalition structures, the counterintuitive insight
is that multiple small arrangements are superior to a single large one that does not involve
everybody. Translated for the Baltic context, it implies that multiple small groups of Baltic
states may possibly achieve more than a single, large, but not all-encompassing group. Against
this background, two main questions arise.
First, the very existence of BSRS hints at a new development of EU governance towards
regional arrangements. In these respects, the IEA literature raises the question whether a more
effective cooperation could be sought among some of the Baltic states, creating sub-regional ar-
rangements. Note how this goes against the received wisdom of resource arrangements "fitting"
the geographical extent of a given resource as much as possible (Young, 2002; Moss, 2012).
It also goes counter the expectations of regional public good scholars (Sandler, 1998, 2006)
justifying larger jurisdictions (e.g. through economies of scope), not smaller ones. By contrast,
from an IEA perspective, BSRS could be surprisingly too large.
Second, BSRS has the same scope of HELCOM, minus Russia. One could thus look at
BSRS as the smaller but stable coalition mitigation economics points at. By the same token,
other sub-coalitions within HELCOM could be studied. The most notorious source of instability
there is the rift between EU and Russia. Paradoxically, the EU-Russia relations may overshadow
other distinctions among HELCOM signatories which may lead to stable coalitions. Candidates
could be the differentials in marginal costs across states, the differentials in marginal private
benefits from abatement, or the actual ability to free-ride.
Side-payments can be a source of stability if costs vary substantially across countries.
Indeed, a few studies find scope for addressing eutrophication in the Baltic region through
side-payments (Markowska and Z˙ylicz, 1999; Gren, 2008), and side-payments do appear in the
HELCOM context (Hassler, 2017), albeit with little political support. A different take could
focus on BSRS as a channel towards EU subsidies. BSRS receives project proposals from the
countries’ local and regional administrations and redirects them to the EU. It is not proactively
crafting them. If steep costs make countries less proactive, supporting proactive countries may
effectively channel funds where costs are low, not high. If one did exactly the opposite, the
resulting side-payments may indeed create stability and overall effort.
Political and legal feasibility aside, the IEA literature also suggests that there may be
scope for "outsiders" to use side-payments to motivate specific EU countries to pursue adapta-
tion within BSRS, if doing so proves more cost-effective than the available domestic options. If
costs are prohibitively high in Russia and Poland, these countries could still consider contribut-
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ing to adaptation through side-payments to e.g. Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia. They will not reap
the private benefits of cleaner inland waters, but they may still protect their own fishing fleets
from the costs of additional eutrophication caused by climate change.
Issue-linkage, in the context of the Baltic Sea, would entail tying cooperation in other
areas to the cooperation achieved in combating eutrophication. It presupposes that other con-
cerns (environmental or not) may be sufficiently (more) valuable to free-riders to motivate them
to contribute. To an extent, issue-linkage may already be at play in the Baltic: EU accession
has been functional in the implementation of EU environmental regulations in eastern European
countries (Kay, 2014; Krˇenová and Kindlmann, 2015), and traces of that can be found in the
HELCOM process too (Hassler, 2017).
From a different angle, issue-linkage has interesting implications for BSRS, which
serves as a coordination platform for all Baltic issues, and was built around the ecosystem
approach (Backer et al., 2010). Issue-linkage is certainly compatible with the ecosystem ap-
proach. It provides however an additional suggestion: there may be a merit in linking adapt-
ation strategies to completely unrelated issues, without any ecological interdependencies (and
thus outside the scope of the ecosystem approach). The only important precondition would be
that the interests of the involved parties are such, that they prevent free-riding.
Finally, trade sanctions would correspond, in the Baltic context, to imposing higher
tariffs and/or bans on products from states that fail to adapt to eutrophication. This seems to be
the least applicable approach and is reported here only for the sake of completeness. Applying
tariffs inside the EU seems hardly compatible with European law. On the Russian front, instead,
trade sanctions are a reality (at the time of writing), but concern much bigger geopolitical issues
(e.g. Crimea’s annexation by Russia, Iran’s nuclear program) than those addressed here.
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Summary of the Findings
Departing from the paradigmatic case and carefully formulating lessons for adaptation in
presence of cross-boundary spillovers, the core insights gained by applying an IEA perspective
are the following:
• Multiple coalitions by few, motivated countries and/or countries in similar conditions
may achieve more than a large coalition involving most affected parties but marred by
free-riding.
• Side-payments should target countries that are not proactive, rather than rewarding coun-
tries that already proactive. National and international adaptation funding schemes may
be reconsidered accordingly.
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• As an alternative to pursuing integrated strategies, transnational adaptation could be
linked to international cooperation on areas with no biophysical link to the recipients
of adaptation.
• Trade sanctions feature may be used to push countries to provide adaptation with cross-
boundary spillovers; their geopolitical costs do not seem commensurate to the gains they
can achieve, though.
Given the explorative character of the present work, caution is due. The following sub-
section articulates therefore potential biases and limitations of the analysis attempted herewith.
6.4.2 Conceptual and Methodological Limitations
A first limitation is that the analysis is limited to cross-boundary adaptation spillovers.
Transnational adaptation is likely to be more heterogeneous than adaptation with cross-
boundary spillovers. An assessment of such heterogeneity is necessary before claiming that
the analytical similarities with the IEA literature hold generally. Future research can provide
such an assessment, e.g. through a systematic review of potentially transnational adaptation
cases.
A second, more serious limitation is that insights from the IEA literature were mostly
derived by solving mathematical game theoretical models, not by testing theories with obser-
vational data. The limitation here is only apparent, though. The application of IEA insights to
adaptation cases would need to be tested empirically regardless of the empirical underpinning
of the IEA literature. Conversely, validation of IEA findings in the adaptation realm would not
be a substitute for empirical explorations in mitigation settings.
Another limitation comes from the possibility that analytical similarities disappear as
soon as the analysis is carried out at a greater level of detail. This is unavoidable. The takeaway
is thus that at a general level, both mitigation and transnational adaptation may contribute to
a unified overarching theory of how states deal with public goods; more refined theories will
instead be problem-specific. This is potentially true even among different instances of transna-
tional adaptation: at a closer look, the role of e.g. coalitions may prove to be crucial in a marine
governance setting but fully irrelevant in a biodiversity one. Further research will tell.
6.4.3 Policy Implications
Potential implications for the Baltic Sea Region have been spelled out in Section 6.3.
The question at this point is what practitioners may generalize from that. In the eyes of a
practitioner, a certainly intriguing message is that, if all countries cannot be brought on board,
it is better to go for deep and narrow agreements than to go for ones that are shallow and broad.
In a context in which the EU becomes open towards regional arrangements, not having to reach
an agreement with all parties involved, but just with some, has the potential to significantly
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lower the transaction costs connected with enacting problem-solving policies: it would allow
for far reaching cooperation agreements among groups of states rather than slow and limited
arrangements that have to apply to all.
Going for small coalitions as opposed to striving towards agreements shared by all
parties involved also seems to grant a stronger role to soft-power, lobbying and ultimately in-
formal arrangements as opposed to hard law and formal commitments. This is not uncommon
in an EU-setting, and certainly liberating from the point of view of those practitioners who have
to broker deals between national governments. Practitioners will certainly be aware, however,
of the costs such an approach has in terms of legitimacy, accountability and transparency.
6.4.4 Implications for Research
Correctly identifying the conceptual space in which this work locates itself required a
rather long chain of thought, addressing whether: 1) adaptation has spillovers; 2) such spillovers
are cross-boundary; 3) cross-boundary adaptation spillovers generate a problem structure that
resembles climate change mitigation; and 4) it is possible to leverage mitigation knowledge in
order to address cross-boundary adaptation spillovers. Adaptation research, including climate
economics (see Scrieciu et al., 2013), has so far largely ignored point 1; point 2 has only recently
started being acknowledged (see Benzie et al., 2016); point 3 and 4 are the main thrust of the
present work, which is an exploratory, not a consolidating one. The four points are therefore
gaps future research could explore. We address them individually.
Concerning point 1, adaptation spillovers are not completely new, but they are not high
on the agenda either. If this is due to the little progress of adaptation on the ground, things
are bound to change. Climate change will not be halted and adaptation is bound to become
increasingly frequent, possibly as disaster risk reduction. The more adaptation happens on the
ground, the likelier adaptation spillovers will manifest themselves, supporting the agenda laid
down herewith. The transnational adaptation agenda has thus the potential to anticipate future
developments and lay down a few seminal contributions on the matter.
Spillovers from adaptation are only relevant here if they are cross-boundary (point 2).
Future research will tell whether the incidence of transnational adaptation viz. purely local ad-
aptation is substantial, or whether transnational adaptation represents a niche. More interesting
is the question whether cross-boundary adaptation spillovers will prove to be non-negligible.
Systematically reviewing the available literature will allow to address that question. Ultimately,
though, it will be dedicated biophysical assessments that provide a conclusive answer. These
may never come about if scholars do not challenge the received wisdom that adaptation is a
purely domestic phenomenon.
Thirdly, the present analysis has relied upon mitigation economics in terms of its find-
ings. These have been applied to the problem at hand after comparing problem structures. The
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basic assumption underlying such procedure is that, as long as empirically different problems
are analytically similar, findings are generally applicable. Future research could carry out the
same analysis at the level of the actual models rather than at the level of the findings. Doing so
would allow to verify up to which point mitigation and cross-boundary adaptation spillovers are
analytically identical (point 3). Fourthly, further research in this area could spell out the tech-
nical dimension of "translating" economics models from mitigation to adaptation, identifying
gaps, pitfalls, low-hanging fruits and, of course, benefits. More importantly, it would be able to
explore actual mechanisms, verify the empirical plausibility of the assumptions underneath the
"translated" models, and provide a nuanced approach to their general applicability and to the
transferability of their findings (point 4).
6.5 Conclusions
The present chapter has addressed climate adaptation in the presence of cross-boundary
spillovers. In presence of cross-boundary spillovers, adaptation presents a problem structure
similar to that of climate change mitigation. For the last two decades, the economic literature
on IEAs has explored that problem structure. It becomes thus worthwhile to explore its findings
and see what implications they may have for adaptation.
Next to reviewing the relevant literature, this chapter has provided an empirical illus-
tration with reference to climate-induced eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. After showing the
similarity with the problem structure of climate change mitigation, the present institutional ar-
rangements in the Baltic Sea region were explored through the lenses of the IEA literature.
Doing so has raised a number of implications for the governance of the Baltic Sea.
Focusing on coalition structures, side-payments, issue-linkage, and trade sanctions, the
analysis has proposed a different perspective on how to address the eutrophication problem in
the Baltic Sea. Most interesting is the possibility to that, under certain circumstances, arrange-
ments may have a merit even when they do not involve all Baltic states. Integrative arrange-
ments, furthermore need not to be limited to addressing ecologically interdependent resources.
Most importantly, though, applying an IEA perspective to another issue with a similar
problem structure has unlocked very counter-intuitive perspectives, raising important, thought-
provoking questions. Transnational adaptation encompasses many other issues with similar
problem structures, ranging from adaptation and biodiversity to adaptation in transboundary
rivers, or adaptation of transport infrastructure. There is thus more to explore.
7 | Conclusions
International cooperation to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change has proven to be
very hard to achieve. The difficulties to reach a binding international agreement with sufficient
reduction targets are evident and extensively discussed in the economic literature. Neverthe-
less, new ideas towards cooperation are evolving. A selection of these new ideas regarding
coalition structures, political economy and trade is analyzed in this thesis. The following sec-
tion discusses the results of all chapters and their implications before the thesis concludes with a
discussion of limitations of the presented research and an outlook on promising ways of further
research.
7.1 Results and Implications
Chapter 2 provides an overview of emerging transnational patterns of cooperation with
heterogeneous actors, taking stock of selected empirical examples of such patterns and of rel-
evant publications from the global governance literature. A comparison with the economic IEA
literature shows that although game theory allows to scrutinize important strategic effects of
these patterns, they can only partially be explained by existing models so far. The proposed
exemplary models for climate clubs and city alliances show that economic analysis can contrib-
ute to understanding these new forms of cooperation. The models indicate that climate clubs
and city alliances may indeed improve over the situation with a single IEA consisting of nation
states. As these proposed models are simple examples that mainly have expository character,
the results have to be taken with caution and cannot provide sophisticated policy advice. The
main conclusion from these modeling exercises is that it is possible and worthwhile to consider
recent and new actors and coalitions in the game theoretical reasoning on IEAs. The proposed
model structures may serve as a starting point for further modeling work. However, it is im-
portant to note, that the question of legitimacy of environmental agreements is increasingly
difficult to answer if actors other than national governments have increasing importance in the
negotiations.
Building on the proposed model structure from the previous chapter, the idea of cli-
mate clubs is explored more generally in Chapter 3 by analyzing multiple parallel IEAs. The
results show that the possible effects of allowing for multiple coalitions depend on qualitative
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properties of the functions of benefits and damages from emissions. For decreasing marginal
benefits and constant marginal damages, multiple coalitions increase the number of cooperating
countries and reduces global emissions in comparison to a single IEA. In contrast, for increas-
ing marginal damages and constant marginal benefits from emissions, the global amount of
emissions is independent of the number of admitted coalitions. If both damages and benefits
from emissions are non-linear, multiple coalitions can reduce global emissions below the level
that can be achieved by a single coalition. Although admitting multiple coalitions does not al-
ways improve cooperation, they are not detrimental. This implies that the idea of climate clubs
deserves more analytical attention and might be a promising avenue for international climate
policies.
The decisions of national governments that do not only maximize welfare but are also
influenced by lobby groups are in the focus of Chapter 4. The influence of lobby groups from
the industry and environmentalists is shown to have effects on both the emission reductions
of countries and the incentives to participate in an IEA. The influence of industry and envir-
onmental influence groups is quite intuitive as industrial contributions reduce emissions abate-
ment and contributions from environmental lobbies lead to more ambitious reduction targets.
Interestingly, green lobby groups in countries that are members of the IEA have effects on
the decisions of all other member countries, whereas industry lobbies only influence their host
countries decisions. This is due to the fact that damages from emissions occur on a global scale
and environmental lobby groups seek to reduce these damages whereas the costs of emissions
reduction, which industry lobby groups seek to avoid, occur only in the host country. The ef-
fects on coalition stability are more ambiguous and depend on the distribution of lobby activities
across countries. Both, industry and environmental lobbies, can have a stabilizing effect on an
IEA. These results qualify previous findings by Marchiori et al. (2017) that find a stabilizing
effect for symmetric countries which is consistent with the findings of this thesis. However,
the results additionally show that if countries are sufficiently asymmetric in their benefits from
abatement industry contributions have a destabilizing effect. It can thus be concluded that lobby
contributions have an important effect on both emissions reductions and coalition stability, with
the latter being often not straightforward, depending on the composition of asymmetric coun-
tries in an IEA. This is important to note because countries in the climate negotiations are far
from being symmetric in reality. The results imply that lobbyism should not be neglected in
considerations about climate cooperation, neither in policy making nor in the theoretical ana-
lysis.
Chapter 5 provides an assessment of import tariffs as a means to stabilize climate co-
alitions. This policy measure has gained increasing attention with the papers by Lessmann
et al. (2009); Nordhaus (2015). These studies have found that import tariffs can effectively
foster international cooperation but rely on the assumption, that outsiders of an IEA are not
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able to retaliate if they are targeted by trade sanctions. In contrast to that, Chapter 5 explicitly
considers the case of retaliation by outsiders by analyzing three policy regimes for the form-
ation of an IEA: a regime without trade sanctions, a regime with trade sanctions in the form
of uniform import tariffs used by coalition members against outsiders and a regime in which
outsiders retaliate against these trade sanctions by using uniform import tariffs themselves. This
is firstly done in an analytical model that confirms the established finding that trade sanctions
without the possibility to retaliate might stabilize coalitions. However, if outsiders can retaliate,
this results in a threshold effect: Above a certain coalition size, the stabilizing effect of trade
sanctions enables larger coalitions whereas in coalitions below that coalition size the effect of
retaliatory trade measures predominates and destabilizes the coalition. In a multi-region, multi-
sector CGE model the analytical results are quantified. The quantitative results show that the
threshold coalition size in the scenarios with trade sanctions and retaliation is well above 50%
of world GDP across all assumptions about the global social cost of carbon. Trade sanctions
as an effective stick to stabilize climate coalitions are therefore less attractive if the possibility
of retaliation is taken into account. Only if substantial coalitions of countries that cover more
than half of the global GDP have already formed they may help to establish the grand coalition.
This is an important finding for international policy-making that currently has to deal with an
increasing risk of trade wars with involvement of the US as an outsider of the climate coalition.
If a climate coalition of insufficient size tries to force outsider countries to join and these react
with retaliatory measures, this can destabilize existing coalitions or even destroy cooperation
and lead to the non-cooperative outcome.
Finally, Chapter 6 revisits prominent recent findings from the IEA-Literature and ex-
plores potential insights that they can provide for climate adaptation in the presence of cross-
boundary spillovers. The chapter finds that if adaptation measures contribute to the supply of a
public good, these measures tend to be underprovided. The case of eutrophication in the Baltic
Sea as a prominent example serves to discuss the role of multiple coalitions, side-payments,
issue-linkage and trade sanctions for transnational adaptation. Whereas the potential of mul-
tiple coalitions, side payments and issue-linkage appears to be promising also for transnational
adaptation, trade sanctions seem to be the least applicable approach. However, although the
similarities between mitigation and transnational adaptation are present with regard to the gen-
eral problem structure, concrete policy advice should preferably be derived from research that
analyzes the concrete problems in greater detail. The more general work in Chapter 6 rather
implies that insights from this thesis, like other results from the IEA-literature can help to find
solutions to problems beyond the realm of climate mitigation as it is shown for the example of
transnational adaptation.
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7.2 Limitations and Outlook
With regard to the analytical game theoretical work conducted in this thesis some gen-
eral limitations should be noted. Like all mathematical models, the game theoretical models
in this thesis represent reality by simplification. This allows to focus the analysis on important
strategic interactions but excludes many other aspects of the problems at hand. In reality these
elements that are neglected in the models may play an important role and should thus be in-
cluded in considerations about context specific policy measures. For such considerations, the
analysis and results of this thesis can well be complemented by research from related fields such
as political sciences, climate sciences and law, as it is partially discussed in Chapters 2 and 6.
Other more specific limitations apply to different chapters of this thesis and could in some cases
motivate further research.
While the results of Chapter 3 are quite general in the cases of either constant marginal
damages or constant marginal benefits from emissions, the fact that the results for the case of
both non-linear benefits and damages rely on numerical examples implies that the results in
this case should be interpreted with caution, as it is not clear if the positive effect of climate
clubs always holds in such cases. Further economic research in the area of climate clubs could
provide insights about combining the idea of multiple coalitions with issue-linkage, as it is
proposed by e.g. Weischer et al. (2012) and Widerberg and Stenson (2013). Other interesting
questions for future research on the topic include the role of intra- and intercoalitional transfer
schemes (c.f. Barrett, 2001; Fuentes-Albero and Rubio, 2010) and different sequences of the
emissions game with some coalitions acting as Stackelberg leaders and moving before others.
As the theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 does not include empirical data, calibrated quantitative
simulations of theses strategic effects are a possible field for further research. The required chal-
lenging quantification of lobby influences on governmental decisions on the formation of IEAs
could possibly draw on empirical work by Fredriksson et al. (2007). In contrast to Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 includes a quantification of the analytical results. The important threshold for a min-
imum coalition size in which trade sanctions can help to stabilize climate agreements is found
to be above 50% of world GDP. Such a threshold motivates further research that could ex-
plore the applicability of minimum participation rules for the use of trade sanctions in climate
agreements. This would connect the work in Chapter 5 with previous literature on minimum
participation rules in IEAs (e.g. Weikard et al., 2015; Carraro et al., 2009; Harstad, 2006; Rutz,
2001). The quite general work in Chapter 6 can serve as a starting point for further research
that could develop more detailed models for problems like transnational adaptation that are
related to the IEA literature by building on advances in coalition theory that have been made
with a focus on mitigation. Similarities and differences in the details of the structures of the
problems might be important for the design of policy measures so that a translation of findings
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from the IEA literature to other fields of international cooperation requires careful analytical
consideration. The first findings in this thesis indicate that it may be worth the effort.
In a changing global climate regime the search for new avenues of cooperation is crucial
for effective climate policies. However, the established economic literature on IEAs has only
sparsely payed attention to such approaches. This thesis provides an attempt to enrich game
theoretic analysis of environmental cooperation and incorporate findings from the global gov-
ernance literature and consider the political economy and the trade regime. The results imply
that it is worthwhile to broaden the scope of analysis in these directions as this may indeed
help to find viable options to increase cooperation. Climate policies increasingly consider new
strategies beyond nation-state actors and economics should be prepared to provide strategical
advice.
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